SWEDISH SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC IDEOLOGY AND ELECTORAL POLITICS 1944–1948

Diane Sainsbury

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A Study of the Functions of Party Ideology

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Abstract

The major part of this study addresses itself to two basic questions: What role does ideology play in electoral politics? What effects does electoral politics have on ideology? Chapter 1 discusses definitional and methodological problems and specifies the aims and limits of the empirical analysis. It recommends a functional approach in studying party ideology which focuses on tasks and uses. Chapter 2 deals with the ideological heritage of the Swedish Social Democrats and party ideology in the 1940s. Chapters 3–5 examine three elections in the mid-1940s and the role of ideological statements in Social Democratic campaign propaganda. Three fairly distinct strategies emerge, and the pattern of the tasks and uses of ideological statements in each election is described. Chapter 6 sums up the role of prominent ideological themes in the three elections in terms of tasks and uses. The final chapter attempts to gauge the impact of electoral politics on ideology by analyzing how the tactical uses of ideological statements can shape ideological content and guidelines for action. The analysis shows, firstly, that modifications and persistent elements in ideological content can be explained by tactical uses, thus suggesting that the effects of tactical functions on ideological content may furnish a valuable perspective in understanding aspects of the revision process of party ideology. Secondly, tactical functions can have important repercussions for prescriptions and guidelines for action.

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CONTENTS

Introduction 4

Part I Ideology 7

Chapter 1 Ideology and Its Functions 7

1 Party Ideology and a Functional Approach to the Study of Party Ideologies 10

2 Aims and Scope of the Empirical Analysis 13

Chapter 2 Party Ideology of the 1940s and Its Historical Roots 21

1 The Ideological Heritage 22

2 Party Ideology of the 1940s 33

Part II Electoral Politics and the Role of Ideology 44

Chapter 3 The 1944 Election 48

1 The Political Situation 48

2 Basic Features of the Rival Parties' Campaigns 52

3 Social Democratic Election Propaganda and Ideological Statements 58

Chapter 4 The 1946 Election 82

1 The Political Situation 82

2 Basic Features of the Rival Parties' Campaigns 87

3 Social Democratic Election Propaganda and Ideological Statements 94

Chapter 5 The 1948 Election 116

1 The Political Situation 116

2 Basic Features of the Rival Parties' Campaigns 121

3 Social Democratic Election Propaganda and Ideological Statements 129

Chapter 6 The Role of Prominent Ideological Themes in the Elections: A Summary 151

Part III The Impact on Ideology 161

Chapter 7 Ideological Content and Tactical Uses 161

1.1 Modifications and Similarities in the Ideological Content of the Programs and Campaign Statements 161

1.2 Explaining Modifications and Similarities 171

2 Changes in Guidelines for Action 176

3 Long-Range Implications 178

4 Concluding Comments 181

Introduction[1)]

This book bisects two separate areas in the study of politics: the analysis of political ideas and ideology and, secondly, electoral research. Its major focus is on the interaction between ideology and electoral politics. This interaction is elucidated first by analyzing the role ideology plays in electoral politics - or more specifically the role of ideological statements in election propaganda. Subsequently the interaction is examined in terms of the impact on ideology. Expressed most simply, a large portion of this book seeks to shed light on two questions: 1) What role does ideology play in electoral politics? 2) What effects does electoral politics have on ideology?

Although elucidating this interaction process involves an analysis of both ideology and electoral politics, my prime concern lies with ideology. Accordingly, the first chapter discusses how ideology is defined and utilized in this study. The discussion is not intended as an exhaustive presentation of the concept but as a clarification, including suggestions about which aspects of the concept might be more fruitfully developed. Chapter 1 recommends a functional approach to the study of ideology, which focuses on the tasks and uses of ideology. In proposing a functional approach, I examine the functions generally attributed to ideology in the literature and argue that they provide an interesting perspective for the empirical analysis of ideologies. Most of the discussion concerning the functions of ideology has been on a very general plane and has occurred in theoretical works. As far as I know, there has been little attempt to utilize the functions dealt with in the theoretical literature as the basis of an empirical analysis of a specific ideology or ideologies. Instead most analyses of specific ideologies have adopted a thematic approach and describe the ideas making up an ideology. To the extent that functions have been dealt with, it has often been either in an implicit fashion or the discussion has been a by-product - an appendage to the analysis of the content. In other words, a functional approach provides a valuable *complement* to the present emphasis on analyzing the content of ideologies - or what might be termed an ideas-for-the-sake-of-ideas approach. Furthermore, and particularly important, the suggested approach allows for a consideration of several functions of ideology and the dynamics of functions and content.

The second chapter deals with the ideological heritage of the Swedish Social Democrats and party ideology of the 1940s. It sketches the broad contours of the party's ideology and some major shifts as primarily reflected in programmatic statements, and it is conceived as a preface to the

major empirical analysis of the book. In large measure this chapter seeks to fill a vacuum. It is an effort to avoid the danger of the book being misleading for the English-speaking reader with little previous knowledge of Sweden or Swedish Social Democratic thought. Secondly, the major study available in English on Swedish Social Democratic ideology - Herbert Tingsten's The Swedish Social Democrats (Den svenska socialdemokratins idéutveckling) - needs to be supplemented.[2] Although Tingstens's analysis is brilliant in several respects, it tells only part of the story. His study primarily traces the disintegration of Marxist elements in the ideology of the Swedish Social Democrats. Tingsten's thesis is that Social Democratic ideology evolved from a form of Marxism into a "social welfare ideology", void of any socialist content, during the 1930s. In the Swedish literature this thesis has been criticized by Leif Lewin in Planhushållningsdebatten (The Debate on Planned Economy). He argues that within the Social Democratic party a "planned economy ideology" emerged in the 1930s, and that certain essential features of this ideology are directly traceable from its Marxist pedigree. Chapter 2 aims at rectifying the rather lop-sided picture in the English literature on the development of Swedish Social Democratic ideology, provided by Tingsten's work. The discussion incorporates aspects of both Tingsten's and Lewin's interpretations but also differs from their analyses on certain points and hopefully offers some fresh insights.

The next four chapters examine the role of Social Democratic ideology in the elections of the mid-1940s. This period was chosen for a number of reasons. First, it was a time of manifest changes in party ideologies in general. Second, several ideological questions dominated the public debate during this period, and the parties produced an exceptional number of ideological statements. Consequently the ideological profiles of the parties were set in sharper relief than usual. Thus it ought to be easier to get a handle on the role of ideological statements in electoral politics during these years than during a period of less ideological saliency. Third, many of the ideas and recommendations prominent in the mid-1940s, e.g. the strong emphasis on equalization and economic democracy, have regained political relevancy in Swedish politics from the late 1960s onwards.[3] In several respects the ideology of the 1940s is a crucial stepping-stone in understanding the current ideology's links with the past. Fourth, by selecting a period sufficiently in the past, it is possible to speculate on the long-range implications of electoral politics for ideology. A final reason for selecting this period is that the elections of the mid-1940s are of special interest. During these years the Social Democrats faced a very serious challenge to their staying power.

Chapters 3-5 each describe an election campaign and present a detailed analysis of the ideological statements in the Social Democrats' election propaganda. This analysis is based on the approach discussed in Chapter 1. Hence, besides dealing with the occurrence and content of ideological statements, it pays special attention to their functions in order to establish the role of ideological statements in electoral politics. The analysis does not, however, attempt to gauge the influence of ideological statements on voting behavior. Chapter 6 sums up the role of the key ideological themes in the three campaigns.

The seventh chapter looks at the other facet of the interaction between ideology and electoral politics: the effects on ideology. This is done by comparing the ideological content of campaign statements and the party's official ideology as embodied in its Programs. Subsequently I argue that the modifications and similarities in content are related to the role of ideology in elections. Modifications can be explained by the tactical uses of ideological statements in the campaigns. Moreover, in a long-term perspective some of the ideological modifications in the campaign statements have eventually been incorporated into the Party Program. This phenomenon suggests that the effects of the functions of ideology on content may provide a key to understanding aspects of the revision process of party ideology.

Notes

1 I am extremely grateful for perceptive criticisms and valuable suggestions from Olof Ruin, who has been my academic advisor, Elias Berg, Kjell Goldmann, Tomas Hammar, Svante Hansson, Barbara Haskel, Bee Kant, Timothy Tilton, Gunnar Wallin and Björn Wittrock.

2 Fortunately Tingsten's description of the Social Democrats' ideology is beginning to be challenged in English. See Timothy Tilton, "A Swedish Road to Socialism: Ernst Wigforss and the Ideological Foundations of Swedish Social Democracy", American Political Science Review, June, 1979, pp. 505-520. In contrast to the emphasis here, Tilton's discussion presents a rather static picture of the aims and instruments of Social Democracy. See also Walter Korpi, The Working Class in Welfare Capitalism (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978) pp. 76-90, esp. p. 78, p. 84.

3 For a discussion of the ideological renewal of the 1970s focusing on economic democracy, see John D. Stephens, The Transition from Capitalism to Socialism (London: Macmillan, 1979) pp. 177-194; Walter Korpi, op.cit., pp. 323-335; Andrew Martin, "Sweden: Industrial Democracy and Social Democratic Strategy" in G. David Garson (ed.), Worker Self-Management in Industry (New York: Praeger, 1977). For equalization, see Towards Equality (Stockholm: Prisma, 1971).

PART I

IDEOLOGY

Chapter 1 Ideology and Its Functions: From Theoretical Generalizations to Empirical Analysis

The study of ideology is hampered by many factors. Most basic is the muddled state of thinking on ideology. This is partially because ideology is a difficult concept to define - on a par with "power", "influence", "interest", "politics", etc. In one respect, however, defining ideology is even more difficult than coming to grips with most of these other concepts. The problem is not only what ideology denotes; it is further complicated by pejorative connotations. The derogatory overtones of ideology, particularly in American usage, are reflected in ideology being linked with dogms and extremism. Further, many nuances stem from the fact that the word has been used as a political weapon ever since the French Revolution; and today numerous connotations of ideology derive from the historical struggle between the left and the right. As a concept in political and social analysis, ideology has also had certain regrettable aspects. Primarily through the sociology of knowledge and Karl Mannheim, ideology has been closely associated with the social basis of knowledge. This has resulted, first, in a preoccupation with epistemological questions; and, secondly, ideology has been equated with camouflaging interests and with the distortion of rational thought. Conceptual clarity has also been obscured by an unending multiplication of meanings, as the concept is redefined and applied in a growing number of contexts. Generally, this multiplication has occurred imperceptibly, without taking stock of its implications. Nor has the end of ideology debate contributed much to a better understanding of ideology. In fact, it has been persuasively argued that the debate has confused several definitional issues involving ideology.[1)]

After these disheartening observations, the question of the utility of ideology as a concept in political analysis arises: what are the merits of ideology as a concept? It seems to me that one of the most fruitful aspects of the concept of ideology has been to focus attention on the political functions of ideas and values, and that if the concept is to be used in a meaningful way, an attempt ought to be made to clarify and expand this aspect. However before discussing the functions attributed to ideology, it is advisable to indicate at least generally what is meant by ideology in this study.

The essential point of this preliminary definition and the subsequent operationalization of the term in the later chapters is the normative nature and subject matter of the ideas making up an ideology. Most generally, ideology

is defined as a body of normative or normative-related ideas about the nature of man and society as well as the organization and purposes of society. Normative ideas contain or imply a prescription or an "ought"; they specify what is desirable or preferable, what is good and bad. It is normative ideas, in the sense of stipulating "oughts" and moral goodness, which form the core of ideology. Without the ethical, evaluative component there is no ideology.

But ideology is not just notions of how things ought to be but also of how things are. Prescriptions are based on both conceptions of what is desirable and views of reality. Specific ideologies offer many examples of the central importance of factual assertions and theories of reality. The notion that individuals act in self-interest is a crucial underpinning of liberalism. Similarly, the theory of the impoverishment of the working class reinforced the prescription of revolution in Marxism. Theories of reality may also be shaped by normative ideas. In short, ideology includes factual assertions and theories of reality which are normative-related; that is, they are either crucial to prescriptions or they are influenced by ethical concerns and values.[2)]

Several functions have been ascribed to ideology. Four of the functions most often encountered in the literature of political science and sociology can be categorized as action-orientation, legitimation, unification or integration, and most recently mobilization. These functions in themselves appear to offer interesting perspectives in analyzing ideologies. They also possess the virtue of having a bearing on fundamental concerns of political science: the significance of ideas and values in motivating and inhibiting political action, in contributing to political legitimacy and authority, and in generating consensus and conflict as well as support and defection.

In the literature, ideology has been assumed to affect action in a variety of ways. Initially, it was loosely postulated that the ideology of the non-rulers, or utopian thinking as labelled by Karl Mannheim, contained a sort of automatic "will to action" in the unconscious desire to change and rectify the existing state of affairs, and Mannheim maintained that utopian thinking served as a "direction for action".[3)] What is essential in Mannheim's conception and its subsequent elaborations is that action-orientation is regarded as being determined by the political position of the group espousing the ideology. Behavioralism and the decision-making approach have tended to reinforce and amplify the importance assigned to ideology as a determinant of action in a different way. Ideology is viewed as a part of the actor's motivational matrix which influences his definitions of situations, goal orientations and thus his selection of alternative courses of action.[4)] Descriptions of ideology have also implicitly and explicitly dealt with

ideology as a restraining factor on behavior. Mannheim referred to what may be termed the virtual blind-spots of an ideology; he pointed out that the ruling groups "are simply no longer able to see certain facts which would undermine their sense of dominaton".[5] Transposed to the decision-making framework, ideology may block awareness of problems, affecting definitions of the situation. Additionally ideology may preclude certain solutions of courses of action in two ways. First, the goals embodied in an ideology may set limits; and secondly, an ideology's prescriptions about what means are appropriate or inappropriate to achieve ends may act as a constraint.[6] The shared values of an ideology may also impose a restraint inasmuch as leaders cannot flagrantly violate these values without possibly risking their position.[7]

Various writers have stressed legitimation as a function of ideology. Legitimacy is commonly described as the quality of "rightness", of what is "right and proper", of "moral goodness". With regard to ideology, two bases of legitimacy seem particularly relevant. Legitimacy of the exercise of power may flow from it being performed according to rules and procedural norms, to certain prescriptions about the conduct of government and how power is to be exercised. Or legitimacy may be derived from goals or purposes; the exercise of power to attain a certain end is deemed legitimate or proper.[8] Legitimation tends to be defined as a process, but definitions frequently highlight one of two distinct but interrelated facets of the process: 1) the process by which leaders convert influence or power into authority by endowing their position and/or policy with legitimacy[9] and 2) the acceptance of the exercise of power because it is in accord with the individual's values.[10] The normative content of ideology - goals and prescriptions of how to attain goals - is the very stuff of legitimation and can be regarded as a link between these two facets of the legitimation process.

Integration has been emphasized as a key aspect of ideology by Talcott Parsons. He describes ideology as "a system of ideas which is oriented to the evaluative integration of the collectivity, by interpretation of the empirical nature of the collectivity and of the situation in which it is placed, the processes by which it has developed to its given state, the goals to which its members are collectively oriented, and their relation to future course of events." It is further noted that "to constitute an ideology there must exist...some level of evaluative commitment to the beliefs as an aspect of membership in the collectivity."[11] Although not entirely clear from these general statements, Parsons' conception is essentially social, and he specifies that he is dealing with "social ideologies". He refers, for example, to the ideology of the scientific community and the ideology of juvenile

delinquents. Parsons' emphasis on the integrative element of ideology has found expression in the thinking of political scientists; it has also been modified so that unification shades into political mobilization. Particularly with the emergence of the new nations and the importance of integration in nation-building, the unification function of ideology has gained new relevance. On the other hand, Carl J. Friedrich has objected to the broadness of Parsons' view, arguing that ideology ought to be limited to a "set of ideas which unites a party or other group for effective participation in political life".[12)]

The attention directed to the mobilization function of ideology has not only grown out of a modification of the integrative element. It has also been buttressed by the mounting emphasis on the legitimation function of ideology. Acceptance of the exercise of power because it coincides with one's values is equivalent to support. According to David Easton, the mobilizing potential of an ideology depends largely upon three factors: 1) the content of the ideology, its capacity to elicit a response from the population, 2) the distribution of belief systems within a population 3) the extent to which the exercise of power is perceived to be in accordance with the ideology.[13)] A fourth factor is the skill of political leaders in utilizing an ideology to mobilize support.

Lastly, in the theoretical discussion of the functions of ideology, a distinction has been made between instrumental and expressive functions. According to one variant, the instrumental function of ideology has been related primarily to action-orientation. It is said to involve the formulation of goals and selection of means - and to guide political decisions. The expressive function, apparently inspired by Parsons' early terminology, basically corresponds to integration and legitimation.[14)]

1.1. Party Ideology and a Functional Approach to the Study of Party Ideologies

The particular focus of this book is on party ideology. The earlier general definition of ideology can now be made more specific. Party ideology is defined as a body of ideas - espoused by a party - concerned with 1) evaluating society 2) proclaiming fundamental goals, ideals and principles about the nature of the good society 3) stating the ways of achieving them. Moreover, party ideology here has been further delimited by introducing the notion, borrowed from the literature, of a "verbalized ideology" comprised of ideological statements. Thus this study deals with a forensic ideology - with verbal behavior. It does not deal with latent ideology, i.e. the unarticulated belief systems of party members.[15)] Furthermore this study is confined to "institutionalized" statements of the ideology, i.e. those issued or endorsed by the party organization - its officers, congress or party board.

By a functional approach I mean one that concentrates on the functions or tasks ideology performs - and in particular investigates the tasks and uses of ideological statements in party activity. Hence, the functional approach proposed here is not based on theories of structural-functionalism nor on systems analysis - two approaches commonly associated with the term "functional".[16] It is also necessary to point out for Swedish readers that the term is employed here in a much narrower and specific sense than recently advanced by Evert Vedung. According to him, "functional analysis of ideas" refers to all causal and explanatory analyses of ideas, including decision-making analysis based on "rational" calculations.[17] As an initial step in presenting a functional approach to the study of party ideologies, generalizations about the functions attributed to ideology in the literature can be sharpened somewhat when applied to party ideologies. And in the next section, categories of analysis for investigating the functions are discussed.

To begin with, inadequacies in Mannheim's line of reasoning concerning action-orientation become apparent. Characteristic of Mannheim's view is a dichotomy between the ideology of non-rulers, which provides a direction for action, and the ideology of rulers, which is a conserving force tending to belittle or obscure the need of changes impinging upon the position and interests of rulers. That Mannheim's dichotomy contains a simplification is revealed when an ideology of the non-rulers becomes a reigning ideology and vice versa. Of course, modifications and adaptations occur under these conditions. But a former ideology of the non-rulers propounding change is not totally transformed into a conserving ideology when it becomes a reigning ideology. Nor does an ideology of the rulers, when they are ousted from power, necessarily become imbued with "utopian thinking".

In examining the action-orientation function of ideology, it seems more profitable to view action-orientation in terms of providing diagnosis and prescriptions for action for the party - and to analyze these elements. Briefly, diagnosis can be said to consist of identifying and defining the critical and decisive features of the present situation. Diagnosis usually also involves or implies explanations. These may range from an elaborate theory of history to rudimentary notions of cause and effect in human affairs. Although the word diagnosis may conjure up an image of being directed toward ills and problems, it is intended here to include both positive and negative assessments of the situation. Prescription consists of specifying goals and instruments for their attainment - and may focus on change or the status quo.

In the works of political scientists, the legitimation function has been largely treated at one level of analysis - the polity or nation-state. In other words, legitimation has been generally viewed as the function of reign-

ing ideologies, and frequently the legitimation function has been contrasted with the action-orientation function of non-rulers' ideologies. This distinction has tended to obfuscate the fact that the ideologies of non-rulers also perform a legitimizing function, although often at a different level of analysis. Party ideologies may serve a legitimation function both at the level of the organization and that of the polity.

Party ideologies can be said to promote integration to the extent that the ideals and vision of the good society set forth in the ideology are mutually regarded by party members and others as desirable goals to strive toward. Among party members the basic principles may be viewed as the *raison d'etre* of the party, and commitment to these principles may constitute the basis of membership in the party. At the level of the party organization, the integrative function of ideology enhances party unity. As in the case of legitimation, it is again useful to distinguish between levels of analysis. At the level of the body politic, the integrative function takes the form of aggregation or building consensus. Needless to say, what is integrative at one level can be divisive at another level.

The mobilization function of party ideologies is perhaps best viewed in connection with a basic strategic dilemma of the parties in maximizing support: the parties must retain the backing of core groups, while appealing to new groups. To retain the support of core groups, the parties often explain policies and proposals in traditional terms, i.e. collective beliefs are used to legitimize policy. Another aspect of party ideology employed to mobilize support is the use of ideological statements in pointing out differences between the parties and in underlining the distinctive nature of the party.[18] Furthermore traditional tenets may be employed to refute charges by the other parties or as counter-arguments. In appealing to new groups, the parties, on the other hand, tailor their ideologies to encompass the demands of an increasing number of voters. Basic, long-standing demands of the parties are presented as accommodating groups outside the party, and new demands may be put forward and incorporated in the party ideology in the hope of winning the support of additional groups. Finally, there may be a tendency to eliminate or modify programmatic statements which are used by the other parties as detrimental propaganda, impairing the party's appeal to certain groups. Or controversial programmatic demands, which are likely to alienate large sections, may be shunted into the background and held in abeyance for long periods of time.

Just as certain inadequacies in the theoretical discussion of the functions of ideology become apparent when applied to party ideologies, difficulties concerning the distinction between instrumental and expressive

functions are magnified when one attempts to apply it to party ideology. In the first place, a major problem is that in the literature the distinction has been made in highly dissimilar, even conflicting ways. Some writers view action-orientation as instrumental, while others categorize it as expressive. Matters are further complicated by the fact that the terms instrumental and expressive have been given various meanings. For example, expressive has been used in the sense of pertaining to emotions. Elsewhere it is defined as communication.[19] In short, the most prudent course is to avoid the terms instrumental and expressive in making distinctions about the functions of ideology.

Here a distinction is made between what might be called the intellectual and tactical functions of party ideology.[20] The intellectual function of ideology refers to the tasks of diagnosis and prescription and thus is synonymous with action-orientation. The tactical functions of party ideology are legitimation, integration and mobilization; and they are intimately bound up with the party's general goal of gaining and maintaining power - or more specifically, the strategic goals of maximizing votes and party cohesion.[21] This distinction is important to one of the main aims of the empirical analysis, which will be made clear in the next section.

1.2 Aims and Scope of the Empirical Analysis

So far this chapter has discussed the notions of ideology and functions on a general plane and more specifically with regard to party ideology. This section deals with the limits and aims of the empirical analysis in Chapters 3-7. It outlines a procedure for analyzing the functions of party ideology, and states how "ideology" has been operationalized.

This study of the functions of party ideology is confined to one major area of party activity - election campaigns - and thus to the tasks and uses of ideological statements in election propaganda. As a result, it focuses on three of the functions discussed above: action-orientation, legitimation, and mobilization of support. Integration at the party level is probably best investigated by examining the internal arena (the party debate, proceedings of the party congress and other organs, party educational activities, etc) rather than the electoral arena. Furthermore, key aspects of integration can be subsumed under mobilization of support. Thus integration at the polity level in the form of aggregating groups of voters and integration at the party level - getting core groups, party activists and sympathizers, to rally around the party - are analyzed as facets of mobilization of support in the subsequent chapters.

Moreover, as brought out in the Introduction, the analysis concentrates

on a short span of time - a four-year period characterized by pronounced ideological saliency. Such a period was chosen because it was believed that the tasks and uses of ideological statements would emerge more clearly and thus facilitate the investigation.

The main aim of the empirical analysis in Part II of this book is to answer the question of what role ideology plays in elections by 1) examining what ideological statements are contained in election propaganda and 2) analyzing their functions in terms of tasks and uses. A basic question in this connection is how and to what extent the functions of action-orientation, legitimation and mobilization of support can be gauged in statements.

The analysis of action-orientation is a much easier proposition when an investigation of the relationship between ideology and specific actions is put aside - and action-orientation is conceived of as articulated diagnosis and prescriptions. Then the focal point of inquiry becomes the extent to which diagnosis and prescriptions are contained in statements as well as their nature. This entails an examination of definitions of the situation, including possible explanations of the existing state of affairs; expressed aspirations and goal formulations; the designation of instruments for their attainment, recommended courses of action.

Certain aspects of legitimation can be fairly easily elucidated through an analysis of statements. One facet of the legitimation process - leaders seeking to endow their policies and proposals with legitimacy by declaring them to be in accord with values and goals - is especially well suited for an analysis of verbal behavior. This involves an inquiry into the types of arguments and justifications for policies and proposals put forward by the party leadership, and particularly the occurrence and frequency of leaders drawing on the party ideology.

Facets of the mobilization function are also quite amenable to analysis through a study of verbal behavior. As indicated in the comments on the parties' basic dilemma in maximizing support, one aspect of the mobilization function is intimately bound up with the legitimation function, i.e. employing party beliefs to justify policy and proposals in retaining the support of core groups. Of further significance are declarations which delineate the unique character of the party and demarcate differences between the parties. Other types of noteworthy statements are those defending the party as well as counter-arguments. Attention also ought to be directed to messages to groups and how party policies, goals and values are presented as satisfying or articulating group interests as well as explanations of mutual concerns of groups.

In summary, the following types of statements are particularly important in shedding light on the functions of ideology:

1) definitions and explanations of the situation
2) goal formulations, demands and recommendations
3) arguments and justifications
4) statements about party differences
5) statements defending the party and counter-arguments
6) statements articulating and aggregating group interests.

In analyzing the functions of ideological statements in the election propaganda, categories based on these types of statements have been utilized (see Figure 1), and the empirical analysis concentrates on the tasks and uses indicated by these types of statements. However, with regard to action-orientation little attention has been given to diagnosis; and in the analysis of election propaganda, definitions and explanations of the situation have not been utilized as a category of analysis. Instead major concern has been directed to prescriptions and guidelines for action in the empirical analysis. It should also be noted, as evident from Figure 1, that these categories are relevant in analyzing more than one function. Furthermore an ideological statement may have several tasks or uses.

The utilization of the categories in empirically determining functions can be illustrated. In the 1946 election economic democracy was the single, most important ideological theme. What were its tasks and uses? That is, what kinds of statements in terms of the above categories were made about economic democracy in the election propaganda? Was economic democracy put forward as a goal backed up by specific recommendations for its realization? Did the statements have an explicit action-orientation function? Were party policies justified as furthering economic democracy? Did the statements have a legitimation function? Was economic democracy fashioned a party difference or an aspiration unique to the Social Democrats? Was it presented as accommodating the interests of groups of voters? Did the statements have a mobilization function and specifically in what way?

These comments indicate how the categories can be applied in analyzing the functions of ideological statements but they say little about the limits of an analysis of verbal behavior. Such an analysis is a necessary, initial step in investigating the functions of ideology; and the categories of analysis are valuable in identifying the functions - the tasks and uses - of ideological statements and thus elucidating their role, which is the major purpose here. The analysis is less informative about the objective consequences of ideological statements, i.e. how successfully the tasks were performed. It is neither my intention nor feasible on the basis of an analysis of verbal behavior alone to draw solid conclusions about whether declared guidelines for action actually guided policy decisions or whether statements legitimizing

Figure 1. Key Terms and Categories of Analysis - A Schematic Presentation



party policy and actions resulted in legitimacy, etc.

A crucial problem in the analysis of Social Democratic ideological statements in the election propaganda is that of distinguishing ideological from non-ideological statements. Several definitions of ideology designate a particular function or functions as the quintessence and distinctive quality of ideology. However, in an empirical analysis of verbal behavior in the electoral arena, the functions attributed to ideology cannot be used to distinguish ideological from non-ideological statements because these functions are not unique to ideology. Non-ideological statements in the election campaigns can fulfill the same functions. Take the example of polemic statements. Much name calling and criticism of rival parties are not of an ideological nature but they mobilize support. Nor are all policy justifications necessarily ideological.

Instead the basic criterion of the operationalization of ideological statements has been subject matter and, as clarified above, the functions of these statements are the object of empirical inquiry. Earlier, party ideology was said to be comprised of 1) the party's fundamental aims, ideals and principles having a bearing on the nature of the good society 2) the means of attaining the desired state of affairs and 3) an evaluation of the existing society. In the later chapters dealing with the election campaigns, ideological statements have generally been identified in the following way: if the subject matter of a statement contains parallels in terms of aims and ideals, means and the assessment of society laid down in the cardinal documents of the party's official ideology in the 1940s, it has been classified as ideological. The procedure can be made clearer by a couple of illustrations. For example, a fundamental aim of the party set forth in the 1944 Party Program was economic democracy, and a planned economy was envisioned as a prime instrument for attaining the good society. Accordingly, statements mentioning or dealing with economic democracy and a planned economy have been identified as ideological statements. This operationalization raises questions about the content of Social Democratic ideology during the 1940s, and its main features are analyzed in the next chapter.

Since this is a study of an "institutionalized" party ideology, the bulk of the source material consists of official election propaganda, i.e. campaign literature listed as the party's official propaganda (in the annual report of the party board) and distributed by national headquarters on behalf of the party board. Most official election propaganda was produced by national headquarters. However, campaign literature listed as official propaganda was also issued by the Swedish Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) and auxiliary organizations of the party - the Young Socialists' League (SSU), the Social

Democratic Women's Federation (SSKF) and the Christian Social Democratic Association (SKSF).[22)]

In general, the source material includes the election platforms, posters, flyers and various types of handouts, leaflets and brochures, the election issues of party magazines, and publications and collections of arguments sent out to election workers. An extensive advertisement campaign in the weekly press during the 1944 election has also been analyzed. The major debates between the parties and special programs on the radio during the 1946 and 1948 elections as well as the Royal Library's collections of regional election propaganda have been used as complementary sources of information. Campaign speeches of leading party politicians have not been included unless they have been published by national headquarters. Neither newspaper editorials nor the daily press have been consulted.

In an analysis of party ideology and electoral politics, a reasonable assumption is that the tactical uses of ideological statements will come to the fore. This assumption points to a basic query: What are the effects of tactical uses on ideological content? In Part III the prime aim of the empirical analysis is to investigate the impact of tactical uses on ideological content and guidelines for action. To a large degree, then, the effects of electoral politics on ideology are gauged by attempting to establish the impact of tactical uses of ideological statements in election propaganda on ideological content.

More specifically, Chapter 7 addresses itself to three dimensions of the possible impact on ideology. First, what kinds of modifications in ideological content occurred in the election propaganda? What elements were reinforced? And to what extent can the modifications and similarities in ideological content be explained by tactical uses? Second, how have guidelines for action been affected by tactical uses? That is, what were the implications for the intellectual function of ideology? Third, what were the long-range effects on the content of the party's official ideology as embodied in the Party Program?

Before turning to the analysis of ideology and electoral politics, however, Chapter 2 discusses party ideology in the 1940s and the ideological heritage shaping it.

Notes

1 Concerning the end of ideology debate, see e.g. Martin Seliger, Ideology and Politics (London: Allen & Unwin, 1976) pp. 25-67 and Leif Lewin, Planhushållningsdebatten (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1967) pp. 504-511, pp. 536-541.

2 See e.g. Stefan Björklund, Politisk teori (Stockholm: Aldus/Bonniers, 1968) p. 16; Herbert Tingsten, Idékritik (Stockholm: Bonniers, 1941) pp. 12-25; William E. Connolly, Political Science and Ideology (New York:Atherton Press, 1967).

3 Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (New York: Harvest Books, 1962) p, 40.

4 Cf. Julius Gould's definition of ideology in the Dictionary of the Social Sciences (New York: Free Press, 1964) and Talcott Parsons, The Social System (London: Tavistock, 1952) pp. 348-58.

5 Karl Mannheim, op.cit., p. 40.

6 Cf. Talcott Parsons, "Role of Ideas in Social Action", Essays in Sociological Theory (New York: Free Press, 1954) p. 30.

7 Cf. Robert Dahl, Modern Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1963) pp. 20-21.

8 Cf. Samuel H. Beer et. al., Patterns of Government (New York: Random House, 1958) pp. 12-18.

9 Cf. Robert Dahl, op.cit., pp. 19-20.

10 Cf. Amatai Etzioni, Modern Organizations (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall,1964) p. 51.

11 Talcott Parsons, The Social System, p. 349.

12 Carl J. Friedrich, Man and his Government (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963) pp. 89-90.

13 David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: Wiley, 1965) pp. 293-297.

14 See e.g. Ibid., pp. 295-297; Ulf Himmelstrand, "Depoliticization and Political Involvement: A Theoretical and Empirical Approach" in Erik Allardt and Stein Rokkan (eds.), Mass Politics (New York: Free Press, 1970) pp. 72-74; Olavi Borg, "Basic Dimensions of Finnish Party Ideologies:A Factor Analytical Study", Scandinavian Political Studies, 1966, Vol. 1, pp. 95-96.

15 See e.g. Arne Naess, Democracy, Ideology and Objectivity (Oslo: University Press, 1956) pp. 181-183; David Easton, op.cit., pp. 280-290. For the distinction between forensic and latent ideologies, see Robert Lane, Political Ideology (New York: Free Press, 1962) p. 16.

16 The literature dealing with functionalism and the concept of function in the social sciences is voluminous. In part this is due to the controversy and ambiguities afflicting functionalism as a methodology and function as a concept. My discussion, it may be argued, brushes too lightly over the difficulties in employing function as an analytical tool. Rather than offer a lengthy discourse on the pros and cons of the concept, I have attempted to clarify certain aspects of the discussion on the functions of ideology as they pertain to party ideology and suggest a procedure for analyzing these functions with the hope that the insights provided by the analysis may be regarded as outweighing the drawbacks connected with the concept. In other words, I rest my case for using a functional approach upon the empirical findings in the later chapters

rather than upon the theoretical strengths or weaknesses of the concept of function. Finally in the prolific literature, three contributions may be mentioned as particularly meriting attention. Robert Merton, "Manifest and Latent Functions", Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe: Free Press, 1968) pp. 73-155; Carl G. Hempel, "The Logic of Functional Analysis", in Llewellyn Gross (ed.), Symposium on Sociological Theory (Evanston, Illinois: Row, Peterson, 1959) pp. 271-307; Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961) pp. 520-535.

17 Evert Vedung, Det rationella politiska samtalet (Stockholm: Aldus/Bonniers, 1977) pp. 15-22, pp. 26-29.

18 Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper & Row, 1957) pp. 97-100.

19 In particular, cf. Ulf Himmelstrand, op.cit., pp. 72-74 and David Easton, op.cit., pp. 295-297. See also Olavi Borg, op.cit., pp. 95-96; Katarina Brodin, Studiet av utrikespolitiska doktriner (Stockholm, 1977) p. 29; Harald Hamrin, Between Bolshevism and Revisionism (Stockholm: Scandinavian University Books, 1975) pp. 19-20.

20 I am indebted to Barbara Haskel for her suggestions concerning this distinction.

21 For a discussion of the strategic goals of parties in a multiparty system, see Gunnar Sjöblom, Party Strategies in a Multiparty System (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1968) pp. 73-74. His discussion also includes maximization of parliamentary influence, which he regards as distinctive for multiparty systems. However, this strategic goal has no direct relevance for this study.

22 Socialdemokratiska partistyrelsen, berättelse för år 1944, pp. 11-30; berättelse för år 1946, pp. 29-44; berättelse för år 1948, pp. 14-29.

Chapter 2 Party Ideology of the 1940s and Its Historical Roots

In the early 1940s the ideological heritage of the Swedish Social Democrats was a mixture of Marxist thought, reformism, strands of guild socialism, and a self-devised variant of Keynesian economic theory infusing the party's notion of economic planning. These elements, in varying degrees, were reflected in the 1944 Party Program and The Postwar Program of Swedish Labor, which were the major official statements of party ideology during the 1940s. The Party Program also encapsulated, at a particular point in time, the evolution of Social Democratic ideology.

One dominant feature in the evolution of the party's ideology has been the successive modification and jettison of several Marxist tenets, and the concurrent ascendancy of other aspects of the party's ideological tradition as well as the incorporation of new elements. Another prominent trend has been the multiplication of ideologically sanctioned instruments for attaining the good society. In the process, socialization - in the sense of public ownership - has declined as an indispensable means and been superseded by various forms of state intervention and reforms. As manifested in program revisions, this process proceeded slowly. In fact there has generally been a lag in the party programs incorporating reformist elements compared to the growing role of reformism in the day-to-day politics of the party. Likewise the programs have been slow to admit the diminishing importance of socialization.

Less pronounced shifts have concerned Social Democratic conceptions of the good society. Aspirations and values, such as a classless society, greater equality, freedom, economic democracy, have tended to be of an enduring nature, although through the decades the weight and substance of these aspirations have obviously not remained wholly unaltered. The critical assessment of capitalism has also been a steadfast feature, but shifts have occurred in the focus of this criticism.

The first section of this chapter presents the broad outlines of this process of evolution,[1] as reflected in the program revisions and the experiences of the 1920s and 1930s,[2] in order to put the party's ideology of the 1940s in perspective. An examination of ideological traditions is especially warranted since the 1940s was a period of revitalization of radical thought within the Social Democratic party. This radicalization consisted of resurrecting certain elements of the party's ideological heritage, and a number of past demands were compounded. However, revived radical aspects were also combined with the more moderate tendencies of the 1930s, producing a curious mixture. The second part of this chapter clarifies the coexistence of these tendencies.

2.1 The Ideological Heritage

During the early years of the party, Marxist thought exerted a prime influence on the ideology of the Swedish Social Democrats.[3] Their first official program - adopted in 1897 nearly a decade after the party's founding and modelled after the 1891 Erfurt Program of the German Social Democrats - largely reflected Marxist ideas, although revisionist and reformist tendencies can also be detected.

In its assessment of society, the 1897 Program condemned the private capitalist mode of production as the cause of the evils afflicting modern civilization. It further criticized the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few, the division of society into basically two classes - with intervening strata of decaying and emergent classes, and the reduction of the true producers to a class of propertyless wage workers whose dependence and oppression were due to their propertyless condition. The prescriptions contained in the General Principles of the Program* focused on the class struggle, socialization of the means of production, and a socialist production of commodities. The class struggle was described as trade union activity to seize as much as possible of the product of work in the form of wages, and the political organization of the working class to take possession of public power. With regard to socialization, the Program called for the gradual conversion of "the means of production - transportation, forests, mines, mills, machines, factories, the land - into community property". Planless production of goods was to be replaced by a socialist production corresponding to the needs of society. The stated goal of Social Democracy was to transform totally the economic organization of bourgeois society and bring about the social liberation of the working class.[4]

Compared to subsequent revisions, the 1897 Program maintained a holistic position on socialization in two respects. First, socialization was to be applied in an all-inclusive manner; no exceptions were made. Secondly, socialization was envisioned as bringing about a complete transformation of society. Compared to the Erfurt Program, however, the Swedish counterpart, as Tingsten notes, contained several modifications, and some were in a revisionist direction. Contrary to the Erfurt Program, the Swedish version promulgated the *gradualness* of socialization, stressed the importance of trade union activity,

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* The format of the Party Program, then as now, consisted of a statement of general principles and a political program with a number of specific demands. The demands in the Political Program also constituted prescriptions,and these were generally reforms to be implemented within the framework of the existing society.

and referred to the new emergent middle classes (thus contradicting Marx's theory of the disappearance of the middle class). Nor did the Swedish program mention the recurrent industrial crises of capitalism and their ever mounting intensity, the growing army of the unemployed, and the increasing impoverishment of the workers. Additional dissimilarities concerned two points in the Political Program, the upshot of which implied greater economic powers for government even within the framework of the capitalist system: 1) regulation of farmers' credit by the state and protection of small farmers against expropriation 2) expanded economic activities of the state and municipalities.[5)]

In the general ideological debate of the party during the 1890s, revisionist and reformist tendencies were more accentuated than in the 1897 Program. Already in the early 1890s reservations that social reforms would delay the coming crisis of capitalism were discarded. Instead reforms were seen as strengthening Social Democracy and the fighting spirit of the working class - and not blunting the intensity of class conflict.[6)] And during the first two decades of the twentieth century, much of the party's practical work concentrated on the introduction of universal suffrage and social legislation. To a great extent, socialization and socialism remained in the background until around 1915 when features of the wartime economy prompted a discussion on "war socialism". Major exceptions were the discussion and revision of the land question in 1905 and the program revision in 1911. The relatively uncommanding place of socialization and the emphasis on reforms - especially suffrage - are in part explained by the growing significance attributed to democracy as a prerequisite of socialism. As early as 1894 a party congress resolution had designated universal suffrage as "one of the most important means towards realization of the Social Democratic program in its entirety", thus implying the possibility of attaining socialism through the franchise. Moreover the partial victory represented by the suffrage reform of 1907 - 1909, which introduced manhood suffrage, enhanced the reformist approach. It also reinforced espousal of peaceful means of securing socialism and collaboration with bourgeois elements desiring reforms.[7)]

The first major revision of the Party Program occurred in 1911 - the same year as the first election after the enactment of the suffrage reform. The General Principles of the revised program failed to incorporate the growing predominance of the reformist line as evidenced in the day-to-day politics of the party.[8)] That is to say, the General Principles did not acknowledge social legislation and reforms as instruments for achieving the good society but concentrated exclusively on socialization and planned production. The chief modifications concerned the class analysis of capitalist society, the nature of the class struggle, and the first substantial erosion in the all-

inclusive application of socialization. Aspects of these modifications can, however, be interpreted as an indirect reflection of reformism - or more specifically one of its consequences, democratic electoral politics - inasmuch as the changes lent themselves to accommodating a wider spectrum of the electorate and not solely industrial workers. Furthermore, two of the modifications represented what were to become recurrent features of program revisions. The first might be termed an umbrella effect of successive programs to encompass a growing number of groups through adjustments in the class analysis of society and program demands. The second involved stipulations concerning socialization which delimited its range of application.

The 1897 Program had focused on the plight of the class of propertyless wage worker; the 1911 Program spoke of the oppressed classes which consisted of the workers and the middle classes - small farmers, craftsmen and tradesmen. Similarly, the range of participants in the class struggle was broadened to include the working class and other groups. The vehicles of the class struggle were increased by adding consumer cooperatives. The class struggle, the Program proclaimed, would never cease until society was so organized that the fruits of labor were given to those who toiled, but it was declared that the requirement was fulfilled where the means of production and labor were joined together, i.e. in the case of independent small farmers and small scale crafts. The implications were: 1) the exemption of small farmers and craftsmen from socialization and 2) two separate courses of action for agriculture and industry. In the area of large scale industry, the Program urged that private capitalist monopolies be transferred to public control and ownership in order to achieve a planned production. It was further pointed out that capitalism assumed different forms in agriculture and industry, and the Program prescribed socialization of large holdings, various forms of leasing of public land, including to private persons, and protection of small holders and tenant farmers against powerful corporations and large owners.[9] Tingsten summarizes the divergent paths for industry and agriculture:

> As far as industry was concerned, Marx's slogan still obtained: first concentration in private hands, then socialization. Regarding agriculture, on the other hand, it was established that concentration should be opposed and that small scale production and the right of ownership on a small scale should be supported.[10]

Two seemingly minor alterations, which were forerunners of eventually substantial changes, concerned socialization and planned production. The 1911 Program mentioned both control and ownership in its demand for socialization, whereas in the previous program the demand had been formulated in terms of ownership and ownership alone. This change probably stemmed from the acknowledgement of private small scale ownership which subsequently necessitat-

ed some form of public control. Secondly, the 1897 Program put forward demands for socialization and a socialist production, implying two interdependent but parallel demands. In the 1911 Program, "in order to" was inserted, inferring that socialization was a prerequisite and means of planned production.

Finally, goal statements were multiplied. The Program not only called for restructuring the economy and social liberation (now of the oppressed classes) but also the abolition of class rule and poverty. The demand for planned production based on the real needs of society also specified the efficient utilization of the means of production.

The next major program revision in 1920 occurred during a critical juncture. During the years 1917-1920 the Social Democrats definitely disavowed violent revolution. This issue, along with other sources of disagreement, led to a rupture of the party. A revolutionary minority broke away and formed the Left Socialist party (*Sveriges socialdemokratiska vänsterparti*), remnants of which became the Communist party in 1921. Already during the first decade of their existence, the Social Democrats had given priority to peaceful means and universal suffrage but they also acknowledged that certain situations could compel the use of force and revolutionary action. Even as late as 1918 the Social Democrats had played upon the possibility of revolutionary action in exacting Conservative support for a suffrage reform to enfranchise women and abolish the system of multiple votes according to wealth. Once the principles of political democracy and parliamentary government had been secured, however, the Social Democrats explicitly and conclusively rejected violent revolution.[11] The intensity of this repudiation and the conflict between them and the Communists, it has been argued, precluded the possibility of a synthesis of reformism and revolution. After the schism the Social Democrats exclusively equated revolution with violence, and revolution and reformism were conceived of as two distinct avenues; whereas prior to the events of 1917 - 1918, revolution and reformism had been interlocking currents of their Marxist heritage.[12]

Furthermore, the passage of the suffrage reform during these years meant that the "democratic prerequisite" of socialism was a reality, and the party's ideological discussion centered on the implementation of socialism. Gradualism was stressed, and considerable discussion was devoted to the criteria in determining which parts of the economy ought to be transferred to public ownership. More subtle and varied meanings were also attached to socialization, which had become synonymous with state ownership. At this time, ideas of economic democracy and industrial democracy borrowed from guild socialism were introduced into the party's discussion about the future organization of

the economy. Various schemes of enterprises and branches of industry organized as autonomous units and administered by boards of representatives of the state, workers and consumers were suggested. Lastly, more importance was expressly assigned to increased production in eradicating poverty. It was held that poverty could not be wiped out solely by equal distribution, that greater production was a precondition. Successive socialization would lead to a more rational organization and eventually to a planned economy - which in turn would raise the level of affluence.[13)]

Several of these ideas found expression in the 1920 revision.[14)] The new program additionally reflected the trends of revision exhibited in the 1911 Program, i.e. the umbrella effect of stretching Marxist class analysis so as to apply to the bulk of the population and an elaboration of conditions in implementing socialization. The 1920 Program also revealed the beginnings of two other main trends: first, the gradual incorporation of an array of different policies and measures as means of transforming society and, secondly, a modification of the goals of socialization.

The major modifications in the 1920 Program's assessment of society were largely an extension of nascent ideas in the 1911 Program. Exploitation was now a central theme, and society was divided into capitalists and the exploited classes - in effect all groups other than the capitalists. Even the free professions were mentioned in this context. The Program stated that the middle classes would continue to exist, but their economic independence was undermined; and the social position of the "true cultivators of the land" was equated with that of industrial workers. The working class, however, was assigned a position of leadership among the exploited classes. The previously implicit criticism of planless production was now articulated, and the Program noted the inability of capitalism to utilize fully and properly the ever growing forces of production.

The most significant modifications in the 1920 Program concerned means. First, a number of changes pertained to socialization. Of primary importance a socialization clause was written into the Political Program, thus implying a new immediacy of the demand for socialization. The clause (Point XIII) read:

> *All* natural resources, industrial enterprises, financial institutions, means of transportation and communication *necessary to introduce a planned economy* are to be transferred to public ownership.
>
> ...
>
> The participation of workers and consumers in the administration of public enterprises.

> Public control over enterprises remaining under private ownership. (italics mine) [15]

A major implication of this clause, as summed up by Tingsten, was that the idea of total socialization at a certain stage of development was replaced by the notion of socialization in certain areas and a more comprehensive planned economy.[16]

Equally important implications of the clause were the growing role of public control as well as the continued existence of private ownership. In two vastly different cases, private ownership would be permitted. The Social Democrats conceded the private ownership of 1) small enterprises not characterized by exploitation and 2) enterprises which were not ripe for socialization because production had not reached the monopoly stage. Parenthetically the discussion at this time also included other forms of socialization than pure nationalization, such as the creation of public enterprises to compete with private companies, mixed enterprises i.e. jointly owned by the state and private stockholders, and cooperative undertakings.[17]

The second major change with regards to means was the multiplication of instruments to achieve a socialist transformation of society. Formerly these means were confined to socialization (common ownership and control) and a socialist or planned production. The socialization clause in the 1920 Program added a democratic organization of the administration of public enterprises with participation by workers and consumers. A similar demand for workers' participation in private enterprises was incorporated into the Party Program in 1924. Furthermore, five articles in the Political Program (Points XII-XVI), which incidentally were the main innovations in comparison to the 1911 Political Program, were designated as providing the basic guidelines for a socialist transformation of society. Besides the socialization clause, the guidelines consisted of: the right of expropriation for the needs of society, government promotion of cooperative enterprises, land policy, and regulation of the distribution of income and wealth.[18] In this respect the 1920 revision represented the first major step toward a broader conception of the means of transforming society as embodied in the party's official ideology.

To a great extent, the goal statements of the 1920 Program were a reiteration of the declarations in the previous program. However, "abolition of class rule" became the "toppling of class society". The total abolition of capitalist exploitation and increased production to raise the general level of affluence were added. A more crucial alteration concerned the interrelationship of goals and means - in particular the goals related to socialization. On the one hand, socialization was a means of achieving classic features of the socialist society: elimination of capitalist exploitation and a class

society. On the other hand, the socialization clause designated it as a means of introducing a planned economy, and in the party debate it was related to increasing production. In other words, there were traces of a certain duality concerning socialization as an instrument. Overwhelmingly it was still viewed as fundamental in achieving the good society, almost to the point that it merged with the goal. To a less extent it was also regarded as a means of attaining more specific objectives. The tendency and eventually the necessity to contemplate socialization in terms of concrete policy goals was the beginning of a trend which was to become decisive for the position of socialization in Swedish Social Democratic ideology.

The 1920 revision took place in a rush of enthusiasm and optimism. An election majority for socialism was believed to be within reach due to the current popular mood and the suffrage reform. A few months after the revision, the 1920 election (before the reform came into effect) resulted in losses for the Social Democrats. It was their first defeat in a general election, and socialization had been a major issue of the election. In the 1921 election (after the reform) the Social Democrats received a little over one-third of the votes cast, but from 1924 throughout the rest of the decade, party electoral support hovered around 40 %. From 1920 until the Social Democrats' victory at the polls in 1932, Swedish politics was characterized by cabinet instability with eight minority governments in office during these twelve years. The Social Democrats formed three governments during the first six years of the period. Subsequently they became increasingly hesitant about assuming executive office without sufficient parliamentary support to enact their proposals.[19)]

The 1920s was generally a decade of frustration for the Social Democrats. Because of the parliamentary situation, the radical planks of the 1920 Program had no immediate prospect of enactment. Certain reforms supported by the Social Democrats became legislation, but an obvious condition for passage was collaboration with at least one other party. On the whole, however, the decade stands out for its paucity of enacted social leglislation - both in comparison to the 1910s and the 1930s as well as subsequent decades. Moreover, radical reform suggestions advanced by the Social Democrats met with defeat in the Riksdag, e.g. the establishment of industrial workers councils, steeper inheritance taxes, a revision of taxes on income and capital, and the creation of a state commercial bank.[20)]

Besides the constellation of power in the Riksdag, the Social Democrats confronted two other quandaries in attempting to implement the more radical guidelines of the 1920 Program. The first difficulty consisted of the general nature of the guidelines and their conversion into specific proposals. The

revision committee had pointed out that the Political Program consisted of general demands - not detailed, concrete measures, indicating that the latter still had to be worked out. The first Social Democratic minority government in 1920 appointed inquiry commissions to look into socialization, industrial democracy, and control of trusts. No major leglislation resulted from the work of the commissions. And the deliberations of the commission on socialization were characterized by inertia and a lack of consensus. In particular, problems connected with the gradualist approach to socialization became apparent when the pros and cons of individual nationalization projects were examined. For example, in the late 1920s and early 1930s the commission and the party executive discussed the creation of a state-owned shoe industry with roughly 25 % of the market. Among the cons were the possibilities of resulting unemployment, excessive capital outlays arising from compensation to private firms, and the state being saddled with unprofitable and antiquated factories. After several reprieves, the commission suspended its activities in the mid-1930s, and after fifteen years of deliberations it failed to deliver a final report containing concrete proposals.[21)]

In assessing the significance of the commission, the prevailing interpretation (Tingsten's) has stressed that the commission eventually became a substitute for action and a device for blocking or postponing party discussion of proposals for socialization by referring to the commission and its coming report. This interpretation has tended to obscure another important aspect of the commission's existence. Key figures in the party, who were members of the commission, were forced to come to grips with the practical problems of implementing socialization measures. As a result, the discussion on socialization revolved around specific objectives in individual cases. In addition, a set of normative criteria for evaluating socialization proposals gradually evolved, and the "final report" of the commission listed the following seven criteria: 1) economic liberation, i.e. liberation from the "fetters of scarcity" 2) a decent livelihood for all members of society 3) utilization of the capacity of all citizens 4) a feeling of well-being through a certain degree of freedom 5) progress 6) security 7) measures involving a minimum of costs.[22)] Neither the pros or cons of specific projects nor the normative criteria involved the dictums for a socialist society as formulated in the 1920 Program - the elimination of capitalist exploitation and class society. Instead they concentrated on the aspiration of raising the general level of affluence. The upshot was that socialization came to be increasingly viewed in terms of promoting a better performance of the economy. Finally, the secretary of the commission, Nils Karleby, in the mid-1920s was one of the first Social Democrats to voice doubts about socialization as the all-important

means of achieving ultimate party goals and simultaneously proclaim other party demands - i.a. labor legislation, higher wages, taxation, educational policy, state intervention of various kinds - as equally important means.[23)]

The second difficulty concerned securing an electoral majority for socialist measures. In the next couple of elections after the 1920 defeat the issue of socialization was toned down. In the 1928 election, radical demands re-emerged. The Social Democrats campaigned on increased inheritance taxes aiming at equalization of wealth, industrial democracy, public ownership or control of natural resources, and the creation of a state commercial bank. As in 1920, the outcome of the election was a defeat for the Social Democrats, and these demands were not made into the major issues of the nationwide election campaigns during the 1930s.[24)]

If the 1920s was a decade of frustration and setbacks, the 1930s was one of impressive successes. In the 1932 election the Social Democrats made substantial gains - receiving nearly 42 % of the vote - and took office. Through the so-called horse-trade, the Agrarians agreed to support the Social Democrats' unemployment program in exchange for favorable farm measures. The Social Democrats' program was basically a Keynesian economic policy (which predated Keynes' major theoretical work) designed to expand both production and demand. Production was stimulated through public works projects, including housing construction, increased public investments as well as loans and subsidies to private enterprise. The program's most innovative features, as well as controversial in terms of party politics, were the amount of money pumped into the economy, financing through deficit spending, and paying public works project laborers the same wages as on the open market. This third feature was also one aspect of increasing demand through the improved purchasing power of the masses. In the same way, various welfare policies also bolstered demand. Among the major welfare measures legislated during the 1930s were unemployment insurance, improved old age pensions, family policy measures, and paid vacations.[25)]

Even after an upswing in the economy, the Social Democrats sought to pursue an economic policy which was largely an extension of their crisis program. They argued that permanent forms of state intervention and an expansionary economic policy were necessary to prevent the recurrent crises of capitalism and to rectify other major structural defects of the capitalist system - chronic unemployment, mass underconsumption, and a lack of macro-coordination of the economy. Greater efficiency and the productive capacity of various branches of the economy were also emphasized. To this end, several inquiry commissions were appointed, and they mainly resulted in a variety of subventions for different branches of industry. Public ownership and nationaliza-

tion occupied a negligible place in Social Democratic policy of the 1930s.[26)]

The successful implementation of the crisis program and welfare reforms had important repercussions for Social Democratic ideology. This occurred partly through added emphasis on certain tenets, partly through a clash of ideas leading to modifications. In the case of welfare reforms, their justifications highlighted certain ideological aspirations, e.g. security for the masses and a levelling in the living conditions of various segments of the population. It was also stressed that welfare measures could only be introduced in conjunction with a policy of increasing production and efficiency. Finally there was a tendency to redefine the socialization process by equating it with social reforms and to designate welfare measures as a socialization of consumption.[27)]

As for the unemployment program and an expansionary economic policy, certain aspects of the Social Democrats' traditional critique of capitalism assumed new currency. The concepts of planned economy and state control - rather than socialization in the sense of nationalization - came to the fore in connection with the new economic policy. As during the 1920s, the concept of a planned economy was extremely vague. It consisted of such notions as planned utilization of resources and a more rational organization of the economy. In the early 1930s emphasis gravitated toward mastery over the economy, the ability to steer the economy in order to achieve the goals of higher employment, greater production and more efficiency. As the decade proceeded, the expansionary economic policy and its Keynesian underpinnings became key components of the Social Democrats' notion of a planned economy. The type of state control now emphasized was various forms of state intervention to achieve employment and production goals, such as public works projects and fiscal policies in general. Public agencies with regulatory powers in the area of rationalization and structural changes in branches were also mentioned.[28)]

During the 1930s a distinction was made between nationalization and a planned economy - and the distinction tended to point up the shortcomings of piecemeal nationalization. More important, it set apart a planned economy approach as an independent course of action, whereas previously nationalization and a planned economy were generally viewed as interlocking. In one of the clearest statements of this distinction, Ernst Wigforss, the Social Democrat primarily responsible for the new economic policy, declared that nationalization and planned economy were not necessarily equivalent. Nationalization could occur without resulting in more planning in the economy and vice versa. A nationalized company was still part of the existing economic system and affected by the same forces as privately owned enterprises.

Nationalization of isolated enterprises was ineffectual in combating depressions and mass unemployment. Nonetheless Wigforss, then and later, assumed that public ownership would facilitate a policy of planned economy.[29]

Finally the new economic policy diverged considerably from the prescriptions of the 1920 Program inasmuch as it contributed to the viability of capitalism and aided individual private enterprises. This was acknowledged by the Social Democrats, who proclaimed the priority of the goals of the new economic policy - higher employment, greater production and efficiency - and their implementation was deemed more important than the issue of ownership. Concurrently traces of a modified perception of private ownership within the party can be discerned: the right of private ownership per se was not opposed but rather its consequences and functions.[30]

In sum, then, during the course of the 1920s and 1930s the Social Democrats' diagnosis of society, their prescriptions for changing society, and goals-means relationships were appreciably altered in comparison to the 1920 Program. The criticism of capitalism based on exploitation receded into the background. Instead, against the backdrop of the depression in the 1930s, attention was focused on the inability of capitalism to utilize fully material and labor resources, the phenomenon of recurrent crises, and the contradiction between the technological capability of producing abundance and existing mass underconsumption.[31] Furthermore, the central position of the role of ownership in the traditional critique of capitalism was in the process of being eroded.

Modifications were most pronounced with regard to means. Socialization declined in importance, and the multiplication of instruments for achieving the good society continued. During the 1920 revision, socialization tended to be conceived of as both a means and an end in itself. By the close of the 1930s it was perceived as a means. Moreover, socialization was designated an alternative not an imperative. Finally, socialization was increasingly seen in the perspective of improving the performance of the economy and less as the prime instrument for changing society.

Concurrently other instruments of social change were elevated in importance. Already in the mid-1920s a wider variety of means than that prescribed in the 1920 Program was advocated, and a 1932 congress resolution, for example, enumerated additional courses of action as components of a socialist program of action to transform society. The actual policies pursued by the Social Democrats when in government also tended to entrench the position of other means - especially state economic intervention and welfare policies.[32]

The concept of class conflict, which was a cardinal prescription of the 1920 Program, became increasingly ambivalent owing to the ascendancy of two

competing concepts: the people, as opposed to class, and cooperation versus conflict. In the late 1920s the party leader, Per Albin Hansson, questioned the class struggle, arguing that the Social Democrats were a party of the people.[33] About this time Marx's analysis of classes and his prophesies concerning the class structure of capitalism came under heavy fire from prominent Social Democrats in the party debate. The value of cooperation was reinforced in a variety of ways during the 1930s. Cooperation with the Agrarians - first through the horse-trade and later as a coalition partner - had made possible the unemployment program and several reforms. The Prime Minister, Per Albin Hansson, personally put a premium on cooperation. He stressed a policy of cooperation and mutual understanding as a means of securing a better society - described as i.a. the People's home and a classless society. Lastly, as the Social Democrats placed growing emphasis on economic performance, they urged cooperation between private enterprise and state authorities in order to manage the economy more efficiently.[34]

The goals of Social Democracy, according to the 1920 Program, were inextricably bound up with the total transformation of bourgeois society. Restructuring the economy through socialization would result in the social liberation of the exploited classes, an end to insecurity, the downfall of class society, and the eradication of mass poverty. The justifications of welfare reforms and the expansionary economic policy singled out certain aspirations and weakened the previously inexorable relationship between the attainment of these goals and a total restructuring of society and socialization. Furthermore, greater stress was placed on values as the fundamental aspirations of the party[35] - a trend which was to become more pronounced in subsequent years.

2.2 Party Ideology of the 1940s

Party ideology, as reflected in the 1944 Program and the Postwar Program, not only incorporated several of the moderate currents of the 1930s. Radical demands, in part echoing the discussion during the 1920 revision, were also resurrected. Moreover, the Party Program was given a more explicit egalitarian thrust. Finally, a number of recommendations in the Postwar Program, a program of action drafted jointly by the Social Democratic party and the trade union movement, constituted a significant radicalization of the party's concrete policy proposals.

The 1944 Party Program

Several aspects of the appraisal of society in the 1944 Program represented a codification of previous shifts in the party's ideological discussion.

For the most part, the Marxist concept of exploitation - a dominant feature of the 1920 Program's critique of capitalism - was eliminated. Specific points of Marx's class analysis were altered or discarded. But a class analysis was retained: an elaborate scheme of class stratification was combined with a basic cleavage between a privileged minority and the majority.

One of the major changes in the 1944 Program was the partial acceptance of the existing society on the grounds that, since the 1920 revision, society had been substantially modified by the establishment of political democracy and changes brought about by the Social Democratic movement. The Program especially underlined the importance of civil liberties and democracy characterizing bourgeois society in Sweden.[36]

Nevertheless the Program contained a scathing indictment of the private capitalistic mode of production. The profit motive and monopolistic tendencies were criticized. Primarily, however, the Program reiterated the arguments of the 1930s concerning the fundamental inefficiencies of capitalism and focused on inequalities arising from the capitalistic system. The Program designated the right of ownership and the right of determination of the essential means of production as dual sources of inequality.

> The decisive feature of the bourgeois economy is not private ownership of property but that the *right of ownership* and the *right of determination* of the essential material means of production in society lie in the hands of a minority, while a majority are barred from partaking in this right of ownership and earn an insecure livelihood as wage earners employed by the owners of capital. This inequality and its contradictions result not only in basic differences in the material standard of living. The lack of economic equality also entails a lack of equality in education and upbringing, in opportunities to be able to participate in the spiritual and material culture.(italics mine)[37]

Subsequently the Program alluded to the primacy of the right of determination and that it need not coincide with ownership. This duality and its implications for prescriptions for action was one of the crucial differences between the 1944 Program and its predecessor.

The goal of Social Democracy, as set forth in the opening statement of the Program, was

> to transform the economic organization of bourgeois society so that the right of determination over production is placed in the hands of the entire people, the majority is liberated from dependence upon a few owners of capital, and the social order based on economic classes is replaced by a community of citizens cooperating on a basis of freedom and equality.[38]

This goal statement differed from its counterpart in the 1920 Program in a number of subtle but significant ways. First of all, it no longer called for

a total transformation of the economy. The right of determination over production was mentioned, but nothing was said about ownership. A classless society and equality were included in the goal statement. Elsewhere the Program enumerated the guidelines for a socialist transformation of society as public influence over the forces of production, the participation of workers in ownership, planning of production, and equality of the citizens.[39] Contrary to the 1920 Program, references to values (freedom, equality, security, responsibility, human dignity, solidarity and cooperation) permeated the new program.

The 1944 revision underscored that legal-political democracy was a goal in itself, not merely a weapon in the fight for an economic transformation of society. Political democracy was said to be "an indispensable component of the democratic order, the community of free and equal citizens, which is the goal of Social Democracy". But according to the Program, political democracy had to be complemented by economic democracy. The Program proclaimed that just as legal and political class privileges had been eliminated by bourgeois democracy,the Social Democrats intended to work for the removal of economic class privileges. This modification represented a formal incorporation of an important facet of the party's earlier ideological tradition rather than new thinking. The theme of economic democracy had been prominent at the time of the 1920 revision, and it had been brought to the fore periodically.[40]

With regard to the instruments for achieving party goals, one of the overall effects of the 1944 revision was to diminish the significance of socialization. The importance of a planned economy was reaffirmed and further enhanced. Rather indirectly the General Principles implied a larger role for levelling policies and state intervention in the economy.

At first glance the prescriptions concerning socialization in the 1944 Program appear fairly similar to those sketched during the 1920 revision. In both instances, socialization pertained to large scale industry and not to small enterprises in either manufacturing or agriculture. Socialization was accompanied by the demand for planning which was to encompass the whole economy. The socialization clause in both programs designated it as a means of achieving planning in the economy and proposed socialization to the extent necessary to introduce a planned economy. The prime differences were that socialization was *explicitly* restricted to big business; both small enterprise and agriculture - now even large estates and holdings - were excluded.[41]

Secondly, the 1944 General Principles were studded with reservations and confining ambiguities concerning socialization, and these added up to a substantial modification. The ambiguity posed by the inferred difference between control or determination, as distinct from ownership, and the tendency

to elevate the right of determination above ownership served to dilute the imperative nature of socialization. An additional limitation was set by declaring that the preservation and strengthening of the spirit of initiative and freedom of action had to be criteria in creating forms for the organization of production based on ownership or control by society. An element of pragmatic flexibility concerning socialization was also incorporated into the Program. The suitability and expediency of introducing socialization was to be adjudged in each particular case.[42)]

Thirdly, assumptions concerning the relationship between public ownership and a planned economy had been profoundly altered since the previous revision. The formulations of the 1944 Program, according to its major author, more clearly indicated the distinction between socialization and a planned economy - and that a planned economy need not entail public ownership.[43)]

Both the General Principles and the socialization clause (now Pt. VIII) assigned more weight to the establishment of a planned economy than to forms of ownership. Planning of production was designated as a guideline for the socialist transformation of society, but notably socialization per se was not. In the socialization clause the goals-means chain grew more complex. Socialization became a means to a means, as the goals of a planned economy were now specified. Pt. VIII read:

> A planned economy which aims at
> *utilizing* fully and efficiently the productive resources of society,
> *providing* the entire able-bodied population with secure employment, and
> *ensuring* all citizens a standard of living corresponding to the fruits of common labor.
>
> To the entire extent necessary to achieve such an economy
>
> the various forms of economic activity *are to be coordinated* under the direction of the state, and
>
> natural resources,
> industrial enterprises,
> financial institutions,
> means of transportation and communication *are to be transferred* to the ownership of society.

Besides specifying the goals of a planned economy, the second major addition to the 1944 clause was the inclusion of a companion means to socialization, viz. coordination of economic activity. This formula was one of the main innovations in the 1944 Program. The vital point, by implication, and as brought out more clearly during the party congress proceedings, was government coordination rather than public ownership.[44)]

The General Principles also alluded to new instruments. The emphasis on the right of determination over the essential means of production suggested state intervention as an adequate course of action, as did the formula of

government coordination of economic activity, and the designation of public influence over the forces of production as a socialist guideline. Similarly by making inequalities a major focal point of the party's criticism of capitalism, by designating equality of the citizens as a socialist guideline, and proclaiming that the first steps had been taken toward equalization through levelling policies - welfare measures, educational policy and taxation - the General Principles heightened the ideological significance of these policies. In the Political Program, the incorporation of new means was more readily apparent. The major additions consisted of family policy (Pt. XIII), housing (Pt. XIV),health and medical services (Pt. XV), employment policy (Pt. XVII) and wage policy (Pt. XVIII).

Basic features of the 1944 revision were a shifting pattern of goals-means relationships and the further decline of socialization as an ideologically privileged means of attaining the good society - at least in comparison to the formulations of the 1920 Program. In Point VIII both a planned economy and socialization were instruments to achieve the economic goals of total and efficient use of resources, full employment and a fair distribution. Although these goals can be regarded as evolving from traditional ideological tenets, they also represented a fundamental departure from Marxist tradition and even the 1944 General Principles, inasmuch as these goals involved neither changing the economic power structure nore eliminating class differences. To some extent the 1944 General Principles retained the crucial connection of socialization as a means of altering the power structure and achieving a classless society. Simultaneously, however, the 1944 Principles inferred that "placing the right of determination over production in the hands of the entire people" - a euphemism for state intervention - would alter the economic power structure by eliminating the power of a few over the majority of the people.[45] Likewise levelling policies were fashioned as instruments to do away with economic, social and cultural inequalities. In some respects this shifting pattern crystallized more sharply in the Postwar Program, which was also on the agenda of the 1944 party congress and was unanimously endorsed.

The Postwar Program

The Postwar Program of Swedish Labor (also known as the 27 Points) presented a formidable array of recommendations for the postwar period. The introduction defined the major task of the future as coordination of economic activity in the form of a planned economy and summed up Labor's proposals under three broad goals: 1) full employment 2) fair distribution and a higher standard of living 3) more efficiency and democracy in the economy.[46] In terms of concrete proposals, the essential features of the Program were a policy of

full employment, a broad program of social welfare measures and educational reform, an expanded role of the state in the economy, including a demand for socialization, and recommendations for industrial democracy.

The concrete proposals of the Program reflected the primacy of state intervention and levelling policies and the lesser importance of socialization in the realm of everyday policy. The specific demand for socialization in the Postwar Program was much narrower than the socialization clause of the Party Program. It focused on the nationalization of private monopolies when they dominated an entire branch of industry or when it would be uneconomical to create competition. The possibility of nationalizing branches with an irrational organization was also intimated. The Program additionally called for the nationalization of insurance companies and the gradual transfer of apartment houses and building sites to municipal ownership. Nationalization of the import of oil was also mentioned. Besides these recommendations entailing nationalization, the Program advocated establishing public enterprises to compete with private business. It suggested creating public enterprises or aiding non-profit companies to break the hold of private monopolies. A state commercial bank was to be set up, and local governments were to organize building companies alongside private firms.[47)]

In general the recommendations to extend public ownership were fused with the major task as defined by the Postwar Program: a planned economy. Compared to the Party Program, the Postwar Program was much more specific in indicating the main features of a planned economy. They consisted of support and regulation of investments, strengthening purchasing power, rationalization of various branches of the economy under state auspices, government supervision of foreign trade, and expansion of cooperative or other non-profit production as well as the economic activity of the government. In regulating investments, the Program proposed that indirect instruments - such as monetary policy and the rate of interest - be supplemented by a public agency comprised of representatives of business (private, cooperative and state enterprise), trade unions, and the government to coordinate and plan investments. This arrangement was to be replicated at the regional level. Public control and possibilities of steering the capital market were to be increased through ownership of insurance companies and a commercial bank, investments in the public sector, and subventions to private enterprise - especially in the housing sector. Measures to boost purchasing power ranged from various types of subsidies to improved social insurance. With regard to rationalization, the Program devoted most of its comments to agriculture and housing. The Program also contained a more general demand to rationalize branches of industry through reorganization, standardization and specialization.[48)]

The Postwar Program contained roughly the same reservations concerning socialization as the Party Program, and in certain cases expanded upon them. It put greater stress on the relationship between socialization and efficiency. The Program declared that private enterprise would be allowed to function without substantial changes as long as it fully and efficiently utilized economic resources. All schematic demands for a pre-established apportionment of private and common rights of ownership as well as private and public economic functions were rejected.[49)]

Furthermore, the Postwar Program attached more weight to other instruments - not just in terms of concrete recommendations but also through ideological justifications. Firstly, the Postwar Program emphasized the right of determination of the entire people over the economy, and influence of all the citizens was to be exercised through the state. Moreover, the right of determination took precedence over the right of ownership in the Postwar Program.[50)] Secondly, levelling policies occupied a central position in the Postwar Program, and they were directly coupled to a socialist transformation of society and the ultimate goal of eliminating class divisions. The concept was also enlarged to include wage and economic policies, and the Program laid special emphasis on educational policy as an instrument to remove class distinctions.[51)]

In conclusion, despite a certain gravitation away from the more traditionally bound prescriptions of the Party Program, the Postwar Program presented several radical demands. Its *specific* demands for socialization were among the most comprehensive ever put forward by the Social Democrats. The expanded role of the state in the economy entailed not only a potentially larger sector of public ownership but also steering and planning investments, greater involvement in housing and agriculture, supervision of foreign trade, and public agencies to coordinate economic activity. In addition, more democracy in the economy was a major goal of the Program. This was to be promoted through industrial democracy, i.e. greater worker influence at the level of the enterprise and increased participation of workers' representatives in the general planning of a branch of industry or the economy. In this latter connection, the establishment of public bodies - composed of representatives of government, private and cooperative enterprise, and employees - to coordinate and plan economic activity was suggested.[52)]

. . . . .

To what extent and how were the ideas in the two programs utilized in electoral politics by the Social Democrats? The second part of this book attempts to answer this question.

Notes

1 This section, as indicated in the Introduction, draws heavily upon Tingsten's and Lewin's analyses. It is largely a synthesis, with certain modifications and differences of interpretation. Differences vis-à-vis Tingsten emerge fairly clearly, I hope, from reading this chapter, since its entire thrust is a vitiation of Tingsten's central thesis that by the mid-1930s Social Democratic ideology was nothing more than a social welfare ideology. What is not clear from the chapter is the nature of my differences concerning Lewin's description of the development of the party's ideology. My major criticisms can be found in, Diane Sainsbury, "A Critique of Leif Lewin's Planhushållningsdebatten", Statsvetenskaplig tidskrift, 1968, pp. 109-118.

2 For the most part, this analysis is based on programmatic and "institutionalized" statements of party ideology. However, a few of the pronouncements cited below cannot be regarded as "institutionalized" statements in the strict sense specified in Chapter 1, i.e. that they have been issued or endorsed by the party organization or its elected leadership - members of the party board and executive committee. The exceptions are confined to a few articles in Tiden, the party's theoretical magazine, authored by individuals who were not included in the party leadership as defined above. If a broader interpretation of party leadership is adopted and opinion leaders are included, then most of the cited articles can be viewed as institutionalized party ideology. For example, Karl Fredriksson did not hold an elected post in the upper eschelons of the party, but he was an influential publicist and also a member of the committee which drafted the 1944 Postwar Program.

3 For a more detailed discussion of the Marxist influence, see Herbert Tingsten, The Swedish Social Democrats, Their Ideological Development (Totowa, New Jersey: Bedminister, 1973) pp. 124-141. All references to Tingsten's study refer to the English version rather than the original Den svenska socialdemokratins idéutveckling (Stockholm: Tiden, 1941). Readers with a knowledge of Swedish are advised to consult the original since the English version contains a number of translation errors. These range from trivia to errors obscuring the meaning of the original text, such as "public enterprise" being translated as "general enterprise", and some serious errors which totally contradict the original.
For a discussion that deemphasizes the Marxist elements and stresses Lasalle's and Bernstein's influence, see Bengt Abrahamsson and Anders Broström, Om arbetets rätt (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1979) pp. 163-188.

4 For the text of the 1897 Program, see Herbert Tingsten, op.cit., pp. 118-120. For Swedish readers, a convenient collection of the complete texts of the Party Program, except for the 1975 version, is found in Från Palm till Palme. Den svenska socialdemokratins program 1882-1960 (Stockholm: Rabén & Sjögren, 1972).

5 Herbert Tingsten, op.cit., p. 120, p. 154, pp. 161-162. There is an error in translation concerning the two points in the Political Program, p. 120 which states that the two points were not new in comparison with the Erfurt Program. The original text (p. 145 of the 1941 edition) reads: "... the third paragraph of article VI ... and article VII ... contained innovations in relation to the Erfurt Program."

6 Ibid.,pp. 150-152

7. Ibid., pp. 192-195, pp. 200-204, pp. 375-393 (quotation, p. 375).

8 In the Political Program, however, the list of advocated reforms continued to grow. The most significant additions had been made in 1905 (disability and unemployment insurance) and in 1908 (measures to combat alcoholism). Reformist elements were very pronounced in the Local Government Program (kommunalprogram) also adopted by the 1911 congress, and several points foreshadowed the party's policy offensive of the 1930s and 1940s. It called for i.a. housing construction by local government or under its control, public labor exchanges and public works projects to combat unemployment, expansion of social insurance programs and public medical services so that the extent of poor relief would be reduced, and separation of medical care and child welfare from poor relief. See Svenska socialdemokratiska arbetarepartiets politiska program, kommunalprogram, m.m. (Stockholm: Arbetarnes tryckeri, 1911) pp. 10-17.

9 In 1910 the percentage of persons engaged in agriculture and foresty amounted to roughly 50 % of the economically active population. In many cases the economic standard of these persons was the same or lower than that of industrial workers, even though nearly half were farm owners or members of their families. Moreover the structure of land ownership was generally small units - only 10 % of the cultivated land consisted of holdings over 20 hectares.

10 For the text of the 1911 Program, see Herbert Tingsten, op.cit., pp. 182-83, pp. 186-87 (quotation, p. 188).

11 Ibid., pp. 400-406.

12 Jan Lindhagen, Socialdemokratins program (Stockholm: Tiden, 1972), Vol. 2, esp. pp. 178-192, pp. 226-231.

13 Herbert Tingsten, op.cit., pp. 204-210.

14 For an English translation of the 1920 Program, see Ibid., pp. 213-215. The Program did not call for the abolition of mass society but of mass poverty. The seventh line in the fourth paragraph on p. 214 ought to read:"... and mass poverty abolished."

15 Program för Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetareparti. Antaget på partiets elfte kongress i Stockholm 1920 (Stockholm: Arbetarnes tryckeri, 1920) pp. 6-7. Cf. Herbert Tingsten, op.cit., p. 228.

16 Herbert Tingsten, op.cit., pp. 237-238.

17 Programkommissionens utlåtande till 1920 års kongress (Stockholm: Arbetarnes tryckeri, 1919) (hereafter Programkommissionens utlåtande) p.26, pp. 46-47; Herbert Tingsten, op.cit., p. 223, pp. 228-231, p. 239, p. 229.

18 Programkommissionens utlåtande, p. 50, p. 45; Herbert Tingsten, op.cit., pp. 257-58. Cf. the Political Programs of the 1911 and 1920 Programs.

19 Herbert Tingsten, op.cit., pp. 240-44, pp. 261-62

20 Ibid., p. 256, pp. 265-66.

21 Programkommissionens utlåtande, pp. 15-16; Herbert Tingsten, op.cit., p. 239, pp. 256-257, pp. 280-285, p. 315.

22 For the criteria, see SOU (Statens offentliga utredningar) 1936:7 (Socialiseringsproblemet: Allmänna synpunkter) pp. 35-40; Herbert Tingsten, op.cit., p. 316.

23 Nils Karleby, Socialismen inför verkligheten (Stockholm: Tiden, 1926) p. 53, pp. 70-73, pp. 82-86, pp. 89-91, pp. 280-281.

24 Herbert Tingsten, op.cit., pp. 249-250, p. 259, pp. 272-276. See also Svenska valprogram 1902-1952, compiled by Sven-Olof Håkansson (Gothenburg:Statsvetenskapliga Institutionen, 1952) Vol. II (hereafter Svenska valprogram).

25 Herbert Tingsten, op.cit., pp. 307-310; Leif Lewin, op.cit., pp. 61-68, pp. 89-96.

26 Leif Lewin, op.cit., pp. 98-107, pp. 150-159.
In the mid-1930s suggestions were put forward to start a few state companies (sugar, coffee, and import of oil) and to look into the possibility of nationalizing insurance companies. These ideas were shelved when the Social Democrats formed a coalition government with the Agrarians after the 1936 election.

27 See e.g. Ernst Jungen, "Socialpolitik och socialism", Tiden, 1931, pp. 469-481, esp. pp. 477-478, p. 480; Herbert Tingsten, op.cit., p. 319, pp. 328-329; SOU 1936:7, pp. 82-83; Karl Fredriksson, "Samhällets rationalisering", Tiden, 1933, pp. 384-385.

28 Leif Lewin, op.cit., p. 74, p. 103; Ernst Wigforss, Den ekonomiska krisen (Stockholm: Tiden, 1931), pp. 118-125; Gustav Möller, Kampen mot arbetslösheten (Stockholm: Tiden, 1936) pp. 70-73; Hela folket i arbete (Stockholm: Tiden, 1934) pp. 32-36. This contrasts notably with the discussion of state control during the 1920 revision which centered on two aspects: state control was to promote concentration of industry and to check various sorts of exploitation. See Programkommissionens utlåtande, p. 47, p. 50.

29 Leif Lewin, op.cit., p. 70, p. 72; Protokoll, Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetarepartis 14:e kongress, 1932, pp. 469-475; SOU:1936:7, pp. 85-86; Frans Severin, "Planhushållning och organ därför", Tiden, 1932, p.414; Karl Fredriksson, "Frihet och trygghet", Tiden, 1937, p. 140. Cf. Ernst Wigforss, op.cit., pp. 118-125 and Protokoll, Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetarepartis 17:e kongress, 1944 (hereafter 1944 Protokoll) p. 62.

30 Herbert Tingsten, op.cit., pp. 324-327; Karl Fredriksson, "Socialismens värdenormer", Tiden, 1937, p. 282.

31 See e.g. Herbert Tingsten, op.cit., p. 304; Ernst Wigforss, op.cit., p. 121; Gustav Möller, Kampen mot arbetslösheten, pp. 67-68.

32 Karl Fredriksson, Tiden, 1937, p. 287, p. 289, p. 292; Herbert Tingsten, op.cit., p. 318; Protokoll, Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetarepartis 14:e kongress, 1932, p. 514.

33 For comments on the earlier background of this notion, see Seppo Hentilä, "The Origins of the Folkhem Ideology in Swedish Social Democracy", Scandinavian Journal of History, 1978, pp. 323-345.

34 Herbert Tingsten, op.cit., pp. 278-280; Gunnar Fredriksson, Bo Södersten,Dieter Strand, Per Albin-linjen (Stockholm: Norstedts, 1970) pp. 7-10,p. 26, pp. 29-30, p. 36; Leif Lewin, op.cit., pp. 114-115, pp. 169-175. For a discussion of the strategic implications of the emphasis on economic performance, see Walter Korpi, op.cit., p. 83.

35 Concerning values as aspirations, see Herbert Tingsten, op.cit., pp. 329-330; Leif Lewin, op.cit., p. 76. See also Chapter 7.

36 Program för Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetareparti, Enligt beslut å partiets 17:e kongress, 1944 (hereafter Partiprogram), p. 3, p. 6; 1944 Protokoll, pp. 43-44; Socialismen i partiprogrammet. Studiehandledning utgiven av Sveriges socialdemokratiska ungdomsförbund, 1944, p. 7, pp. 9-10.

37 Partiprogram, pp. 3-5 (quotation, pp. 3-4). For key comments on these modifications, see 1944 Protokoll, pp. 43-45, pp. 59-60, pp. 63-67.

38 Partiprogram, p. 3.

39 Ibid., p. 8.

40 Ibid., pp. 6-7, pp. 3-5 (quotation, p. 7); Herbert Tingsten, op.cit., pp. 345-415, esp. pp. 404-5, pp. 305-6.

41 See Programkommissionens utlåtande, pp. 25-26.

42 Partiprogram, pp. 7-8.

43 For the statement on the distinction between socialization and a planned economy, see 1944 Protokoll, p. 266.

44 Partiprogram, pp. 7-8, p. 10 (quotation, p. 10); 1944 Protokoll, pp. 62-63.

45 This was made mor explicit in the revision committee's comments and Wigforss' statements. See 1944 Protokoll, p. 44, p. 403.

46 Arbetarrörelsens efterkrigsprogram. De 27 punkterna med motivering (Stockholm: Landsorganisationen, 1944) (hereafter Efterkrigsprogram), pp. 4-5. For an abridged English version, see The Postwar Programme of Swedish Labour (Stockholm: Landsorganisationen. 1946).

47 Ibid., p. 22, pp. 26-27, pp. 23-24, p. 60, p. 200.

48 Ibid., pp. 22-27, p. 45, pp. 55-60, pp. 69-71, pp. 80-87, pp. 100-102, pp. 127-141, pp. 199-200.

49 Ibid., pp. 197-199, p. 21, p. 45, p. 83, p. 188.

50 Ibid., p. 21, p. 190, p. 199, pp. 205-207.

51 Ibid., pp. 14-20, pp. 148-149.

52 Ibid., pp. 22-23, pp. 55-61, pp. 79-102, pp. 127-141, pp. 44-45, pp. 192-193, pp. 196-197, pp. 212-216.

PART II

ELECTORAL POLITICS AND THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY

The mid-1940s was a period of intense political activity, and these years are of interest with regard to both party ideologies and electoral politics. As noted in the Introduction, party ideologies underwent several changes at this time. Party programs were revised, and action programs drafted. The revitalization of radical thought and demands was not confined to the Social Democrats. New thinking and proposals were put forward by the Communists during this period. Seeking to create a united front[1)] and a "left government", the Communists expressed belief in the possibility of a peaceful transition to socialism, and they generally disavowed violence as a means of coming to power. (They were more ambiguous, however, concerning the question of force as a means of staying in power.) The Liberal party launched "social liberalism", which placed greater emphasis on social reforms than during the previous decade. The program revision of the Agrarians contained several modifications. The most conservative elements in the 1933 Party Program were omitted, and much of the eulogy of the "farmer class" was deleted. Although there was some ideological disunity in all the parties, signs of discord were perhaps most pronounced in the Conservative party. This was reflected, first, in the inability to effect a decision to revise the 1919 Party Program and, second, in substantial discrepancies (primarily concerning the nature of the state) in the Party Program and the Conservatives' action program drafted in 1946.

The elections of this period were fiercely fought campaigns, with bitter party polemics reaching a crescendo in 1948. And the years from 1944 to 1948 can be regarded as an especially critical period for the Social Democrats in terms of electoral politics. During these years the Social Democrats were extremely hard pressed from both the left and the right. In the 1944 election the Communists made substantial gains, and in the 1946 election they slightly increased their share of the votes and attained their peak of voter support (11.2%). The 1946 election also indicated an upswing in the Liberals' electoral support, and in the 1948 election - one of the closest approximations to a landslide election in Swedish postwar politics - the Liberals won 31 new seats. The Social Democrats lost three seats in 1948, but they retained a larger number of seats (112) than the non-Socialists (110) in the lower chamber of the Riksdag. The Communists held the remaining 8 seats. This distribution of seats, plus the Social Democrats' majority in the upper chamber, precluded the formation of a non-Socialist government. (See Table 1.)

Table 1. Party Electoral Support during the 1940s

	1940 General Election		1942 Local Election		1944 General Election		1946 Local Election		1948 General Election	
	%	Seats-Lower Chamber	%	Seats-Upper Chamber	%	Seats-Lower Chamber	%	Seats-Upper Chamber	%	Seats-Lower Chamber
Social Democrats	53.8	134	50.3	82	46.7	115	44.4	86	46.1	112
Conservatives	18.0	42	17.6	31	15.9	39	14.9	26	12.3	23
Liberals	12.0	23	12.4	15	12.9	26	15.6	14	22.8	57
Agrarians	12.0	28	13.2	21	13.6	35	13.6	21	12.4	30
Communists	3.5	3	5.9	1	10.3	15	11.2	3	6.3	8
Other Parties	0.7	-	0.6	-	0.6	-	0.3	-	0.1	-

Sources: Stig Hadenius, Hans Wieslander, Björn Molin, Sverige efter 1900 (Stockholm: Aldus/Bonniers, 1968) pp. 278-279, p.281; Statistisk årsbok 1943 p. 323 and 1947, p. 326.

Comment: Prior to the 1970 parliamentary reform the Riksdag was a bicameral body elected on the basis of proportional representation, and the two chambers had basically equal competence and powers. The lower chamber was directly elected every four years. Members of the upper chamber were indirectly elected for a term of office of eight years, and one-eight of the members were selected annually by the county councils. Thus the local elections, which elected the county councils, indirectly determined the composition of the Riksdag and assumed importance in national politics. In fact, election platforms for the local elections dealt almost exclusively with national issues, as did the propaganda produced by party headquarters. And in the case of the Social Democrats during the 1940s, there are no significant differences concerning the volume and types of propaganda issued by party headquarters for general and local elections. It should also be pointed out that the system of election to the upper chamber meant that in some cases its membership reflected voter opinion which was twelve years old. In the table, the lag effects of the system can be observed by comparing the Liberals' share of the vote and their number of seats in the upper chamber. During the 1930s this lag penalized the Social Democrats but it generally worked to their advantage after 1941 when they finally acquired a majority in the upper chamber. When the unicameral reform came into effect in 1970, and the Social Democrats lost this advantage, several political commentators declared that it was merely a matter of time before the Social Democrats would have to step down from power.

Thus, despite the grave challenge on two fronts, the Social Democrats managed to stay in power. The next three chapters shed light on how the Social Democrats accomplished this.

Although there are several similarities in the Social Democrats' campaigns during this period, significant variations exist. In fact, three fairly distinct election strategies emerge. To some extent the distinctive elements can be seen as responses to changes in the strategic environment. The shifts in strategy were probably also prompted by the Social Democrats' failure to come up with a winning strategy in either 1944 or 1946. In any event, an observation based on the analysis of the three elections is that losing and stagnating parties try a different strategy or substantially modify their strategy in the next election; whereas winning parties largely stick to the same strategy. (A major exception to these generalizations was the Communist party.)

In 1944 the Social Democrats were faced with a two-front situation, but the most decisive feature of the strategic environment was the Communists' offensive and their growing popularity. The Social Democrats countered by concentrating heavily on workers and previous party supporters. The propaganda directed to these groups was often differentiated from the propaganda to the general electorate, and dual images of the party's aspirations and future proposals were projected. The 1944 strategy can be summed up as a "dualistic" strategy.

Attacks from the left had abated by the time of the 1946 election. Instead the Communists called for unity in the labor movement at all levels and urged party cooperation with the Social Democrats. The non-Socialists, however, persisted in their criticism. In this election the Social Democrats attempted to broaden their constituency. Appeals to marginal groups were multiplied, and the party sought to forge an alliance between these groups and the labor movement. The 1946 strategy can be termed an "alliance-building" strategy.

In 1948 the Social Democrats were again assailed from all sides. To make matters worse, the economy was now in serious trouble, and the Social Democrats as the governing party were held responsible for the difficulties. Thus the party was much more on the defensive in 1948 and the possibility of losing power loomed large. The Social Democrats tried to get voters, particularly passive sympathizers, to go to the polls by making possession of office a major issue of the election and emphasizing the consequences of a change in government. The 1948 strategy can be characterized as a "get out the vote" strategy.

Because of the substantial differences in the campaign strategies as

well as the dissimilarities in the patterns of the uses of ideological statements in the three elections, a separate analysis of each election is warranted. Each of the next three chapters describes an election campaign, and the chapters have the same format. The first part is a chronicle of important political events outlining the political situation on the eve of the election. The second part presents the broad contours of the rival parties' election strategies as reconstructed from their propaganda.[2] The main purpose of these sections is to delineate the basic features of the strategic environment in which the Social Democratic party operated. The third part is a detailed examination of Social Democratic campaign literature and the ideological statements in the propaganda. An overall picture of the party's election propaganda is first provided. This is followed by an analysis of the tasks and uses of ideological statements in the propaganda with the aim of determining the role of ideology in electoral politics.

Notes

1 During the war years and the immediate postwar period, the "front" tactics of the Communists shifted and assumed a variety of guises and labels. For a discussion of this phenomenon during the war, see Yvonne Hirdman, Sverges kommunistiska parti 1939-1945 (Stockholm: Allmänna förlaget, 1974) pp. 142-183, pp. 223-255.

2 The source material for the sections dealing with these parties' campaigns consists of propaganda issued by national headquarters. It is basically the same type of material as used in the analysis of the Social Democrats. For discussions on the analysis of election propaganda, see Gunnar Sjöblom, op.cit., pp. 114-125, pp. 206-249 and Magnus Isberg, Anders Wettergren, Jan Wibble, Björn Wittrock, Partierna inför väljarna (Stockholm: Allmänna förlaget, 1974).

Chapter 3

THE 1944 ELECTION: "Work Stoppages? No, Jobs" and "Carry on the Welfare Policy"*

3.1 The Political Situation: The Making of a Communist Upswing

A basic feature of the political setting of the 1944 election was the existence of a national coalition government, which had been formed during the early phases of the Second World War. The coalition was composed of the four major parties - the Social Democrats, Conservatives, Liberals and Agrarians - and the Communists were excluded. The Social Democratic leader, Per Albin Hansson, continued as Prime Minister, and the party also retained the key ministries - with the exception of the office of Foreign Minister which went to a career diplomat. The non-Socialist cabinet members, however, outnumbered the Social Democrats.

Faced with an ominous threat, the coalition's first two years were characterized by party efforts to encourage a spirit of national unity and play down controversial matters. These efforts were reflected in the 1940 election when the governing parties agreed to exercise restraint regarding propaganda about politically charged issues. The election propaganda emphasized i.a. national unity and the threat of war, mobilization and military preparedness, and the war economy. The outcome of the election was a sizable victory for the Social Democrats who won 22 additional seats and acquired an impressive majority in the lower chamber of the Riksdag (134 of 230 seats). All the other parties suffered losses in seats, although the Conservatives increased their share of the vote. In particular, the Agrarians were seriously jarred by the loss of 8 out of 36 seats. Of further interest, the percentage of votes cast for parties to the left of the Social Democrats, which had been around 8 % during the 1930s, was reduced by half. The Communists, however, held their own - receiving a little under 4 %.[1)]

Along with the vital areas of foreign policy and defense, economic problems were a major headache of the coalition government. And eventually the economic policy of the war years had important consequences for party politics. With the outbreak of hostilities, and in particular the German occupation of Denmark and Norway, the Swedish economy was confronted with staggering problems of readjustment due to the blockade and the necessity of establishing war industries. The blockade not only created supply difficulties but also produced inflationary tendencies by causing higher freight and production

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* Social Democratic poster slogans

costs as well as a shortage of consumer goods. Two other factors aggravated inflationary tendencies. The first was the poor harvests of 1940 and 1941, together with the farmers' demand for better compensation. A second factor was wage policy. Employees had been often guaranteed automatic wage increases in the event that the cost of living index rose. Government measures to curb inflation consisted chiefly of price controls, rationing scarce commodities, subvention of certain basic necessities in order to keep the cost of living index down, and efforts to establish a ceiling on automatic wage increases. On the whole, however, these measures proved inadequate. In the spring of 1942 the possibility of introducing more drastic steps was probed. But it was not until after the local and county elections in September that a more stringent stabilization policy was initiated.

In the late autumn, price controls were tightened, and in effect the general price level was frozen. The new wage agreements, negotiated after price controls were tightened, meant that wages were also frozen. For the most part, the stabilization program came into being in a spirit of compromise and with the backing of the major economic organizations and the coalition parties.[2] The only condemnation of the stabilization program came from the Communists.[3] Economically, the stabilization measures were a success, and the price level remained relatively constant until the end of the war. Politically, the stabilization program had important repercussions because of the discontentment it generated. The farmers were generally dissatisfied with the prices set for their products. With time the workers also became increasingly unhappy with the wage freeze.

Up until the early months of 1943, it had been widely assumed in government circles and especially in the Foreign Ministry that the Germans would emerge victorious from the war.[4] The events of late 1942 and early 1943 led to a revised opinion and ensuing modifications of Swedish foreign policy - eventually the termination of the troop transit agreement and a reduction in trade with Germany.

The easing of the international situation had two major consequences for domestic politics. First, with the reduction of the external threat, the Communists acquired greater freedom of action, and increased agitation was signaled. The Communist party leader Sven Linderot announced a "new course" for the party shortly after the dissolution of the Comintern in May 1943. Linderot stressed the importance of trade union activity. Former factionalism - defined as a struggle with the Social Democrats to win positions of leadership in the trade unions - was to be replaced by a party line emphasizing unity and designed to galvanize the workers against the government's labor and wage policies. This tactic was dubbed a "united front from below", and

its aim, according to Linderot, was to create a single united Marxist party.[5]

The second consequence was that differences and friction among the governing parties became more visible. These differences frequently revolving around economic matters - government spending, taxation and postwar economic policy - became particularly evident when the 1943 budget proposal was made public and during a heated Riksdag debate in connection with the decision to request the government to appoint an inquiry commission to study reconversion of the economy. In the 1944 parliamentary debate the cleavage in economic matters persisted, focusing on taxation. Moreover, party activity in the Riksdag also assumed new proportions in contrast to the first years of the war when parliament's role in the political process had declined. There was a growing incidence of both parliament as a whole and individual parties deviating from the recommendations of the cabinet. Another facet of parliament reasserting itself was the sizable increase in the number of bills introduced by MPs during the 1944 spring session as well as the number of requests by parliament to appoint inquiry commissions.[6]

As the parties looked forward to peace, party activity outside the Riksdag also gained momentum. The Liberals, Social Democrats and Communists were engaged in revising and drafting party programs. In addition, the Liberals and Social Democrats presented programmatic statements for the postwar period during the first half of 1944, while the Agrarians designated their 1944 election platform as a special program of action for the postwar years. The Agrarian party was also attempting to expand the base of its support. In 1943 the Agrarians (literally the Farmers' Alliance) adopted the additional label of the rural party, and their propaganda placed considerable emphasis on the dichotomy between rural and urban interests.

The increased activity of the Communists resulted in gains during the 1944 trade union elections. Several Communist actions in the spring of 1944 can be interpreted as an ideological rapprochement to court Social Democratic followers generally and in particular Social Democrats who were dissatisfied with the 1944 version of the Party Program. The Communists criticized the revised Social Democratic Party Program. Simultaneously the Communists adopted a new program which deleted explicit advocacy of seizing power through violence and a dictatorship of the proletariat. And several aspects of the 1944 Communist Party Program resembled the 1920 version of the Social Democratic Party Program. In fact, it was openly declared that the Communists had taken the 1920 Social Democratic Program as the foundation for their new program.[7] Furthermore, much to the consternation of the Social Democrats, the Communists endorsed the Social Democratic action program for the postwar period, and urged unity in the working class to introduce the program.

Fuel was added to party controversy when the Social Democrats presented the Postwar Program in April 1944. The Program forecast a depression in the wake of the war. To attain full employment, the Social Democrats proposed a series of countercyclical measures, frequently involving some form of state intervention, plus improved employment exchanges and retraining programs to increase labor mobility. Fair distribution and a higher standard of living were to be secured primarily through a score of welfare measures. Wage, education and tax policies were also listed as means to these ends. No concrete taxation measures were proposed. But references were made to levelling incomes, inheritance taxes and restrictions on personal fortunes, thus intimating the possibility of higher taxes for wealthier groups. It was also declared that, if possible, tax cuts for low income groups would be introduced. But the Program clearly assigned greater priority to introducing welfare reforms than to reducing taxes. As brought out in the previous chapter, the Program contained a broad recommendation for more state intervention in the economy and economic democracy. The implementation of the Postwar Program, it was proclaimed, would "change the organization of the economy and transform society in a socialist direction".[8)]

The three non-Socialist parties also recommended countercyclical measures in the event of a depression, and they acknowledged the possible need of temporary state intervention during a period of transitional difficulties. But the Conservatives and Liberals adamantly opposed the prospect of permanent economic intervention and the scope of intervention implied by the Postwar Program. The non-Socialist press and party propaganda further condemned the Postwar Program as a blueprint for a totalitarian society based on state socialism.[9)] The Conservatives and Liberals were also critical of the guidelines for postwar taxation intimated in the Program.

Thus the approaching election was accompanied by an acceleration of party activity and an emergent party conflict - which was to be one of the most bitter party disputes of Swedish postwar politics. The intensity of the 1944 campaign was compounded by several circumstances. During the whole coalition period, with perhaps the exception of 1940, a cleavage in economic matters had loomed in the background and had periodically come out into the open. With the publication of the Postwar Program, the Social Democrats put forward several recommendations which the Conservatives and Liberals regarded as inimical. Moreover, the radical demands and formulations of the Postwar Program, as compared to party pronouncements of the 1930s, furnished the two parties with an opportunity to inflate the issue of socialization as well as the radical nature of the Social Democrats' postwar recommendations. Another factor which contributed to the fierceness of the campaign was the parliamenta-

ry situation. The strong possibility of a Social Democratic majority at the polls, which would enable the party to form a government on its own after the war, probably added to the zeal of the Liberals and Conservatives.

On one flank, then, the Social Democrats were confronted with Conservative and Liberal charges that the party advocated socialization, levelling and other policies which would lead to totalitarianism. On the other flank, the Communists were on the offensive, and as indicated by the results of the trade union elections, they were gaining ground. The Communists attacked both the ideological tenets and the everyday policy of the Social Democrats. The tactical situation of the Social Democrats was further complicated by strained relations between the workers and farmers resulting from wartime scarcity and Agrarian criticism of the Social Democrats.

3.2 Basic Features of the Rival Parties' Campaigns

The Communists: Protests against the National Coalition

The Communists likened the election to a vote of confidence by which the people could show their disapproval of the coalition government and its policies. The foreign and domestic policies of the national coalition were branded as having been determined by financial and reactionary interests. This was said to be manifested i.a. in a foreign policy favoring the Nazis and their "ally" Finland, the wage-freeze, the introduction of price controls after prices had become exorbitant, confiscation and censorship of newspapers, and a tax policy creating profits for business and imposing an unjust burden upon low income groups. The Social Democrats were mainly held responsible for these measures. They were generally accused of having failed the working people, engaging in class collaboration with the bourgeoisie, and being a pawn of big finance and monopoly capital. A continuation of the coalition government was deemed an obstacle to introducing the Postwar Program. On these grounds and on the basis of their support of the Postwar Program, the Communists called for the national coalition being replaced by a "left government" consisting of themselves, the Social Democrats and all progressive bourgeois groups which accepted the Postwar Program as a basis for future policy.[10)]

In contrast to the biting accusations which dominated the propaganda, the Communists put forward relatively moderate proposals. The platform contained vaguely and mildly worded demands, such as a policy "attuned to the movement to the left and the imminent process of social transformation" and cooperation between all honest democratic forces "to create the new Sweden of the future". The party campaigned on the Postwar Program and most of its demands

were quite similar to those stressed by the Social Democrats. However, the Communists urged immediate enactment of the Program instead of waiting until the end of the war. They also argued that the sole way to ensure the Program's implementation was to vote for them. The only major campaign recommendations which differed from those of the Social Democrats concerned taxation, agriculture and elimination of the cost of living index regions. The Communists demanded higher taxes for the wealthy, a special tax on fortunes, and the repeal of the wartime sales tax. Social Democratic emphasis on creating family farms was denounced by the Communists, and they advocated rationalization measures focusing on cooperatives.[11)]

Although the campaign literature per se did not refer to ideological divergences between the Communists and Social Democrats, other pamphlets published during 1944 prior to the election pointed out programmatic differences between the two parties. The revised program of the Social Democrats was characterized as a document of opportunism and "petty bourgeois socialism", stripped of the Marxist theories of capitalist exploitation and the class struggle, and failing to call for the abolition of the private capitalist right of ownership of the means of production. Furthermore, a number of articles in the Communist press attacked the Social Democratic line on socialization as being limited to a means of introducing economic planning, and this was condemned as a betrayal of the whole idea of socialism.[12)]

To sum up, the major arguments and demands were aimed at the labor movement - particularly malcontents. Under the banner "The rich have become richer, the poor poorer", the party emphasized the injustices of the wage-freeze and high taxes, which were the main grievances of the workers; and demands were formulated so as to be specifically addressed to the working class. The Communists urged the workers to adopt an "independent labor policy", in contrast to the Social Democratic policy of class collaboration. Oligarchic tendencies within the labor movement were criticized, and activation of the masses commended. In effect the Communists were pleading for a rank-and-file revolt against the labor leadership (both that of the party and LO), a "united front from below".[13)]

The Conservatives: "A Conservative Course or a Society of Coercion"
The fundamental issue of the election was depicted as making sure a free economy was not supplanted by a "socialist economy of coercion". The Conservatives, literally the Right, underscored the virtues of the private enterprise system and brandished an ominous picture of the dangers inherent in Social Democratic economic proposals. Private enterprise was hailed as the basis of Swedish progress and well-being, and a "strong, free economy" was

designated as a prerequisite for a higher standard of living and greater social security. Conversely, it was argued that state intervention - in the form of socialization and central planning - posed two basic threats: economic stagnation and the loss of freedom. Further disastrous consequences of a Social Democratic election victory were declared to be a party dictatorship, class rule, a growing bureaucracy, and taxation aimed at economic levelling.[14)]

Emphasis on opposition to Social Democratic economic policy tended to overshadow Conservative recommendations. Generally the Conservatives lagged seriously behind the other parties with regard to election promises. Proposals, which were advanced, were often vaguely formulated. Major exceptions were tax cuts,[15)] recommendations in the area of agriculture and to improve rural conditions,[16)] and demands for a strong defense and opposition to extremist parties.[17)]

The clearest gap in pledges concerned welfare policy. The Conservative platform stated that social security had to be fostered. But excluding the positive pronouncements on assistance for families, often linked to the Conservatives' traditional concern about the population question, the campaign literature was essentially void of welfare policy proposals. Moreover, reservations concerning the harmful effects of welfare policy on the economy and the individual's sense of responsibility tended to reaffirm the party's past position. And while the Conservatives acknowledged support of enacted welfare leglislation, they remained largely non-committal on future measures.[18)] To a certain degree, however, nonforthcoming promises of social benefits were compensated by pledges to reduce taxes.

The demand for lower taxes and arguments on the dangers of pending socialization were aimed, in part, at the workers and lower income strata. It was explained that tax cuts operated more to the advantage of lower income groups than did welfare policies. Social Democratic economic policy was described as not serving the interests of the workers. An attempt was also made to eliminate the notion that the Conservatives were an upper class party. A much more substantial appeal was addressed to the middle class - which according to the Conservative platform was comprised of small entrepreneurs, white-collar workers and employees. In fact, white-collar workers were a major target group of the Conservatives.[19)] An extensive and clear-cut appeal was also made to the farm vote. The interests of business were articulated in much of the campaign literature, but relatively few messages were specifically aimed at businessmen.

Each of the coalition parties was concerned with presenting a distinctive profile. This effort left a very definite imprint on the Conservative propaganda: several campaign themes re-echoed points of the Party Program. The

themes of a strong, free economy with no socialization, of "the defense of the fatherland as the most urgent task" facing the Swedish people, and the Conservatives' intransigent stand against the enemies of society, especially their endeavors to secure legislation outlawing extremist parties, served to give programmatic demands new currency. Moreover, one pamphlet was devoted to elucidating the nature of conservatism and its view of society and the state.[20)]

In short, much of the propaganda consisted of criticism and charges levelled against the Social Democrats as well as descriptions of the Conservative party; relatively few concrete proposals were offered. This preoccupation with criticizing the Social Democrats and with reinforcing the conservative image of the party appears to have had serious consequences, insofar as these themes were not complemented by a comprehensive program for the future. This weakness was heightened by the fact that the Conservatives were the only party without an action program at this time. One party spokesman caustically commented in retrospect, "The vital questions of our people as a nation had less resonance among the voters than questions concerning the living conditions of segments of the population."[21)]

The Liberals: Opposition to Socialism, Advocacy of Social Reforms - the Embryo of a Winning Strategy

The Liberals, the People's party, adopted a stance somewhere between the Conservatives and the Social Democrats. The People's party promulgated the necessity of a free enterprise economy and condemned Social Democratic proposals for increased state intervention with roughly the same arguments as the Conservatives. Similarly the Liberals urged an easing of the tax burden, and Social Democratic tax policy was criticized as confiscation. In general the Social Democrats' economic proposals were dubbed the "state socialistic alternative".

On the other hand, the Liberals professed that they were a social reform party, and recommendations for the postwar period figured more prominently in their campaign literature than in the Conservatives'. (However, the Liberals scarcely began to approach the Social Democrats' emphasis on welfare policy and reforms.) Besides a strong platform plank on welfare policy, Liberal propaganda was punctuated with demands for assistance for families, more comprehensive social insurance, better pensions and medical services, and a "broad-minded" welfare policy seeking to alleviate misery and injustices. It was additionally maintained that the dividing line between the Liberals and the Social Democrats did not involve welfare policies, as alleged by the Social Democrats, but concerned the degree of state intervention in the

economy and the level of taxation. Thus the Liberals put forward several recommendations which coincided with Social Democratic election promises, and simultaneously underlined the negative consequences of voting for the Social Democrats: "socialistic experiments", continued high taxes, class rule and a policy dictated by class interests, and increased Communist influence.[22)]

Although divergences between the Liberals and the Social Democrats were stressed, the propaganda also alluded to differences between the Conservatives and the People's party. The Conservative alternative for the postwar period was said to be mainly a resumption of the policy of the 1930s, while the Liberals' policy was progressive. A distinction was also made concerning the two parties' views on civil liberties - mainly with regard to freedom of the press and freedom of association. Misgivings were further expressed about the Right's traditional admiration of the authoritative state. The Liberals characterized themselves as the party of the golden mean, between the Conservatives and the Social Democrats. It was also noted that the Liberal party was based on idealism as opposed to materialism, that the Liberals were a party founded on ideas (*idéparti*). This characterization was important in distinguishing the Liberals from primarily the Social Democrats but also from the Agrarians - who were depicted as class and interest parties.[23)]

Besides these distinctions, emphasis on liberal tenets tended to amplify differences between the parties. A major slogan of the campaign was "Freedom first, justice foremost", and the newly adopted Party Program was, to some extent, disseminated via the campaign literature. The propaganda also contained several pronouncements on freedom, individualism and human dignity; and central significance was attached to the problem of safeguarding freedom. Individual freedoms had to be protected from encroachments by the state as well as large scale organizations, and freedom of action and the right of initiative were viewed as essential for the individual's personal development. In terms of policy, it was declared that government measures which promoted social levelling and security but endangered freedom had to be rejected.[24)]

Finally, the Liberals made efforts to attract the votes of businessmen, small farmers, temperance groups and Christians. In statements affecting the interests of business, the party stressed economic freedom, a reduction of the sales tax, and opposition to the nationalization of insurance companies and high direct taxes on income and fortunes. As distinct from the Conservatives, the Liberals put more emphasis on aiding small businessmen, merchants and craftsmen. The appeal to farmers was quite weak, compared to those of the other parties, excluding the Communists. But in this election the Liberals had a monopoly in their bid for the support of temperance groups, and their

propaganda directed to Christians surpassed that of the remaining parties.[25)]

The Agrarians: Justice for the Countryside and Equal Benefits for Rural and Urban Groups.

The main campaign theme of the Farmers' party was that the countryside had not received a fair deal and that this was evidenced by the disparity in the standard of living of urban and rural dwellers. The Agrarians proclaimed that they alone could reverse the trend in legislation which discriminated against the countryside, and their key slogan was: "Justice for the countryside". The Agrarian platform, an action program with an impressive number of demands to improve and establish equivalent living conditions for the rural population, reinforced the party's basic pledge. In the 1944 platform social benefits were elevated to a new prominence. Specific proposals for welfare measures exceeded the number of demands in earlier platforms; innovations were housing subventions, loans to newlyweds, and a broad program of social insurance. The advocacy of broad social insurance marked a turning point inasmuch as this was the first platform statement advocating a broad social welfare policy rather than merely proposing improvements of existing social services in the countryside or benefits limited to rural groups. Specific recommendations, however, were usually fused with the demand for an equivalent standard for social benefits and service in the town and country.[26)]

The platform also contained several demands accommodating a variety of rural occupational interests - both small farmers and larger landowners, small timber holders and forestry workers, fruit growers, fishermen, small businessmen and artisans. An attempt was also made to woo away farm laborers from the Social Democratic party. Messages to farm workers underlined that the Agrarians demanded equal wages for equal work; it was argued that higher wages were dependent upon a better price settlement for farm products, and that only the Farmers' party fought unrelentingly to achieve this.[27)] Thus one major aspect of the Agrarian campaign was to present an image of the party promoting a wide gamut of rural interests. Furthermore, a resentful tone toward cities and the urban way of life peppered the propaganda and probably lent strength to the party's claim that it alone sought to further rural concerns.

The second major aspect of the campaign consisted of discrediting the other parties' policies and proposals for securing a better livelihood for the rural population. The other parties were generally purported to regard the differences in income between industry and agriculture as justified. The Social Democrats, however, bore the brunt of the attack. They were accused of pursuing a housing policy which favored urban communities. The party,

along with LO, was also charged with giving priority to wage improvements of industrial workers and neglecting the wage problems of farm workers. Strong criticism was also levelled at the Social Democratic proposals for rationalization of agriculture and a land reform. With their implementation, the possibility of state control and ownership was said to loom large.[28)]

Equally crucial in making possible inroads on Social Democratic support among rural and farm groups, the Agrarians demanded the same benefits for everybody. The party emphasized its proposal to abolish the cost of living index regions, equal pensions, equal wages, equal tax exemptions and family allowances. In this way the Agrarians emulated the Social Democrats in the advocacy of social benefits. Simultaneously, the Agrarians inferred that Social Democratic policies were inconsistent with the party's subscription to equality, since its policies provided neither the same benefits for everyone nor equal wages for equal work. Thus it was held the Agrarians were the true champions of an equivalent standard and social justice.[29)]

3.3 Social Democratic Election Propaganda and Ideological Statements

3.3.1 The Election Propaganda: An Overview

The key "offensive" of the Social Democrats' campaign was their emphasis on future policy. Recommendations for the postwar period and the theme that the party had an action program to deal with problems dominated the propaganda. In effect, the party assumed the lead in several policy areas. Besides, the focus on future policy may have diverted dissatisfaction with stringent wartime measures. Campaigning on the Postwar Program also served to dissociate the Social Democrats from the other governing parties.

The main facets of postwar policy highlighted were *full employment*, expansion of *welfare legislation*, *agriculture*, *housing* and *education* - with major stress on full employment and welfare policy. Party recommendations in these areas were spelled out as jobs, social insurance, larger pension allowances, assistance for families, public aid for agriculture, better and cheaper housing, and improved educational opportunities. These benefits were usually to be secured either through reform legislation or more government influence over the economy.

Two issues were conspicuous by their near absence in the campaign literature: taxation and socialization. The platform mentioned the possibility of tax cuts for low and middle income groups, but the bulk of the campaign literature glossed over the issue of taxation and emphasized social benefits instead. Moreover, the platform and the few other statements on taxation stipulated that tax relief must not jeopardize the financing of urgent social

reforms. Essentially the party's position was that it would try to find a way to reduce taxes for low and middle income groups and simultaneously finance the major reforms. In comments to party sympathizers on taxation, reductions for high income groups were flatly rejected, and the possibility of steeper taxes on wealth was hinted at.[30] As for socialization, a few pieces of campaign literature suggested socialization as a possible measure.[31] But relatively little of the propaganda dealt with the issue. This relative silence suggests that the Social Democrats were trying to keep socialization from becoming the decisive issue of the election.

The importance of party differences concerning postwar policy was emphasized in the election platform. But in propaganda aimed at the mass electorate, only a few current differences in policy were actually specified. Policy differences concerning agriculture were underlined, and Conservative opposition to the Postwar Program was pointed out. Otherwise statements on party differences largely consisted of calling attention to past opposition to Social Democratic policy. Both non-Socialist disapproval and Communist condemnation of the 1933 employment policy and welfare legislation during the 1930s were prominent themes.[32]

Delineating party differences was substantially more important in campaign literature directed to party members and sympathizers than in propaganda to other groups - with the exception of the appeal to the farming population. Prime emphasis was on differences between the party and the non-Socialists in the areas of employment policy, welfare policy and agriculture. To a lesser extent the propaganda referred to divergences in the questions of housing, taxation and industrial democracy. In several instances it was noted that these policy differences were related to dissimilar ideological stances.[33]

On the other hand, the propaganda did not mention any current policy differences between the Social Democrats and Communists, but this was mainly precluded by the fact that the Communists also based their campaign on the Postwar Program. Nor were ideological differences between them heavily emphasized. Instead divergences between the two parties were marked by Social Democratic accusations against the Communists and statements defending the Social Democrats. The Communists were depicted as generally incompetent, ideologically irresponsible, and as practicing the politics of deception and making rash promises. The incompetence and unreliability of the Communists were contrasted with Social Democratic achievements. It was argued that the Social Democrats alone could best promote the interests of labor, that a vote for the Communists would split the labor movement, and that this was only to the advantage of the non-Socialist parties.[34]

In refuting charges, the Social Democrats focused primarily on the Com-

munists and secondly on the Agrarians, while only two aspects of the Conservative and Liberal propaganda were countered. The Social Democrats sought to discredit Communist criticism of foreign policy, taxation and the wage-freeze.[35] The Agrarians' attack on the system of cost of living index regions was largely brushed off as a tactical maneuver, and the Social Democrats concentrated on defending their scheme for the rationalization of agriculture.[36] The two aspects of Conservative and Liberal propaganda which were challenged concerned taxation and the argument that the party's proposals menaced freedom. On the tax issue, the Social Democrats countered non-Socialist propaganda in an oblique fashion. In a leaflet issued for mass distribution on the eve of the election, the Conservative demand for lower taxes was described as a calculated move to reduce government funds in order to torpedo the full employment policy and the postwar welfare program.[37]

The pattern of group appeals in the 1944 campaign literature largely followed the practice of the 1930s: aside from propaganda aimed at the entire electorate, campaign literature was mainly directed to the labor movement with special messages to women and young people; and the major appeal to a group outside the labor movement was to the farming population. The strong appeal to workers and agricultural groups in 1944 was not merely a reflection of continuity. It was no doubt prompted by widespread discontent among the workers and farmers as well as the drives by the Communists and Agrarians to regain and increase their electoral support by attracting these groups.

Messages aimed at the workers stressed labor policy proposals, welfare legislation, and the points in the Postwar Program which especially accommodated the interests of workers. In fact, a striking feature of the 1944 campaign was the clear-cut articulation of workers' interests in the form of policy proposals. Besides full employment, the Social Democrats called for higher real wages, a solidaristic wage policy, better labor exchanges and vocational guidance and training, improved industrial safety and hygiene, shorter working hours, and workers' influence. Moreover, issues and policy recommendations were described in terms of immediacy for the workers. For instance the propaganda inquired: "What about a job?" and the poster slogan: "Work stoppages? No, jobs!".[38]

In their appeal to the second major target group, the Social Democrats promised to provide the farming population with a standard of living comparable to other groups through rationalization of agriculture and protection against a decline in farm prices. Creating equivalent conditions for rural and urban residents with regard to pensions, housing and educational opportunities was a prominent theme.[39]

The prime differences in the 1944 propaganda from the pattern of the 1930s

were a modest appeal specifically addressed to white-collar workers and an effort to reach new groups - considered as inacessible through the party's normal channels of propaganda - by an advertisement campaign in the weekly press, an innovation in Social Democratic election propaganda.[40] The advertisements mainly converted party recommendations into the everyday and personal concerns of the voters. The successful leadership of P.A. Hansson was also a major theme of the press campaign. The appeal to white-collar workers focused on party demands for full employment, higher real wages, increased social benefits, improved education, and cheaper and better housing. The common interests of laborers and white-collar workers - as employees - were noted. And the appeal attempted to erase the image of the Social Democrats as strictly a working class party, instead they were pictured as the party of the wage-earners.[41] Additional appeals were made to elderly people and Christians. Only the Social Democrats appealed to pensioners, but the party's appeal to Christians was dwarfed by the prominence given to Christianity especially by the Liberals but also by the Conservatives.

In conclusion, the Social Democrats who had received over 50 % of the votes cast in the last elections concentrated on retaining the support of previous backers - the working class (both industrial and agricultural laborers) and other low income groups in the farming population. This basic thrust was complemented by efforts to reach new sections of the electorate and an intensification of propaganda to the general electorate. Thus a striking feature of the 1944 strategy was a dual focus on previous backers and the general electorate. More significant, this dual focus was characterized by a differentiation in the content and uses of ideological statements. In messages to previous supporters - and especially to workers and party activists - ideological statements were more prominent; traditional tenets were more frequently invoked; party and ideological differences were clarified. On the other hand, in the propaganda to the general electorate certain ideological messages were de-emphasized or deleted, and a different pattern in the content and uses of ideological statements emerges.

3.3.2 Ideological Statements in the Propaganda

In this analysis, ideological statements have been identified on the basis of the definition of party ideology in Chapter 1. To recapitulate, they include statements envisioning or reflecting the nature of the good society and pronouncements about fundamental goals and political ideals of democracy, freedom, equality, justice etc. Declarations about means are mainly confined to statements dealing with means assigned an important place in the Party Program and the Postwar Program: socialization, planned economy/economic

planning, state intervention and control, and levelling policies. Statements evaluating society focus on assessments of the economic system and class society.

The analysis is concerned with the content of the ideological statements in the propaganda, but especially with their functions to determine what role ideology plays in electoral politics. For example, does a particular statement assume the form of a demand or specific recommendation? is it a justification for policy measures? or a description of party differences? Thus in attempting to determine the tasks and uses of ideological statements, the categories of analysis presented in Chapter 1, with certain modifications, have been utilized. The categories are the following:

1) goal formulations, demands and recommendations
2) arguments and justifications
3) statements about party differences
4) statements defending the party and counter-arguments
5) statements articulating and/or aggregating interests and groups.

Since emphasis is on functions, the analysis of the campaign literature is organized around these categories rather than thematic categories based on subject matter. However, in describing the election propaganda, demands and recommendations have been grouped by policy areas. Although arguments and justifications form a separate analytical category, it is more profitable to discuss arguments in conjunction with recommendations in order to avoid too great a fragmentation and repetition. This sort of presentation provides a more comprehensive picture of the party's positions in the policy areas, brought up in the propaganda, than would otherwise be possible.

The most substantial modification is the omission of definitions of the situation as a category. This deletion, as noted in Chapter 1, is largely a result of concentrating on prescriptions and guidelines for action and not on diagnosis. In the process, definitions of the situation have become peripheral to the analysis.

Recommendations and Argumentation

A distinctive feature of the 1944 election was that propaganda to the general electorate and messages to party supporters conveyed dual images of the party's aspirations and recommendations for the postwar period. The dual picture of party aspirations is best exemplified by descriptions of the Postwar Program in the election platform and a pamphlet by Ernst Wigforss, Minister of Finance, addressed to workers and party activists.

The platform summed up the cornerstones of the Postwar Program as "*jobs, social services and education*". The Program's basic premise, according to

the platform, was that national resources were common and were to provide for the security of everyone. As distinct from the socialist transformation of society proclaimed in the Postwar Program, the platform declared that the Postwar Program indicated the ways "to make society into a better home for people", which resembled Per Albin Hansson's popular vision of the good society - "the People's home" (*folkhemmet*). Of the Postwar Program's broad goals, the platform emphasized full employment, a higher standard of living, and greater efficiency. More democracy in the economy and fair distribution were not mentioned, although the platform did call for levelling the costs of having children.

In contrast, Wigforss declared that the broad goals of the Postwar Program signified an assault on the economic conditions of the existing society. He argued fervently for fair distribution and economic democracy, and he related the Program's goals to traditional socialist concerns. Fair distribution was to be achieved through a "socialist levelling policy" and economic democracy through doing away with ownership privileges.[42)]

Similar differences existed in presenting the major policy recommendations for the postwar period to the general electorate and party sympathizers. Much of the propaganda for mass distribution, and especially the platform and advertisments in the weekly press, stressed goals and policy objectives which were usually synonymous with material benefits for the electorate. Recommendations tended to be general or vague. Ideological arguments and recommendations of a controversial nature were often deleted or de-emphasized. When controversial means were suggested, they were justified in terms of specific policy objectives involving material benefits such as jobs, cheaper housing, more land for small farmers, etc. Controversial recommendations were seldom fashioned as instruments for attaining ideological aspirations.

Propaganda intended for party stalwarts put more emphasis on traditional ideological goals and recommendations, and proposed measures were justified on ideological grounds. Furthermore, recommendations in messages to party supporters were often more specific and detailed than those in the general propaganda. Elements of this differentiated pattern emerge in varying degrees in the major policy recommendations for the postwar period: full employment, welfare legislation, housing, agriculture and education.

Full Employment

All types of campaign literature stressed the primacy of the employment issue and recommended state intervention to achieve full employment; however, the kind and specificity of recommended intervention varied considerably. The platform declared that the state, in cooperation with economic organiza-

tions, was to organize and ensure the rational utilization of national resources in order to keep the economy in full swing. The ads in the weekly press urged economic planning and quoted the Postwar Program:

> The major task is to coordinate economic activity in a planned economy so that labor and material resources are continuously utilized for efficient production. Such coordination ought to occur under government direction and to the effect that private interests are subordinated to goals mutually sought.

Otherwise emphasis was on keeping regular production in full swing by public measures to 1) sustain buying power and 2) replace armaments production with production satisfying wants in peacetime. More concrete recommendations in the ads and the party magazine Vår väg consisted of encouragement of construction activity and especially housing, government planning for the creation of jobs, public works projects, and public employment exchanges. Apart from the propaganda listing the 27 points, only Wigforss' pamphlet "Bread and Freedom", directed to the workers and party activists, provided a fuller enumeration of measures to attain full employment. The measures generally coincided with the points of action in the Postwar Program: gradual lowering of prices and a low rate of interest; some form of control over capital investments; planning and public regulation of housing construction; state guaranteed production of consumer goods and public measures to strengthen consumer buying power; government credits to foreign countries to maintain exports and an export organization for small industries; and improvement projects in agriculture, forestry and fisheries.[43)]

Differences in argumentation, however, were more pronounced than variations in specifying the kind of state intervention needed to achieve full employment. All the campaign literature emphasized the likelihood of a postwar depression and the benefits of a full employment policy, but these two arguments assumed greater proportions in the propaganda to the general electorate. In addition, the propaganda to the entire electorate put forward moderate, sometimes consensual, arguments for state intervention; traditionally oriented ideological arguments were not advanced.

Campaign literature directed to workers, party sympathizers and activists - on the contrary - invoked ideological justifications. Essentially three arguments of this sort were put forward. The first argument noted shortcomings in the functioning of the economic system. Vår väg, distributed to party sympathizers in this election, generally cast a dubious light on the capabilities of private enterprise. Wigforss' pamphlet and the brochure of the young socialists went much further in expounding the traditional criticism of the private enterprise economy. The two pamphlets declared that state intervention

was necessitated by the periodical crises characterizing the capitalist economy.

The second argument maintained that extending state influence in the economy would entail greater freedom for the majority of people. The crucial point of the argument was that the livelihood of the majority was dependent upon the decisions of a small minority. The two pamphlets contended that the economic freedom of the masses was constricted by the decisions of a privileged few who determined conditions of employment and production. State intervention guaranteeing employment and higher production, therefore, eliminated dependence on the decisions of the privileged few - increasing the freedom of the majority. In more pointed terms, Wigforss stated that the full employment policy would result in "the propertyless wage laborer not being completely dependent on private capital owners' judgments of whether it was profitable to offer work".

Thirdly it was argued that greater state intervention would promote economic democracy. Wigforss declared that democracy meant increased influence of all the people over the economy, upon which their livelihood depended; and state intervention was viewed as a vehicle through which the common influence of the people could be brought to bear in determining the direction of the economy. More implicit was the notion that state intervention would change the basis of decisions determining the use of productive forces: decisions would no longer be based on the private interests of a small minority but on the common interests of the people.[44)]

Welfare and Labor Policy

Of equal prominence in the campaign literature was welfare policy. The Social Democrats called for the continuation of welfare legislation, and expansion of welfare policies was also linked with past social benefits introduced by the party in the 1930s. This campaign theme was summed up in the slogan: "Carry on the welfare policy" and in statements that "the job is only half done". It was also declared that social legislation was going to be radically recast by making benefits available to *all* citizens.

An unprecedented number of welfare measures were brought before the electorate: health and accident insurance, unemployment and disability insurance, a national pension reform, general child allowances, reorganization of poor relief, maternity allowances, extension of vacation legislation, a variety of labor policy measures, and improvements for the partially disabled. Major emphasis was placed in the pension reform and assistance for families.[45)]

A prevalent type of argument in the propaganda dealt with the hardships facing certain underprivileged groups and justified welfare policies as

improving their situation. This sort of argument was often linked with the goals of a minimum standard and social security. Messages to party sympathizers also mentioned more ambitious objectives for welfare policy: a higher standard of living and fair distribution. Vår väg characterized welfare policies in general as the redistribution of wealth from the rich to the less fortunate. In a similar vein, Wigforss stated that welfare policies were a form of socialism inasmuch as the total income of the people was regarded as a common resource and a portion of it was transferred to those with inadequate incomes. In his pamphlet, welfare measures and taxation were designated as "levelling policies" to achieve a higher standard of living and fair distribution. There were also occasional references to welfare legislation as the "work of social transformation" and as the means of creating the good society.[46)]

In the area of labor policy both the demand for greater employee influence in management and wage policy recommendations had strong ideological overtones. Wage policy recommendations were linked to the aspiration of equalization. The propaganda emphasized equal pay for equal work and a levelling of wage differentials between men and women as well as between agriculture and other branches of the economy. Secondly, the party advocated a general rise in real wages but argued that groups with particularly low income deserved additional pay increases.[47)]

Housing

The election platform declared that in the area of housing the state had to assume an entirely different role from previous years, and the ads explained that the "new" position of the state should consist in being responsible for providing satisfactory housing. In a few ads state intervention was qualified by the "rider" - when free enterprise displayed inability to solve the problems, but otherwise the failure of private enterprise was clearly assumed. Neither detailed recommendations nor guidelines for state intervention, however, were put forward - except concerning monopolistic prices of building materials in housing construction. Four ads invoked the Postwar Program, proposing more public information about price cartels, and two ads stated: "In the case of monopolistic price cartels, competition ought to be created, and if necessary as public or non-profit enterprises. If this is not possible, ownership of the monopoly ought to be transferred to society." The young socialists' brochure contained a more general demand for public construction of housing.

The major argument for state intervention and the controversial suggestion to socialized the building materials industry can be summed up in the election poster slogan: "Better and cheaper housing". This argument emphasizing material benefits was accompanied by a stern assessment of private enterprise

juxtaposed with the advantages of public intervention. Several ads emphasized that speculation, preoccupation with profits, and monopolistic practices had led to high rents, an inadequate amount of construction, and generally a failure to satisfy the public need for housing. Free enterprise, the ads maintained, resulted in "freedom" to live in crowded, expensive housing; "freedom" for the poorest and largest families to live under the worst conditions; "freedom" for a few to make profits at the expense of the majority. In contrast, through wartime public construction, the housing shortage had been eased, speculation had been prevented, seasonal unemployment had been reduced, fluctuations in housing construction had been evened out, thus lowering costs and rents. It was also noted that the state had rationalization possibilities which private individuals lacked. In one case, the proposed housing policy was characterized as "rationalized, planned housing production based on human needs not interests in profits". This notion recurred in the ad caption: "Public Welfare above Private Gains".[48)]

Agricultural Policy

The campaign literature focused on two problems of agriculture: international price fluctuations which were to be counteracted by price supports and structural problems which necessitated a land reform and rationalization. Although the ads laid emphasis on protective measures for farmers, several reservations were expressed about price supports as a long-range solution. Instead prime attention was devoted to the land reform and rationalization. Conversion of insufficient units into profitable family farms was designated as an objective of the land reform. Rationalization referred to mechanization and the introduction of labor-saving methods. In a few instances, it was equated with increasing collective use of machinery and other forms of cooperation (a point in the Party Program). According to the propaganda, the role of the state was to plan and finance the reform.

The most specific statement in the campaign literature on how to achieve rationalization was contained in Per Edvin Sköld's pamphlet "The Future of Agriculture", directed to party activists and workers. It outlined the following four steps: 1) a public investigation into various aspects of agriculture to map out problems and solutions 2) a publicity campaign among the farmers to explain the merits of rationalization 3) establishment of local agencies, composed of representatives of the government, farm organizations, agricultural workers' union, and other interests 4) formulation of local plans for rationalization with the consent of the farmers. Of additional interest is the resemblance of the scheme to the organization of planning prescribed in the Postwar Program, i.e. creating public agencies comprised of government

representatives and organized interests for coordination and planning in a sector of the economy.

The bulk of the argumentation for the proposals was a description of the plight of agriculture and the necessity of surmounting its problems. However, the distinctive aspects of Social Democratic recommendations - the advocacy of state intervention and reservations concerning price supports - were justified by arguments with an ideological bent. The necessity of state involvement in overcoming structural problems was based on the view that the individual, especially the small farmer, was unable to undertake the financing and planning of rationalization. This, in turn, may be interpreted as deriving from a conception, prevalent among the Social Democrats, that the individual alone could not master overwhelming social and economic problems. Regarding price supports, the propaganda noted their limitations in attaining an equivalent standard of living: price supports favored the larger farmers and did not help the small farmers who were in the greatest need of aid.[49)]

Education

The importance of educational policy was emphasized in the election platform by designating it as one of the cornerstones of the Postwar Program. In the press campaign three major demands were put forward: eliminating economic barriers to education, creating equal opportunities for young people in urban and rural areas, and improving vocational training and guidance. The young socialists' leaflet and pamphlet additionally advocated longer and better elementary education in the form of an *enhetsskola* (a comprehensive school). Their pamphlet made the most specific recommendations contained in the campaign literature: 1) the elementary school should be extended from six to nine years, and the intermediate school (*realskola*) should be done away with 2) the university entrance examination system *(studentexamen)* ought to be abolished.

The argumentation in the ads centered on the long-standing demand in the Party Program: "Economic barriers to education are to be eliminated". The press campaign stressed that wealth was the major factor determining type and length of education, and several ads condemned the restrictive influence of wealth as creating social injustices. The ads also argued that the intelligence of the younger generation was a capital asset and that economic barriers to education resulted in the waste of human potential. In general, the press campaign depicted the defects of the existing system in terms of its effects on the individual and as a source of waste for society.

The pamphlet of the youth organization put considerably more weight on social injustices connected with the education system as well as its un-

democratic consequences. The school system reinforced access by a privileged few to the key positions in production and administration, creating a contradiction in a democratic society for two reasons: 1) recruitment to these positions was not from the masses and 2) one of the guiding principles of democracy was removal of privileges. The young socialists also called for democratizing the school system per se. They protested against pupils being separated into a grammar school and a more "exclusive" school and prescribed that everyone should go to the same school.[50)]

. . . .

Thus with regard to three major issues of the election - full employment, housing and agriculture - the prime recommendation was substantial increases in state intervention. The demand for full employment was fused with the demand for a planned economy. In the case of housing, the possibility of socializing monopolies in the building materials industry was raised. The propaganda listing the 27 points verbatim also recommended "gradual transfer of building sites and apartment houses to local government ownership" and "government support of non-profit production or socialization where private enterprise entails abuses or monopolistic practices".

The campaign recommendations were complemented by a statement of principle on state intervention. Wigforss declared that the scope and kind of government measures, and particularly the extension of public enterprise, were dependent upon their effectiveness as a means to attain full employment and greater efficiency in production. More specifically, Wigforss' remarks about the possible extension of public enterprise centered on 1) investments and 2) eliminating inefficient monopolistic practices. He maintained that a substantial amount of public enterprise could decisively facilitate the task of stabilizing investments, and that the investment activity of public enterprises could be expanded to ward off a depression. To combat private monopolies, Wigforss named two avenues: creating competition in the form of cooperative or public enterprises and, secondly, nationalization or in Wigforss' words "organizing the entire branch as a public enterprise".[51)]

To what extent did the 1944 campaign demands constitute a radicalization as compared with the election propaganda of the preceding decade? Ever since the 1932 election, government measures to cope with unemployment had been a prime issue in Social Democratic campaign literature; however, the type of intervention recommended had varied. In 1932 public works projects were urged, in 1936 "cooperation between government representatives and private enterprise", in 1938 public measures to aid in the marketing of Swedish exports. The question of state intervention in housing had cropped up in the 1936 and 1938 elections.[52)]

Now in the 1944 election these points were welded together and, along with several other instruments of a countercyclical policy, put to the voters. Further, the demand for public measures in rationalization of agriculture represented a shift in Social Democratic farm policy, and the government was assigned a broader role in the housing sector. The inclusive purview of state intervention was additionally indicated in the platform statement that "productive resources (must) be effectively utilized in *all* sectors, industry and handicrafts as well as agriculture and forestry" and that the government was responsible for a rational use of all national resources. Not only were the areas of state intervention expanded, participation in economic cooperation was now extended to organizations of employees; during the 1930s cooperation had been prescribed between the government and business. Although rather cautiously, the question of industrial democracy was interjected into the 1944 campaign.[53)] Finally, in this election the coordination of economic activity and state intervention were fashioned a planned economy. During the elections of the 1930s the Social Democrats had urged a more efficient organization of the economy and more planning, but they did not describe their recommendations as a planned economy. Instead their recommendations for more state intervention were presented as an unemployment policy - or an anti-depression program.

In short, the radicalization in the Social Democratic campaign demands stemmed firstly from the fact that a number of past demands for state intervention were now compounded and complemented with new recommendations, and that these recommendations were summed up as planned economy. Secondly, socialization and industrial democracy were muted demands in comparison to the attention riveted on other questions; however the Social Democrats had not campaigned on these demands in a national election since 1928, and in this respect even the limited references to socialization and industrial democracy constituted a revival of radical proposals.

Statements on Party Differences

Statements on party differences - especially ideological differences - were an important element of the dualistic strategy. They tended to reinforce the dual images of party aspirations since in this election these statements figured much more prominently in messages to party sympathizers than in the campaign literature aimed at the general electorate.

In messages to regular backers, the two major ideological distinctions between the Social Democrats and the non-Socialists were state intervention and fair distribution - and both were linked to socialism. Fair distribution was indirectly related to socialism by references to a socialist

levelling policy.[54] State intervention was fused with the traditional Socialist - non-Socialist cleavage. Wigforss declared that the broad goals of the Postwar Program could only be attained by common measures, which could be termed as "socialist in the broadest sense of the word". He added that the opponents of Social Democracy criticized these measures on the basis of their socialist character. Differences concerning state intervention were further accentuated by pointing to party disagreement over the role of the state in maintaining the level of employment, in rationalization of agriculture, and control over the production of building materials.[55]

Fair distribution was declared a party difference in two different contexts. First, Wigforss argued that the non-Socialists viewed an uneven distribution as a prerequisite for efficient production. In contrast, he maintained that levelling policies contributed to increases in production by 1) improving the productive capacity of the people and 2) raising the level of consumption. According to him, these conflicting views caused policy differences concerning increased welfare expenditures, steeper taxes on high income and wealth, and wage policy. Wigforss also claimed that the non-Socialists regarded increased production as more important than fair distribution. He stressed that greater production without fair distribution was unacceptable, and he also called for raising the standard of the masses even if it meant decreasing the affluence of the few. Secondly, a distinction was made concerning fair distribution between rural and urban areas - and this distinction was not limited to messages aimed at party regulars. The campaign literature stated that the Agrarians and Conservatives wanted a levelling between the countryside and cities; the Social Democrats underlined that this sort of equalization had to be combined with a levelling between economic classes.[56]

Considering the amount of propaganda focusing on the Communists, relatively few ideological differences were drawn. Fakta, published for "party debaters", implied a distinction involving democracy by characterizing the Communists' subscription to democracy as a contradiction, since their ultimate ideal was the Soviet dictatorship. Elsewhere the campaign literature alluded to differences concerning reformist versus revolutionary means of transforming society and underscored Communist disapproval of reformist methods.[57]

Statements Defending the Party

The sharpest differentiation in propaganda to party sympathizers and the rest of the electorate concerned ideological statements defending the party. These statements occurred almost exclusively in propaganda to party supporters.

The importance of ideological statements in discrediting Communist criticism was largely confined to the wage issue and taxation. Emphasis on fair distribution and levelling tended to dilute the strength of Communist allegations. The Social Democrats countered the condemnation of the wage freeze by pointing out the redistributional effect of welfare policies, and social benefits were portrayed as the transfer of income to the workers and spelled out as cash benefits. The Communist charge that the taxation policy had led to "the rich becoming richer and the poor becoming poorer" was indirectly refuted by Wigforss' statement that levelling had occurred in some instances through wartime taxes on wealth.[58)]

Ideological pronouncements were much more important in dismissing non-Socialist propaganda. For example, fair distribution and levelling were forcefully argued in countering non-Socialist propaganda on taxation. In the propaganda directed to workers and party sympathizers, Wigforss deftly singled out one aspect of the non-Socialist criticism - their disapproval of taxation for levelling purposes. In this way he shifted the discussion to their opposition to levelling policies in general, which simultaneously inferred a reluctance toward welfare policies and trade union wage demands. In defending levelling policies, Wigforss argued against a number of non-Socialist objections - progressive taxation was an ineffective means of levelling; levelling policies stifled individual initiative; they placed a burden on the economy and retarded growth of production; they endangered saving and capital formation. He declared that the existing disparities in the distribution of wealth made equalization an imperative task. Moreover the distribution of wealth, it was held, was so disproportionate that it could not possibly reflect the contributions by individuals to production, and hence a substantial economic levelling was possible without adversely affecting individual initiative. Wigforss also denied that "socialist levelling policy" did not take account of the problem of individual incentive, and quoted the Party Program:

> The motivating force contributing to economic progress represented by the individual's desire to improve his position is to be taken into consideration in the work for a basic levelling of incomes...

In discrediting the objection that levelling policies endangered capital formation, the alternative of collective saving was mentioned. Wigforss proclaimed that collective saving, which replaced capital information by wealthier social groups, represented a democratization of the economy. Furthermore, he related it to the goal of the Party Program:

> It is part of the development by which "the majority is liberated from dependence upon a small number of owners of capital" and "the right to determine production is placed in the hands of all the people". 59)

Wigforss also devoted major attention to the accusation that Social Democratic policy posed a threat to freedom. He argued that the party's policy in the spheres of employment and education promoted the freedom of the individual. Primarily, however, Wigforss presented another side of the question of freedom. He argued that Social Democratic policy would result in greater freedom for the majority: "State intervention guaranteeing employment and better production means increased freedom for the majority because it increases their influence over their own work and livelihood." Concurrently he noted the limited freedom of those not having a share in the ownership of the means of production in a "free economy". Furthermore, the freedom of the workers and the people was pitted against the freedom of the economically privileged:

> The struggle for increased freedom for the workers in the workshop, local and national government has naturally been a struggle to limit the power and freedom of the people formerly in power. The continuing work to remove economic privileges has the same aim. In this sense the powerful position of Social Democracy implies a threat to the freedom of certain groups. It must be further limited in order that freedom be equally the heritage of the entire people.

Finally, industrial democracy was depicted as a means of attaining freedom in the form of the liberation and development of the individual's energies. Wigforss, in an indirect fashion, related industrial democracy to state intervention by implying that common ownership would eliminate an obstacle to the introduction of industrial democracy, since bourgeois notions of the sacrosant relationship between administrative decisions and ownership inhibited willingness to consider industrial democracy.[60)]

On the other hand, the Social Democrats largely ignored non-Socialist charges of socialization. The allegations were left totally unanswered in campaign literature aimed at the general electorate. A few statements, however, were issued to party sympathizers. Wigforss rejected the idea that the party wanted total socialization, but he also argued that changes in the right of ownership were desired as long as ownership remained a privilege. Morgonbris, the magazine of the Social Democratic Women's Federation, declared that the Social Democrats had no intention of socializing private enterprise as long as it performed efficiently.[61)] This general reticence constituted the party's solution to a tactical dilemma. The possibilities of denials or reservations concerning socialization, which could cause dissident radicals in the party to defect to the Communists, had to be weighed against the chances of voters switching over to the non-Socialists because the charges had not been refuted.

Ideological statements were of importance in efforts to solicit the votes of the labor movement, the farming population and Christians. They were of less prominence in the appeal to white-collar workers. However, one leaflet addressed to white-collar workers did express demands of an ideological character:a fairer distribution of income and industrial democracy (*företags-demokrati*); planned housing production; state intervention and planning in the economy, if private enterprise faltered; and political, economic, and social democracy.[62)]

Not surprisingly, the propaganda aimed at the labor movement contained the most fervent invocation of traditional ideological tenets. References to an ideal society of the future punctuated the appeal. The LO flyer "Peace" called for a new order where unemployment was non-existent and the common good had precedence over private interests. The Women's Federation reminded that "socialism was a higher organization than capitalism". In his pamphlet to workers and party activists, Wigforss propounded the necessity of changes in society and removal of economic privileges. The pamphlet of the young socialists envisaged a more just society with fair distribution, equal opportunities and elimination of social differences. The prominence of ideological arguments in the young socialist brochure was exceeded only by Wigforss' pamphlet, and frequently the special demands of youth were integrated with ideological statements. For example, the young socialists, in stressing the need of better recreation facilities, pleaded that young people should not be at the complete mercy of the private capitalist entertainment industry.[63)]

The key ideological themes in the appeal to the farming population were levelling,fair distribution and the nature of economic divisions in society. These themes served to aggregate the farming population and the labor movement on three levels. The broadest of these was a rural-urban dimension. The appeal maintained that the common interests of the "little people" (*småfolk*) in the towns and countryside outweighed rural and urban considerations. An equivalent standard for cities and rural areas had to be complemented by a levelling between economic classes, and the conditions of the most deprived groups in society had to be improved. Secondly, the Social Democrats sought to drive a wedge between small and large farmers. The press campaign, along with a special poster for rural areas, called attention to differences in income and hours of work between small holders and large landowners - and argued that unless the size of farms was levelled out, higher prices would continue to favor the larger farmers. The necessity of state intervention in securing more land for small holders was also underscored. Thirdly, the

messages to the farm workers emphasized the schism between them and farmers (as employers), as contrasted with the community of interests of industrial and agricultural workers. They were joined by virtue of their propertyless condition and dependence on economic conditions as well as trade union endeavors to achieve fair distribution of the fruits of labor irrespective of the branch of the economy.

In aggregating the farming population and labor, the propaganda also sought to induce workers to perceive mutual interests. This was partially accomplished by pointing to economic divisions within the farming population and noting that poverty was most common in this segment of the population. It was further argued that a policy which did not aid impoverished rural groups was incompatible with the longstanding party aspiration of eradicating poverty. Finally, statements on the necessity of state intervention in agriculture were a common denominator in the messages to workers and the farming population.[64)]

The thrust of the appeal to Christians was to explain the similarities between Christian and socialist aspirations, and the reinforcing relationship between Christianity and socialism in seeking a better society was underlined. A recurring theme was that welfare measures introduced by the Social Democrats were in accord with the Christian ethic: welfare policies aiding the weak embodied the teaching of brotherly love and solidarity. In addition politics was basically viewed as a process by which society could be improved by being imbued with Christian virtues, and one vision of the future society - a cooperative society characterized by freedom, solidarity and brotherhood -resembled the Party Program's goal of "a commonwealth of free and equal citizens working together".[65)] Although this appeal was limited in size and its impact was probably further blunted by the prominence given to Christianity in Liberal and Conservative propaganda, the significance of this appeal should not be entirely discounted. By stressing social change to make society more Christian rather than emphasizing Christianity in connection with preserving society, as the non-Socialist propaganda tended to do, the Christian Social Democrats offered an additional alternative to the religious voter. Thus this appeal may have contributed to the further splintering of the Christian vote and limited the possibility of the non-Socialist - Socialist cleavage being congruent with the non-Christian - Christian cleavage in Swedish politics.[66)]

In summary, the differences in propaganda aimed at party sympathizers and at the rest of the electorate tended to reduce the importance of ideological statements in aggregating groups. For example, much of the discussion of freedom and economic democracy was directed to party supporters, and had only

a limited distribution. However, statements on fair distribution and/or levelling occurred in the appeals to all the groups discussed above. These themes, along with statements on state intervention, were particularly important in aggregating the farming population and the workers. Equally crucial were statements emphasizing the economic divisions in the farming population. This picture partially stemmed from an essential aspect of the Party Program's assessment of society, i.e that the fundamental cleavage in society was based on economic differences.

. . . . .

Before moving on to the 1946 election, it is appropriate to note a couple of salient features of ideological statements in the 1944 propaganda. The analysis based on functional categories reveals that several statements with the most radical content, invoking ideological principles and incorporating program formulations, did not assume the form of specific recommendations. Instead they were made in conjunction with underlining party differences and defending the party. For example, Wigforss, when defending party policies against the criticism that they endangered capital formation, argued for collective saving and designated it as a facet of democratizing the economy. He went on to relate it to the goal of the Party Program: liberation of the majority from its dependence upon the wealthy minority. But collective saving was not advanced as a recommendation in the campaign propaganda. Nor was economic democracy a crucial demand in the propaganda - except in Wigforss' pamphlet. In a similar fashion, the themes of fair distribution and levelling occurred primarily in statements noting party distinctions, defending party policy and aggregating groups of voters. Only to a limited extent did the Social Democrats describe specific proposals as promoting fair distribution - or much less levelling.

This is not to say that ideological statements did not figure prominently as recommendations and their justifications. As seen from the analysis, they did. The Social Democrats campaigned on a broad recommendation to extend the scope of state intervention in the economy - particularly in the areas of employment policy, agriculture and housing. Greater intervention was equated with a planned economy, and full employment was portrayed as dependent upon introducing a planned economy. The propaganda also contained cautious recommendations for industrial democracy and to socialize monopolies. Proposals to reform the school system were fashioned as a democratization of education and described as leading to a more just and democratic society. However, a striking characteristic of ideological statements in the categories of recommendations and argumentation was a duality. In the propaganda to the mass electorate, recommendations tended to be more general or vaguely formulated,

and they were spelled out as concrete benefits. Justifications were less often phrased in ideological terms. Recommendations in messages to party sympathizers exhibited greater specificity, and ideological arguments for proposals occurred more frequently. In the 1946 election a somewhat different pattern emerges.

Notes

1 Socialdemokratiska partistyrelsen, berättelse för år 1940, pp. 5-6, 34-35.

2 Ernst Wigforss, Minnen (Stockholm:Tiden, 1954) Vol. 3, pp. 193-196, pp. 203-228; Leif Lewin, op.cit., pp. 178-186.

3 Sven Linderot, Bönder och arbetare (Stockholm: Arbetarkultur, 1943) p. 8,p. 23.

4 Ernst Wigforss, Minnen, pp. 231-233; Gustav Andersson, Från bondetåget till samlingsregeringen (Stockholm: Tiden, 1955) p. 311.

5 In 1940 the Riksdag had passed legislation forbidding conspiratorial associations. Although the law was never applied to the Communist party, at times the possibility of the party being outlawed seemed near at hand. By 1943 it was clear that, despite the undaunted efforts of the Conservatives, there was little chance of the party being outlawed. Transportation restrictions, which had obstructed the distribution of Communist newspapers, were lifted in 1943. For the Communists' new course, see Sven Linderot, Ny kurs (Stockholm: Arbetarkultur, 1943) pp. 16-23, pp. 28-31.

6 Ernst Wigforss, Minnen, pp. 248-252; Leif Lewin, op.cit., pp. 242-245; Elis Håstad, "Samlingsregeringen", Svensk tidskrift, 1944, pp. 327-333.

7 Vårt program. Med kommentarer av Hilding Hagberg (Stockholm: Arbetarkultur, 1944) pp. 9-11.

8 Efterkrigsprogram, pp. 5-20, p. 30, 43-132, pp. 142-175 (quotation, p. 30).

9 Leif Lewin, op.cit., pp. 264-265. See e.g. Stockholms-Högern, 1944, No. 20, pp. 3-4, p. 9, pp. 11-13; Folkpartiet, 1944, No. 5, pp. 4-5.

10 See e.g. "Vad kommunisterna inte fick säga i radio"; Nils Holmberg, Tomma löften eller verklighet? (Stockholm: Arbetarkultur, 1944) pp. 9-12, p. 19; Set Persson, Med kommunisterna mot samlingsregeringen! (Stockholm: Arbetarkultur, 1944); C.H. Hermansson, Förmögenheter, inkomster, profiter och löner (Stockholm: Arbetarkultur, 1944); Sven Linderot, Kommunisternas dagsprogram (Stockholm: Arbetarkultur, 1944) pp. 24-25, pp. 28-29.

11 Svenska valprogram; Nils Holmberg, op.cit., p. 8, pp. 14-17, 19-24; Set Persson, op.cit., pp. 28-31, 19-23; "Kommunister till riksdagen från Värmland!"; "Det fattiga och det rika Norrköping!"; "Det rika och fattiga Linköping"; Erik Aström, Vill kommunisterna ta jorden från bönderna! (Stockholm: Arbetarkultur, 1944) pp. 14-15.

12 C.H. Hermansson, Den socialdemokratiska programrevisionen (Stockholm: Arbetarkultur, 1944). For the 1944 Program of the Communists, see Vårt program. Med kommentarer av Hilding Hagberg, pp. 5-7. Leif Lewin, op. cit.,p. 237.

13 Nils Holmberg, op.cit., pp. 8-14, 17-19. At the Communist party congress, Sven Linderot declared that "a united front from below" was still the most important tactical watchword. Sven Linderot, Kommunisternas dagsprogram, p. 13.

14 See the poster "A Conservative Course or a Society of Coercion"; Gösta Bagge, Frihet eller socialism (Stockholm: Högerns riksorganisation, 1944); Medborgaren, 1944, No. 9, pp. 3-4, p. 31; Vårt land, 1944, p. 8, p. 18; Stockholms-Högern, 1944, No. 20, p. 9, p. 11.

15 See e.g. the poster "Taxes Must Be Lower"; "Modern Höger".

16 Landsbygdens framtid - en nationell livsfråga (Stockholm: Högerns riksorganisation, 1944); Vårt land, 1944, p. 6, 14; Politisk valhandbok 1944 (Stockholm: Högerns riksorganisation, 1944) pp. 237-78, p. 12; Ekonomi och politik, 1944, No. 2; G. Saemund, Jordbruket och framtiden (Stockholm: Högerns riksorganisation, 1944).

17 See platform statement on defense, the poster "The Conservatives Strive Steadfastly to Secure Peace"; Nils Herlitz, Konservativ samhällssyn (Stockholm: Högerns riksorganisation, 1944) p. 44. Concerning extremist parties, see Vårt land, p. 17, 21, the poster, "Nazism=Communism, the Conservatives against the Enemies of Society"; "Modern Höger"; Politisk valhandbok 1944, pp. 362-365.

18 "Modern Höger", pp. 2-3; Politisk valhandbok 1944, p. 13; Vårt land, p. 15, p. 10.

19 Vårt land, p. 11; Medborgaren, 1944, No. 8, p. 3; Valhandbok, pp. 221-226; Elis Håstad, En aktiv medelklasspolitik, (Stockholm: Högerns riksorganisation, 1944); "Du som är tjänsteman..."; Stockholms-Högern, 1944, No. 21; Arbetsglädje åt de anställda (Stockholm: Ungsvenskarnas riksförbund, 1944).

20 The relevant passages of the 1919 Conservative Party Program read: "A strong economy, based on free enterprise and private ownership, and secure from socialization and stifling government coercion." "It (the Swedish Conservative party) places the fatherland, its security and independence, above all other political considerations." "Prohibition of parties advocating violence." See Valhandbok, pp. 17-19; Nils Herlitz, op.cit.; Vårt land, p. 10.

21 Medborgaren, 1944, No. 10, p. 2.

22 See e.g. "Skatter och näringsfrihet"; Till val med Folkpartiet, 1944, p. 3, p.5; Folkpartiet, 1944, No. 5, pp. 4-5.

23 Folkpartiet, 1944, No. 5, p. 13, p. 7, p. 11; Till val med Folkpartiet.

24 Folkpartiet, 1944, No. 5, p.3, p.5, p.13; Till val med Folkpartiet, pp. 7-9, p.20. See also Politiska dagsfrågor, 1944, No. 1 and Folkpartiet 1944-45. Ombudsmannens verksamhetsberättelse (hereafter Ombudsmannens berättelse) p. 27.

25 See e.g. the platform; "Skatter och näringsfrihet"; "Ärade medborgare"; Till val med Folkpartiet, pp. 3-4, p. 7, pp. 9-10; "Landsbygdens väl, hela folkets intresse"; Folkpartiet, No. 5, p. 6, pp. 8-9; "Till val, nykterhet, socialt ansvar"; "Välj kristna förtroendemän till den lagstiftande församlingen".

26 Before 1938 there was no mention of social welfare measures in Agrarian platforms. The 1938 platform demanded better medical care for the countryside, vacations for rural housewifes, and lifting social services in rural areas to the level of those in cities. These platforms demands remained essentially unaltered until the 1944 platform. See Svenska valprogram.

27 The platform; "Livsmedelsproducenterna, jordens och havets män gå hand i hand i kamp för gemensamma intressen" and "Skall fisket vara blott en konjunkturnäring?" and "Lika lön för samma arbete".
"Arbetaren sin lön värd - även i jordbruket"; "Lantarbetarna måste få det bättre"; "Alla som arbeta i jordbruket måste få det bättre".

28 "Alla som arbeta i jordbruket måste få det bättre"; Bondeförbundets medlemsblad, 1944, August (hereafter BM) p. 8; "Så bygges det i folkhemmet"; "Till landsbygdens väljare"; "Arbetaren sin lön värd - även i jordbruket"; Den svenska jorden (Stockholm: Landsbygdspartiet, 1944).

29 It is significant, however, that Agrarian criticism of the Social Democrats hardly dealt with postwar economic policy; only in one instance did the campaign literature allude to the Social Democrats' desire to socialize the economy and socialization was designated as the most profound difference between the Agrarians and the Social Democrats. See Sysselsättning eller arbetslöshet (Stockholm: Landsbygdspartiet Bondeförbundet, 1944) p. 6.

30 The platform; Ernst Wigforss, Bröd och frihet (Stockholm: Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetareparti, SAP, 1944) p. 16, pp. 19-20, pp. 27-28. Cf. Fakta, 1944, No. 5, p. 17.

31 "Du får avgöra väljare"; Bröd och frihet, p. 33; Morgonbris, 1944, No. 9, p.9, and a couple of ads on housing in the weekly press.

32 Svenska valprogram; the ads; "Ett ansvarslöst fruntimmer".

33 Vår väg, 1944, No. 2, pp. 4-5, pp. 13-14; No. 3, p. 3, p. 8, p. 15; Bröd och frihet, p. 8, pp. 13-16; Per Edvin Sköld, Jordbrukets framtid (Stockholm: SAP, 1944) pp. 32-43; Inför höstens val, Studiekurs i aktuell politik, Brev 4, Sveriges socialdemokratiska ungdomsförbund, pp. 14-15 (Hereafter Inför höstens val); Bertil Johansson, Vem vinner? (Stockholm: Frihets förlag, 1944) p. 44, p. 29; Fakta, 1944, No. 5.

34 "Handlingens radikalism"; "Varför ej arbetarkartell?"; Vår väg, No. 2, p. 14; No. 3, p. 11; Fakta, No. 3, p. 4-18.

35 Per Albin Hansson, Neutraliteten och dess vedersakare (Stockholm: SAP, 1944); Fakta, No. 3; Rolf Edberg, Idag röd, imorgon? (Stockholm:SAP, 1944); Inför årets val, Brev 2-3.

36 Vår väg, No. 3, p. 14; Per Edvid Sköld, op.cit.; Fakta, No. 4.

37 "Ett ansvarslöst fruntimmer".

38 Vår väg, No. 3; the ads; Henning Thylin , Blomgren och Bengtsson diskutera dagens frågor (Stockholm: SAP, 1944); "Du får avgöra väljare".

39 The platform; the ads; "Rättvisa åt landsbygdens folk"; "Till Sveriges jordbrukare, skogs- och lantarbetare"; Per Edvin Sköld, op.cit.; Vet Ni ....".

40 Socialdemokratiska partistyrelsen, Cirkulär 1944, 19 (hereafter Cirkulär). The campaign ran for ten weeks in ten weekly magazines: Se, Vecko-Journalen, Husmodern, Vårt Hem, Hela Världen, Levande Livet, Veckorevyn, Hemmets Veckotidning, Folket i Bild, Hemmets Journal and for five weeks in two other magazines. According to the 1944 Annual Report of the Party Board, the campaign included a total of 140 pages of advertisements dealing with over 20 questions (p. 16). The advertisements published in the 10 weekly magazines, mentioned above, have been preserved by the Labor Movement Archives. Remarks about the press campagin are based on an analysis of these advertisements.

41 "Tjänstemännen mitt i samhället"; "Tjänstemän vet Ni att?"

42 The platform (italics original); Bröd och frihet, p. 4, pp. 13-29, p. 34, p. 37, p. 39, p. 48.

43 The platform; the ads; Vår väg, No. 2, p. 4, pp. 8-9; No. 3, pp. 2-3, pp. 10-11; "Full sysselsättning"; Bröd och frihet, pp. 30-31, p. 12.

44 Vår väg, No. 2, p. 4, pp. 8-9; No. 3, p. 11; Bertil Johansson, Vem vinner? (Stockholm: Frihets förlag, 1944) pp. 14-16; Bröd och frihet, p.5, pp. 33-34, p. 37, p. 39, pp. 41-43, p. 48 (quotation, p. 41).

45 See e.g. the platform; the ads; "Fullfölj välfärdspolitiken"; Vår väg, No. 2, p. 13.

46 Vår väg, No. 2, pp. 4-5, p. 13; No. 3, p. 3; Morgonbris, No. 9, p. 6; Bröd och frihet, pp. 13-29, Henning Thylin, op.cit., p. 18.

47 Vår väg, No. 3; the ads; "Du får avgöra väljare"; "Tjänstemännen mitt i samhället".

48 The platform; the ads; and Bertil Johansson, op.cit., p. 29.

49 The ads; Per Edvin Sköld, Jordbrukets framtid (Stockholm: SAP, 1944) pp. 32-43; Efterkrigsprogram, p. 82.

50 The ads; "Vem vinner?"; Bertil Johansson, op.cit., pp. 5-13; Vad vi vill (Stockholm: Sveriges socialdemokratiska kvinnoförbund, 1944) pp. 8-11; Morgonbris, No. 9, p. 20; Vår väg, No. 3, p. 13; Fakta, No. 5, pp. 19-20.

51 Bröd och frihet, p. 12, pp. 31-32 (quotation, p. 32); "Du får avgöra, väljare"; Morgonbris, No. 9, p. 9.

52 See Svenska valprogram.

53 See the platform (italics original). For statements on industrial democracy see one ad, "Du får avgöra, väljare"; Vår väg, No. 3, p. 5, Morgonbris, No. 9, pp. 8-9; Bröd och frihet, pp. 37-40.

54 Vår väg, No. 3, p. 3; Bröd och frihet, pp. 20-21, p. 25

55 Bröd och frihet, p. 4, p. 8; Vår väg, No. 2, p. 4; No. 3, p. 8; the ads; Per Edvin Sköld, op.cit., pp. 32-43; Inför höstens val, Brev 4, pp. 14-15; Bertil Johansson, op.cit., p. 29.

56 Bröd och frihet, pp. 20-25; Vår väg, No. 2, pp. 4-5; No. 3, p. 3, p. 11; "Till jordbrukets folk"; Vad vi vill, p. 8; Fakta, No. 4, p. 12.

57 Fakta, No. 3, pp. 19-33; Henning Thylin, op.cit., p. 18; "Handlingens radikalism"; Vår väg, No. 2, p. 14; Rolf Edberg, op.cit., p. 25, p. 44, pp.54-5.

58 Vår väg, No. 2, p. 5; No. 3, p. 3; Henning Thylin, op.cit., pp. 19-24, p. 18; Bröd och frihet, p. 20.

59 Bröd och frihet, pp. 13-29, esp. p. 14, pp. 20-22, pp. 25-29 (quotations, p. 21 and p. 29).

60 Ibid., pp. 41-48, pp. 33-34 (quotation p. 39). See also Bertil Johansson, op.cit., p. 16

61 Vår väg, 1944, No. 3, p. 15; Morgonbris, 1944, No. 9, p. 18; Bröd och frihet, p. 36, pp. 39-40.

62 "Tjänstemännen mitt i samhället".

63 See e.g. "Fred"; "Till Sveriges kvinnor"; Vad vi vill; "Vem vinner?"; Bertil Johansson, op.cit., pp. 36-37.

64 "Till Sveriges jordbrukare, skogs- och lantarbetare"; "Till jordbrukets folk"; "Rättvisa åt landsbygdens folk"; Vad vi vill, p. 8; Bertil Johansson, op.cit., pp. 31-33; Fakta, No. 4, p. 12, pp. 15-19; Per Edvin Sköld, op.cit., p. 17, pp. 32-42; Inför höstens val, Brev 4, pp. 2-3.

65 "Socialvården - ett verk i linje med den kristna livssynen"; Broderskap,September 16, 1944.

66 For the importance of reinforcing cleavages, see Robert Dahl, op.cit., p.78.

Chapter 4

THE 1946 ELECTION: "Safeguard the Postwar Program"

4.1 The Political Situation: Non-Socialist Attacks and Communist Overtures

The prime outcome of the 1944 election was a setback for the Social Democrats (a loss of 19 seats) and Communist gains. In fact, this was the Communists' largest victory in a general election; they received a little over 10% of the votes. However, the Communist victory did not affect the party composition of the government. Its main effect was to strengthen the vociferousness of Communist parliamentary opposition. Party representation in the lower chamber rose from 3 to 15. For the first time, the Communists had crossed the numerical threshold entitling them to membership in parliamentary committees and inquiry commissions.

Communist gains did, however, place strains on the government. For one reason, many Social Democrats viewed the coalition as a major cause of the Communists' election victory. Strains further mounted when Social Democratic MPs introduced a series of controversial bills during the 1945 spring session of the Riksdag. The bills were passed by a Social Democratic-Communist majority, usually against the solid opposition of the non-Socialists. The adoption of the bills put the government in an awkward position since the appointment of the inquiry commissions requested in the bills would have probably met with the opposition of non-Socialist cabinet members. Communist pressure also increased due to the party's activities in the trade unions and the metal workers' strike during the first half of 1945 - the largest labor dispute in Swedish history.[1)]

Thus it was in an atmosphere of political discord that informal discussions between the party leaders on the future of the coalition government were initiated in June 1945. Although some reluctance was expressed, strong sentiment within all the parties - with the exception of the Agrarians - more or less favored an end to the coalition. A major stumbling-block to continuing the coalition was the program of the future government. The three non-Socialist parties flatly rejected making the Postwar Program in its entirety the government program. For the Social Democrats it would have been extremely hazardous to settle for anything less. At the end of June, Per Albin Hansson announced that the national coalition was to be dissolved, and a purely Social Democratic government was formed on 31 July 1945.[2)] This was the first Social Democratic government whose majority in parliament was not dependent on the support of non-Socialist MPs. The new government adopted the 27 Points as its program, declaring that its implementation would signify

a successive democratization of society politically, socially and economically.[3)]

Several of the Postwar Program's recommendations quite naturally, then, dominated domestic politics during the next few years. The first broad goal of the Program - full employment - and measures for its attainment, however, slipped from public prominence as the level of trade union unemployment steadily declined, dropping to 3.2% in 1946.[4)] Instead attention was devoted to welfare reforms, taxation and the issue of state intervention; and party controversy centered on taxes and economic intervention.

Of the main welfare recommendations in the Postwar Program, only the pension reform was legislated prior to the 1946 election. And the decision of the Riksdag was virtually unanimous. Preceding the presentation of the government bill, however, party differences revolved around the choice of a basic pension with a supplementary allowance which would be subject to a means test - or a uniform basic pension with no means test. From the start, the Conservatives favored the latter alternative. The Agrarians and Liberals also backed this alternative, and the Communists were critical of the means test. In the Social Democratic party and the cabinet, opinion was divided apparently due to considerations of cost. However the Minister of Social Affairs, Gustav Möller, came out in support of a uniform pension. His view prevailed, and the government bill provided a uniform pension without a means test.[5)]

The issue of taxation, as previously brought out, had smouldered beneath the surface, erupting now and then, during the national coalition. In the early postwar years, the issue came to a head. The general public was clamouring for tax relief and particularly the removal of special wartime taxes, and all the parties had committed themselves to tax reductions during the 1944 election, although in varying degrees. The first decision to alter the wartime tax system was adopted during the spring of 1946. In April the government submitted a bill which scheduled the removal of the sales tax for January 1948. In the area of direct taxes, only general guidelines were put forward: income tax reductions for low and middle income groups; increases for the high income brackets; and steeper taxes on fortunes, inheritances and corporations.

Both the date for repealing the sales tax and the guidelines for direct taxes were attacked by the other parties. The Liberals and Communists pressed for a swifter removal of the sales tax, as did LO. The Conservatives, Liberals and Agrarians were critical of the government's guidelines for direct taxation; and the Conservatives and Liberals recommended larger income tax reductions than those suggested by the Social Democrats. Confronted with

these criticisms, the Social Democrats revised their position by moving up the date of the repeal of the sales tax and proposing larger income tax reductions - equal to the amount recommended by the Conservatives and Liberals. The two parties countered and upped the figure again.[6)]

The question of state intervention and economic planning - particularly certain recommendations of the Postwar Program - continued to engender party strife. The issue was the source of a heated ongoing debate, and the Liberal and Conservative press waged a vigorous campaign against the socialistic aspirations of the Social Democrats. Besides the press, business interests - especially those who felt themselves threatened by the Postwar Program's recommendations - started a number of propaganda publications and conducted a huge publicity campaign against socialization. The Social Democrats retaliated by charging the non-Socialists with gross exaggeration and distortion. Eventually they branded the non-Socialist propaganda as the handmaiden of big finance, and Per Albin Hansson coined the phrase "the opposition to planned economy" (*planhushållningsmotståndet*, abbreviated PHM). The party, together with LO, mounted a counter-attack in the spring of 1946 - a massive propaganda campaign with the slogan "The people's welfare goes before big finance".[7)]

At the same time as the debate and publicity campaigns were gradually escalated to the level of a virtual propaganda war, the Social Democrats proceeded with relative caution regarding concrete steps to implement the Program's recommendations to increase state intervention. The government appointed inquiry commissions to examine nationalization of the import of oil and rationalization measures, including possible changes in ownership, in about ten branches of industry. In the areas of investment and foreign trade, the Social Democrats proposed the establishment of advisory councils.[8)] Other major areas in which the Postwar Program prescribed more state intervention were agriculture and housing. Although the pending agricultural reform was the topic of considerable debate, no legislation was passed before the election. In the area of housing, however, the Riksdag in June 1946 adopted legislation which was eventually to contribute to far-reaching changes in the structure of ownership of apartment houses.[9)] Ironically this question did not become a matter of public controversy until after the 1946 election, and even then it was a "second-rate" issue.

Contrary to the proposals for state intervention, the Postwar Program's recommendations concerning industrial democracy did not spark off a major controversy. In August 1946 labor and management signed a works council agreement,establishing the works council as a purely advisory body with the aims of promoting productivity and providing insight into production. The

Social Democrats hailed the agreement as the initial step toward greater industrial democracy, while the results of the negotiations were acceptable to the Liberals and Conservatives who had underlined that the works council should not be a decision-making organ.[10)]

The period between the elections was characterized by a high level of activity in all the political parties. The most significant changes occurred within the four other parties, and these changes were important in shaping the constellation of party conflict and major themes in the coming election.

Conservative losses in the 1944 election caused much soul-searching within the party. In December 1944 the party elected a new leader, Fritiof Domö, a member of the coalition cabinet, who projected an image of competent but uninspiring leadership. It was also decided to revise the Party Program, which was essentially from 1919. This decision subsequently led to tension between the "younger" generation who favored a revision and pleaded for a positive welfare program and the older generation who tended to underline the validity of Conservative tenets as expressed in the Program and were hesitant toward welfare policy. The outcome was that the Party Program remained intact, while an action program The Conservatives Want... , was adopted in late May 1946. With an outward show of unity, the party went to the electorate with its new program. Indications exist, however, that elements in the party found it hard to accept certain formulations in the action program - most likely the strong plank on welfare policy.[11)]

The Liberal party also elected a new leader after the 1944 election. The change resulted in a vitalization and strengthening of the party leadership, and Liberal propaganda acclaimed Bertil Ohlin as a vigorous leader. With the dissolution of the coalition government, the emphasis on dynamic leadership was expanded to include the theme of an alert and effective opposition. The notion of a vigilant opposition was also related to the Liberal's opposition to socialization, which constituted a major theme in the party's propaganda during these years. Moreover, in the early postwar period, the Liberals set out to improve their weak standing in terms of propaganda output and party membership. Efforts were also made to build up the party's organization and finances. In combination with these efforts, the Liberals proclaimed themselves to be the party of the future.[12)]

The Agrarians in the 1944 election had managed to recoup most of their losses from the previous general election. However, it was noted that the party had not done as well in 1944 as in the 1936 election, and that the base of the party was shrinking as the number of voters in the farming population continued to decline. In coping with this unfavorable development, the Agrarians attempted 1) to gain a greater share of the farm vote by

appealing to its most deprived segments (who had a propensity to vote Social Democratic) and 2) to broaden their electoral base by intensifying appeals to the rural population at large. In 1946 the Party Program from 1933 was revised, and some aspects of the revision may have facilitated the party's efforts to gain support from depressed farm groups and the rural population in general. The Agrarians deleted the most conservative pronouncements (i.e. clauses reflecting racism and promulgating rigorous enforcement of the law, strict morals, protection against degenerate influences, and putting down attempts to overthrow the existing social order), and a paragraph on welfare policy was inserted. Simultaneously the most salient articulation of farmers' interests was toned down, and references to the farming class (*bondeklassen*) were omitted.[13)]

The Communists, after the coalition was dissolved, and despite the fact that the Social Democrats had turned a deaf ear to the Communists' proposal for a left government, persevered in trying to bring about some sort of collaboration between the two parties. The Communists declared that they would support all government actions to carry out the essential points of the Postwar Program. During the 1946 debate on the budget the party leader, Sven Linderot, went even further. He stated that for the first time in the party's history, the Communists were not an opposition party but one that supported the government.[14)] Another major overture was to urge a front against reactionary forces and big finance - the creation of a democratic bloc and ultimately a merger of the two parties into a united workers' party. The Communists' rapprochement vis-à-vis the Social Democrats was not without problems. It failed to yield the desired results, and at the same time there was skepticism and resistance among the rank and file as well as in the party executive toward the party line. "Revisionist" propositions in the 1944 Party Program, their subsequent ascendancy, and emphasis on the possibility of a peaceful transition to socialism appear to have given rise to dissension.[15)]

To sum up the tactical situation of the Social Democrats, they had seemingly lost the lead in two questions of vital concern to the voters - the pension reform and lower taxes. The tax issue, in particular, put the Social Democrats in a difficult predicament. Initiative in repealing the sales tax had been lost to the Liberals and Communists, while the Social Democrats had been outbid by the Conservatives and Liberals concerning the total amount of income tax reductions. In late June, however, the party seized the initiative. The guidelines for direct taxes laid down in the government bill were converted into concrete proposals.[16)] This move meant that the discussion of the tax issue during the election focused on direct taxes instead of

repealing the sales tax. Nor did the Social Democrats have to fight a two-front battle on the tax issue now. The Communists came out in support of the Social Democratic proposals.

On the issue of state intervention, the Social Democrats found themselves confronted with the same dilemma as in 1944. Their quandary was equally, if not more, acute in 1946. The Conservatives and Liberals persisted in stressing the dangers of impending socialization. Within the Social Democratic party it was now more apparent that there was considerable disagreement concerning socialization and greater intervention in the economy. Simultaneously the Communist position gravitated increasingly toward the Social Democrats' stand, but the Communists pressed more actively for the nationalization of certain industries.

In two respects, however, the overall tactical situation of the Social Democrats can be regarded as somewhat brighter on the eve of the 1946 election than in 1944. First and foremost, the sharp attacks from the Communists had largely subsided. The dissolution of the wartime coalition, the Social Democratic leadership's approval of trade union efforts to raise wages, and finally sections of the party's tax program had undercut cardinal grievances of the Communists. Furthermore, the dictates of united front tactics precluded overly aggressive attacks on the Social Democrats. Secondly, the Agrarians had dissociated themselves from the other non-Socialist parties' position on state intervention, and Agrarian criticism of the Social Democrats on this point was much milder.[17)]

4.2 Basic Features of the Rival Parties' Campaigns

The Conservatives: A Positive Stand on Reforms and Welfare Policies

The Conservatives went to the electorate with their newly adopted action program, The Conservatives Want ...; and the three main themes of their campaign at the national level were the party's positive attitude toward social reforms and welfare policy, a proposal for tax cuts, and the Conservatives' unyielding opposition to the socialization and centralization policy of the Social Democrats.

Repeatedly the Conservatives pointed out that they were a party with a reform program; however, most of the proposals in the action program were not converted into campaign pledges. In fact, the influence of the action program on the platform planks was largely limited to the advocacy of "effective welfare measures for the elderly, the sick and children", along with "sound, pragmatic (*saklig*), durable" reforms in other areas - the most positive Conservative statement on welfare policy in an election platform up to that time. Another important aspect of projecting a positive image

concerning reforms was an attempt to reap the glory for the recent pension improvements, with the slogan "The Conservative line was the people's". However, at the same time as the party's support of reforms was stressed, several statements on welfare policy implied or specified differences between the Conservatives and the Social Democrats, such as the feasible rate of introducing reforms, the construction of benefits, and the means of financing reforms (deficit spending and increasing the amount of money in circulation were rejected).[18)]

On the tax issue, the Conservatives underlined the reduction of income taxes and said relatively little about their opposition to tax hikes for wealthy groups. Only in statements to party sympathizers did the Conservatives condemn increased taxes on fortunes, inheritances and high incomes. Instead they emphasized that their proposals entailed the greatest relief for taxpayers. Two points were stressed: 1) the Conservative proposal provided tax cuts for all groups, but overwhelmingly benefited middle and low income groups 2) it comprised the largest tax reductions - even for low income groups. The Conservatives also charged the Social Democrats with redistributing rather than decreasing the tax burden.[19)]

As in 1944, the Conservatives pronounced that the most important issue was socialization versus free enterprise. The platform maintained that socialization and centralization were a growing threat, resolutely opposed by the Conservatives, and one of the election posters read: "We have faith in YOU, you don't need any guardian." Social Democratic declarations on socialization were portrayed as efforts to camouflage the socialist implications of their policy and to dupe the honest citizen. The continued appointment of investigatory commissions to examine various branches of industry, the points of the Postwar Program, the Social Democrats' advocacy of "coordination of economic activity under government direction", and the demands of a vociferous Marxist faction within the party were adduced as evidence of the Social Democrats' socialist intentions. Furthermore, the Conservatives argued that the strengthened position of the Communists was a factor inducing the Social Democrats to pursue a socialization policy.[20)]

The pattern of group appeals in the propaganda resembled that of the 1944 campaign. However, for the first time, the Conservative platform mentioned the workers without hostile overtones: the party wanted security for the workers and employees. Again the Conservatives issued messages to the farmers, stressing rural improvements. Substantial emphasis was also put on "middle class questions". The new action program contained important implications regarding the range of policies to promote the interests of the middle class; consideration had to be given to the middle class in formulating economic

and fiscal policy and especially welfare measures. It was asserted that the middle class had paid the bill but had seldom shared in the benefits, and this line of reasoning was reflected in the Conservative stand on pensions and child allowances.[21)]

In conclusion, the Conservatives, by parading their positive stand on welfare policy, appear to have tried to eliminate or at least neutralize the issue as an element of controversy in electoral politics. Equally important in the party's strategy was shifting attention to socialization and proclaiming it to be the decisive issue of the election, since opinion polls revealed the lack of a majority for greater state intervention among the electorate in general and Social Democratic voters.[22)] On the debit side, however, the emphasis on a positive stand on welfare policy and to a lesser degree on tax reductions may have detracted from the image of the Conservatives as "the core of resistance" to socialization - both in comparison to the party's own election propaganda in 1944 and the Liberal leader Ohlin's vigorous stance in 1946. Certain pronouncements hardly strengthened the party's image as the prime opponent of socialization. The most striking example was a statement emphasizing the common front of the bourgeois parties - even to the extent of citing the other parties' platforms on socialization.[23)] Despite their action program, the Conservatives were still on the defensive concerning their attitude toward reforms, and the belated appearance of the program was labelled by the other parties as an about-face and an obvious attempt to court the voters in a new guise. Finally, the Conservatives' new position on welfare policy and rather insipid opposition to higher taxes seem to have been a bitter pill to swallow for many party stalwarts.

The Liberals: A Repeat Performance with an Increasing Payoff

The Liberals, as in 1944, underlined their opposition to socialism and their advocacy of reforms. In fact, their opposition to socialization became more emphatic, and their advocacy of reforms was extended to a wider range of areas.

Socialization was the key issue in the Liberals' propaganda, and especially in Ohlin's statements. He was particularly vehement in insisting that the Social Democrats had not written off massive socialization, in the sense of nationalization, despite their reassurances to the contrary - and that socialization was a veritable threat. Repeatedly Ohlin alleged that Wigforss wanted to socialize large industry. The propaganda further maintained that the more limited demands of the Postwar Program had to be seen against the background of the Party Program. The socialization clause was quoted, and the Party Program was interpreted to the effect that total socialization had

not been ruled out. Ohlin stressed that the Party Program demanded, as a matter of principle, a new order of production and ownership by society, and that this basic principle colored the Social Democrats' approach. He challenged Social Democratic assurances that greater efficiency was the primary criterion in proposing nationalization and that their approach was pragmatic. Moreover, a particular feature of Ohlin's style of argumentation was that he addressed his comments directly to the Social Democrats and demanded an answer. This tended to create an impression of confrontation between the Liberals and the Social Democrats. Lastly, the Liberals bracketed the Social Democrats, and Wigforss in particular, with the Communists. Ohlin further contended that the Social Democrats were likely to become more dependent upon the Communists in the future because the Communists could easily come to hold the parliamentary balance.[24)]

At the same time as the Liberals underlined opposition to Social Democratic socialization, which was mostly described in exaggerated terms, they moved closer to the Social Democrats on the issues of welfare reforms, employment policy, monopolies and industrial democracy. By demanding that pensions be safeguarded against inflation, the Liberals even tended to outshine the Social Democrats in one area of welfare policy. Certain government measures to mitigate fluctuations in the business cycle and to increase labor mobility were endorsed. The Liberals condemned abuses by private monopolies. Democratic cooperation between employees and management was urged in the form of consultative councils - composed of representatives of labor, foremen, white-collar workers and management - in private firms as well as state and local government administration.[25)]

The Liberals, unlike the Social Democrats and Conservatives, did not place so much weight on spelling out their tax proposals graphically, via figures and tax tables. Instead the Liberal propaganda portrayed the government, and especially Wigforss, as exceedingly reluctant to introduce tax cuts, and as giving priority to social reforms. In contrast the Liberals were pictured as demanding both tax reductions and social reforms. Secondly, Wigforss' proposals for lower taxes - particularly removal of the sales tax - were attributed to pressure brought to bear by the Liberals. Otherwise the Liberals' criticism of the Social Democratic tax proposals was essentially the same as the Conservatives'.[26)]

Group appeals in the propaganda were substantially strengthened. In the 1944 campaign the Liberals had been outdistanced by the other parties in issuing appeals to the farming population, and by the Conservatives and Social Democrats in appealing to white-collar workers; this was remedied during the 1946 election. Although special messages comparable to those

aimed at farmers and white-collar workers were not issued to manual laborers, the Liberals' initiative in repealing the sales tax and their declarations on industrial democracy may, in part, be interpreted as an embryonic appeal to the workers, and as a foretaste of the 1948 election.[27)]

The Agrarians on the Sidelines: Agricultural Policy and the Rural/Urban Cleavage.

The single most important issue of the Agrarian campaign was the future of the countryside and specifically the implications of future agricultural policy for the continued existence of small farms. Two election posters raised the questions: "How will the countryside's future be formed?", and in more threatening tone, "Are 100,000 small farms going to be rationalized away? No, more land, better incomes, social justice, voluntary mergers, other rural employment."

The Agrarians pleaded for the retainment of small farms and demanded full compensation for farmers. Their defense of small farms was contrasted with Social Democratic recommendations, which were said to have the unavoidable effect of eliminating 100,000 small farms. Several measures to come to grips with the small farmer's problems were suggested: more favorable prices, introduction of types of farming particularly profitable for small units, locating new industries in rural areas to provide part-time employment. One measure, especially emphasized, called for allocation of forest lands to small farmers through the sale of public lands or expropriation of forests owned by speculators and large companies.[28)]

The Agrarians also persisted in their efforts to gain a wider following among the rural population, underlining that the basic aim of the party was to create equivalent conditions in rural and urban areas. Many of the party's demands were also fused with the rural/urban cleavage, and in this election campaign the cleavage was explicitly related to party politics by dubbing the other parties as the "city-ruled" parties. Criticism of the Social Democrats continued to dominate, but it was frequently added that the Liberals and Conservatives shared the objectionable outlook of the Social Democrats.[29)]

As the lines of conflict hardened between the "socialist" and "bourgeois" blocs, the Agrarians found themselves on the sidelines in the 1946 election. The party paid little heed to the major issues of socialization and taxes. Moreover the strong emphasis on future agricultural policy may have been a drawback in certain respects. It buttressed the image of the party's *raison d'etre* as the promotion of farmers' interests, and possibly hindered a broader aggregation of rural interests afforded by even greater stress on issues like the cost of living index regions and welfare policies. The prominence

given to agricultural policy was partially dictated by the fact that the mainstay of the party was small farmers who owned their land. In addition, it seems that the Agrarians regarded the Social Democrats' rationalization scheme as a blunder to be exploited in trying to make inroads in the farm vote of the Social Democrats.

The Communists: "A Democratic Bloc Against Reactionary Forces - Unity in the Ranks of Labor"

The most significant modification in Communist electoral tactics stemmed from the fact that the Communists had moved from being the only opposition party in 1944 to a party evincing support of the Social Democratic government in 1946. Secondly, the party line, as formulated during the 1946 party congress, defined the political struggle as between democracy and reaction.[30] Thus the chief target of attack was no longer the Social Democrats. Now the adversary was reactionary forces - monopoly capitalists and the bourgeois parties, particularly the Conservatives. And the Communists called for unity within the ranks of labor.

The struggle between democracy and reaction was a dominant theme in the Communist propaganda. The platform proclaimed that the importance of the election was the choice between a "policy of democratic progress and a reactionary policy". A democratic policy was explained as the extension of popular government so that all production and agencies of society came under the control and leadership of the people - and as a democratization of the military establishment and the state apparatus. It was also argued that the extension of democracy to the economy conflicted with the interests of the possessors, that the interests of monopoly capital were diametrically opposed to real popular government. This line of argument was abbreviated in the poster slogans: "The people, not big finance, shall decide", "It pays off - a democratic bloc against reaction" and "A democratic bloc against reactionary forces - unity in the ranks of labor".[31]

Another feature of the propaganda, which also represented a change in comparison to 1944, was emphasis on the party's policy recommendations - both past and present - in a variety of areas. This theme was summed up in the slogan, "Promises fine, Action better", and drew an implicit comparison between the Communists and the Social Democrats. The main areas in which the Communists offered proposals for the future were housing, social policy, agriculture and economic policy. With the exception of agriculture, the proposed measures were often lauded as steps to introduce the Postwar Program.

A common feature of Communist recommendations in these areas was that they were more radical than the proposals of the Social Democrats. For example,

Communist proposals on housing stressed the radical points in the Postwar Program, such as public ownership of apartment houses. The party also kept alive the recommendation to socialize the building materials industry, and called for a national plan for housing production. In the area of welfare policy, the Communists urged a consolidation of different types of social assistance in the form of a "social wage" from the state, abolition of the existing means test, and levelling through taxation and not through social benefits. The party recommendations for agriculture focused on cooperative ventures - common use of farm machinery, cooperative dairies and other types of cooperation. In addition, the state was to plan agricultural production, manufacture farm machinery, and furnish capital to purchase machinery, which would speed up the creation of machine stations.[32)]

Of special interest is the major Communist statement on economic policy - "Economic Action Program" by C.H. Hermansson. Although he mentioned specific Communist proposals for nationalization, Hermansson gave immediate priority to economic controls, noting that the Communists had not put forward proposals to nationalize all the key branches of industry. Moreover, he stated that the possibility of a peaceful transition to socialism meant the acceptance of a transitional period during which the working class would take command of the leadership of the state and the right of private ownership of important means of production would still exist. The main controls advocated were economic planning, regulation of investments, and price controls. The Communists demanded the drafting of a long-term plan for the development and allocation of national resources, with the budget as an instrument of control, and the establishment of a permanent planning board. They further called for the newly created investment council to be vested with decision-making powers. Finally, they urged that price controls be made permanent to aid in economic planning and to combat both inflation and cartel prices.[33)]

In sum,vitriolic attacks on the Social Democrats had practically ceased to be an element of Communist election propaganda, although certain actions of the Social Democrats were regretted. Instead criticism was lavished on monopoly capitalists, and differences between the Communists and Social Democrats tended to be played down. By acknowledging the possibility of peacefully introducing socialism - the non-acceptance of which had previously been held up as the ideological difference dividing the labor movement - and by calling for unity, the Communists shifted the blame for continued disunity onto the Social Democrats. Similarly emphasis on constructive policy recommendations tended to counter Social Democratic charges of negativism. In short, to win over the workers the Communists vied with the Social Democrats, frequently using quite similar campaign themes. But the Communists

contended that they put forward more vigorous measures, implying that they pursued a more radical policy in questions of day-to-day politics.

4.3 Social Democratic Election Propaganda and Ideological Statements

4.3.1 The Election Propaganda: An Overview

The Social Democrats launched the slogan, "Safeguard the Postwar Program", and implementation of the Program was fashioned as the most important question of the election. Now the Program had come to symbolize *both* the party's recommendations for the future and the policy pursued by the government since the dissolution of the national coalition. The recent sessions of parliament were hailed as "reform sessions". The pension reform, wage improvements, pending tax cuts and the introduction of a general child allowance, the extensive program to combat an eventual depression, and "the investigations with the task of finding ways to increase productive resources" were heralded as the rapid conversion of the Postwar Program into reality. This theme was important in countering sporadic Communist insinuations that the Social Democrats had foresaken parts of the Program, and the more frequent argument that the Communists were needed to spur on the Program's enactment.

Two aspects of the continued implementation of the Program were stressed: 1) future reforms and 2) more efficiency and democracy in the economy. Campaign literature with a widespread distribution highlighted future reforms - especially in housing, education and social policy. In this manner, non-Socialist opposition to the Postwar Program became synonymous with opposition to future reforms, and the Social Democrats declared that the one condition for the introduction of reforms was that the party retained its majority.

In propaganda aimed at major target groups, with the exception of messages to the rural population, emphasis was placed on more efficiency and democracy in the economy, which were acclaimed the goals of Social Democratic economic policy. Thus non-Socialist opposition to the party's economic policy was treated as opposition to the elimination of abuses and shortcomings of private enterprise and a reluctance to subject the economy to democratic influences[34] - and not as opposition to socialization. This was one way in which the party handled the issue of socialization. In addition, contrary to 1944, the Social Democrats made more of an effort to explain their position on socialization. Still, however, statements on the matter did not occupy a dominant place in the party's propaganda.

Another major theme - but one which was not generally related to the Postwar Program - was tax reductions for the broad strata of the population.

The campaign propaganda presented the tax proposals that the party had put forward in late June. The presentation of these specific proposals (before the report of the inquiry commission on taxation) constituted a major offensive, or perhaps counter-offensive is a more apt term. At any rate, the Social Democrats' proposals to raise taxes for high income groups and corporations as well as on wealth and inheritances put the Conservatives and Liberals on the defensive.

Party differences tended to play a more important role in the Social Democrats'campaign strategy in 1946 than in 1944. On the one hand, the Communists' rapprochement and their plea for unity heightened the need of demarcating party distinctions. The Social Democrats countered by stressing the irreconcilable nature of ideological differences between them and the Communists. On the other hand, the Conservatives' and Liberals' emphasis on socialization as the basis of party cleavage put the Social Democrats at a disadvantage. Apparently to minimize this disadvantage, the Social Democrats accentuated other differences between them and the non-Socialists. The most widely acclaimed policy difference concerned taxation, and more generally the non-Socialists continued to be pictured as disinclined to support new reforms.[35)]

During the past election, the Social Democrats had devoted most of their energy to refuting Communist charges; now they turned their efforts toward rebuking bourgeois accusations. The sharpest recriminations were directed to private foundations, purportedly sponsored by big finance and dubbed PHM, and to the bourgeois press. The Social Democrats generally deplored the demagogic tactics of the private foundations, and the party bitterly assailed assertions that the Social Democrats were about to introduce a dictatorship and analogies between Social Democratic economic policy and Hitler's economy. The bourgeois parties were associated with big finance and society's privileged few. Their campaign literature was said to follow the lines drawn up in the propaganda issued by the PHM organizations. Of the parties, the Conservatives were most frequently singled out for attack in the propaganda[36)] - with the obvious exception of the campaign literature to the rural population which contained a polemic against the Agrarians. Social Democratic refutation of bourgeois allegations also consisted of restating the party's policy and objectives in positive terms.

The most interesting and significant feature of the 1946 campaign was the pattern of group appeals. The Social Democrats tried to broaden their constituency and adopted an alliance-building strategy - or perhaps an alliance-broadening strategy is a more apt description. They issued more clear-cut appeals to a wider spectrum of groups than the other parties. Be-

sides addressing the primary target groups of the previous election - the workers and the farming population - the party aimed substantial appeals at the white-collar workers, small businessmen and fishermen. Essentially the Social Democrats attempted to enlarge the alliance of labor and farm voters by incorporating these groups, and the distinctive characteristic of this alliance-building strategy was the attention given to marginal voters.[37)]

In its efforts to win over marginal groups, the party not only sought to discredit non-Socialist propaganda by levelling countercharges and defending its positions, the party also concentrated on describing how its ideological aspirations and policy recommendations coincided with the concerns of these groups. Considerable emphasis was put on the benefits derived from Social Democratic policy. In the case of white-collar workers and fishermen, the Social Democrats presented special action programs for these groups. The major points in the white-collar program largely corresponded to the demands in the 1944 appeal. The action program for fishermen focused on social security benefits, education and cultural measures, and improvements in the fishing industry. Messages to small businessmen explained that the expansionary economic policy of the Social Democrats (usually labelled a full employment policy) was a policy of full enterprise, accentuating marketing and credit guarantees.[38)]

Finally, in one very important respect, the pattern of aggregation in 1946 was not solely a departure from 1944 dictated by immediate tactical exigencies, i.e. getting the party's views and policies across to marginal voters in countering non-Socialist propaganda. In a long-term perspective, the 1946 campaign definitely marked a basic reorientation in the Social Democrats' electoral strategy of aggregation, the traces of which were evident much earlier. In elections prior to the 1940s but even until 1946, campaign literature indicates that the party mainly attempted to forge an alliance between the urban working class and the deprived sections of the farming population - mostly agricultural laborers, tenant farmers and small holders. From the mid-1940s this strategy was complemented by major endeavors to build an alliance between the labor movement and white-collar workers. The 1946 campaign represented an important turning-point on two counts. The size of the appeal (amount of propaganda) to white-collar workers more than doubled in comparison with the previous election. As distinct from earlier elections of the 1940s and from the 1946 messages to fishermen and small businessmen, the appeal to white-collar workers was not solely addressed to them as a target group; rather statements were aimed at both white-collar workers and laborers to explain their common interests and affinities as wage-earners.

4.3.2 Ideological Statements in the Propaganda

Recommendations and Argumentation

Education, agriculture, housing and social policy were still highlighted as being on the agenda for reform, and proposals in two other areas assumed new significance: taxation and economic policy. The issue of education reform was presented in strong ideological overtones. In contrast, the tax proposals were scarcely accompanied by ideological justifications, but their essential thrust clearly embodied a levelling philosophy. In the areas of agriculture, housing and economic policy, expanded state intervention was a key feature of the party's recommendations; and ideological arguments were important in justifying housing and economic policy measures. Contrary to the 1944 election, ideological justifications of social policy recommendations were quite few. Emphasis was on presenting pending reforms: the general child allowance, better social insurance (health, unemployment and occupational injury), free medical care, and a total reorganization of poor relief.[39] Indirectly, however, these reforms, along with the others proposed in the Postwar Program, were justified ideologically. The election platform declared that the task of the Social Democratic government was to continue the work to democratize society politically, socially and economically as laid down in the Postwar Program.

Most of the propaganda distributed to the mass electorate laid greatest stress on reforms and lower taxes. Only a few general statements on economic policy were made in this sort of propaganda. In campaign literature with a limited distribution and aimed at particular groups, economic policy was frequently discussed, and pronouncements were often characterized by relative specificity. This feature constituted an important aspect of the alliance-building strategy: the Social Democrats deemed it imperative to explain their economic policy recommendations to marginal voters. Hence, as distinct from 1944 when the most specific recommendations were confined to messages aimed at party sympathizers, concrete declarations were now addressed to party regulars and marginal voters alike. Similar ideological arguments were also used to justify economic policy proposals. Furthermore the differentiation in ideological argumentation in propaganda to party supporters and the mass electorate - which characterized the 1944 campaign - was substantially muted.

Education

Again the Social Democrats called for the democratization of education and establishing equal educational opportunities by removing economic barriers to education. A thorough overhaul of the educational system was signaled, and

the voters were called upon to choose whether the future school reforms were to be formulated in the spirit of the Postwar Program - "'for increased equality and a stronger feeling of solidarity among the citizens' or according to bourgeois lines". And, as in the Postwar Program, school policy was declared a vital step toward levelling class distinctions and the standard of living. In another instance cultural policy and democratization of education were linked with the realization of socialism, by equating socialism with a democratization of all areas of society.[40)]

Taxation

The income tax proposals and recommendations to raise taxes on wealth and corporations were particularly emphasized in the propaganda. These measures were summed up as "Increases for the few - relief for the small". The Social Democrats explained that their income tax proposals meant: "Nearly 3 million taxpayers in lower and middle income brackets will receive reductions. Not quite 100,000 taxpayers with large incomes will have higher taxes." As for taxes on business and wealth, the Social Democrats urged increasing the corporation tax from 32 to 40 per cent and an upward revision of the annual tax on wealth. Finally, a new inheritance tax (*kvarlåtenskapsskatt*), modelled after Anglo-Saxon death duties, was advocated.

The campaign literature was nearly void of references to the tax program as an aspect of levelling. In general the tax increases were described as necessary to implement reductions for low income groups, and it was argued that neither higher corporation taxes nor increased taxation of wealth was unjust due to the unfavorable development of wartime taxes for wage-earners. Only the pamphlet, "Safeguard the Postwar Program", declared that the tax proposals were in accord with the Program's demands for "a basic levelling of the citizens' incomes, restricting large fortunes, and a more even distribution of property".[41)]

Agricultural Policy

Statements on agricultural policy were largely a reiteration of 1944 in terms of policy objectives and reservations about price supports. However, rationalization of agriculture was now spelled out more concretely as creating viable family farms; mention of cooperative forms of farming totally disappeared from the campaign literature. Emphasis was on ways of increasing the size of insufficient farms, and the government was assigned a special role in the consolidation of small farms. Before other buyers had an opportunity, the government would be entitled to purchase land for the purpose of selling it to a neighboring farmer in need of more land. The difference

between the price proposed by the seller and the amount the buyer could afford to pay was to be covered by the state.[42)]

Housing Policy

The types of public measures desired in housing were clarified - in comparison to the 1944 propaganda. Proposals centered on housing allowances so that low income groups could afford better housing, and public loans to stimulate housing construction. It was further noted that non-profit and cooperative building firms were to receive public loans on more favorable terms than private enterprises. The Social Democrats prescribed greater local government involvement in construction and management of housing by establishing public or semipublic corporations to compete with private and cooperative companies. Building sites and apartment houses should be gradually transferred to municipal ownership to facilitate the clearance of inadequate housing. While the Social Democrats were more explicit in designating the kind of public intervention in housing, they were also more emphatic in underscoring the importance of private and cooperative enterprise. It was maintained that the essential feature of the housing program was not municipalization but a planned economy based on private and cooperative enterprise; planned economy measures (subventions and loans) were described as necessary for the survival of private housing construction and management.

One of the main ideological arguments for a "planned economy on the housing market" was skepticism concerning private enterprise being able by itself to provide satisfactory and inexpensive housing, along with criticism of the profit motive and speculation in housing and land values. This argument, however, was not nearly as prominent as in the previous campaign. Secondly, the housing program was fused with the Postwar Program's goal of more democracy and efficiency in the economy. Strengthening the cooperative housing movement and increasing the influence of public bodies at both the national and local levels were deemed aspects of democratizing the economy. As for furthering efficiency, housing construction was viewed as a key industry in maintaining a high level of economic activity and stabilizing the business cycle.[43)]

Econmic Policy

The nature of the planned economy desired by the Social Democrats was also made clearer in certain respects during this election. Quoting the Postwar Program, the propaganda defined planned economy measures as:

> encouragement of cooperative or other non-profit production; expansion of economic activity carried out by public or semi-public bodies, with or without the expropriation of privately-

owned means of production; support and regulation of investments; strengthening of purchasing power. 44)

Of these measures, the campaign literature focused on recommendations for support of investments, strengthening of purchasing power and - to a lesser degree - encouragement of cooperative undertakings.

Sectors of the economy specifically mentioned in connection with a planned economy were agriculture and particularly housing. Two other areas of the economy which figured prominently in the campaign literature were fishing and small industry. Although they were not directly related to a planned economy, noteworthy similarities existed in Social Democratic proposals in these four areas. Similar recommendations were: 1) public credit or aid 2) government guarantees for the marketing of products (the other side of the coin in strengthening purchasing power) 3) rationalization measures and 4) promotion of "cooperative" undertakings.[45)]

Planned economy measures included an expansion of public enterprise with or without nationalization. The most concrete and immediate suggestion to expand public enterprise was to set up municipal or semimunicipal building companies in housing. Nationalization was mentioned as a *possible* measure in a variety of contexts, viz. the gradual transfer of apartment houses and building sites to municipal ownership, nationalizing insurance companies, at least part of the oil import, the shoe industry and a few minor branches of industry. It was added that the final outcome would depend upon the findings of the inquiry commissions.[46)]

The statements on nationalization touched on two other matters of economic policy: rationalization and eliminating harmful monopolies. Public scrutiny was now emphasized as the prime means of combating monopolies, and nationalization was stipulated as a last resort. Rationalizing entire branches of industry represented a new issue in the campaign literature. In essence two approaches were prescribed: 1) a reorganization of inefficient branches, ranging from possible total nationalization to only minor adjustments in ownership 2) coordination and planning, not involving any changes in the ownership structure of the branches. In both cases inquiry commissions were to be appointed to decide what types of measures were appropriate. Finally it was urged that the commissions be made permanent and gradually converted into branch councils with representatives for the government, wage earners, entrepreneurs - both manufacturers and distributors - and consumers.[47)]

The two principal justifications for Social Democratic policy proposals were more efficiency and democracy in the economy. Much of the argument that state intervention could increase efficiency was based upon the party's assessment of the private economy. Inefficiency and defects of the private

sector were primarily attributed to two phenomena: monopolistic practices and a lack of coordination and planning within entire branches and industries. Monopolies caused inefficiency by thwarting competition and through agreements curtailing production. The absence of planning and coordination impeded efficiency primarily through recurrent depressions but also through failure to utilize economies of scale.[48)]

Furthermore, it was held that the degree of state intervention in the economy depended on the efficiency of private enterprise, that if private enterprise failed to utilize fully and efficiently economic resources, planned economy measures would have to be introduced. In fact, the Social Democrats mainly framed the issue of more intervention as the rightful prerogative of the state to look into unsatisfactory conditions impinging on efficiency and to offer solutions.[49)]

The second major justification - economic democracy - was now spelled out as strengthening democratic influences over the economy. This included not only greater public influence in the sense of government intervention as in 1944 but also extending the influence of economic organizations with a mass membership, i.e. cooperative movements of various sorts - consumer, agricultural and housing - and trade unions. Elsewhere cooperation between business and government was designated as a democratization.[50)] These broad definitions served to justify the Social Democrats' general prescriptions for more state intervention, increased cooperative undertakings, and the creation of public bodies composed of government officials and representatives for various interests - consumers, business and labor.

Specific recommendations were also advanced as promoting economic democracy. The propaganda focused on four proposals: 1) industrial democracy and the establishment of the works councils 2) legislation requiring public disclosure of the financial records of business, which was held to be a prerequisite for increased popular influence over the economy and effective participation of workers and employees in management 3) public surveillance of monopolies, which would mean they were under greater democratic control and 4) the establishment of branch councils.[51)]

. . . . .

In summation, a quick inventory of the extent and types of state intervention recommended by the Social Democrats is in order. A general declaration on government intervention enumerated four major spheres of state responsibility: the government was responsible for 1) maintaining full employment 2) providing a decent standard in the event of sickness, old age, invalidity and unemployment 3) ensuring the availability of housing through measures sustaining construction 4) eliminating abuses and defects in the

economy. But three of these tenets (1, 3, 4) were qualified to the effect that they were prerogatives of the state if private business failed to solve these tasks. More specifically, the propaganda indicated that the Social Democrats intended to press for more intervention in primarily four areas: housing, agriculture, foreign trade and branch rationalization.[52]

With regard to the type of intervention, the most noticeable contrast between the two elections was the frequency and prominence of remarks on nationalization in 1946. The entire discussion, however, was couched in reservations and reassurances concerning the modest scope of the nationalization contemplated by the Social Democrats. The pronouncements on nationalization represented a retreat - compared to the party's position in 1944 - with regard to the demand to nationalize monopolies. On the other hand, the Social Democrats stuck to their guns concerning certain nationalization proposals (most notably the oil import and municipalization of apartment houses) and expanding public enterprise (local government construction companies). The propaganda simultaneously underscored that other kinds of intervention were far more important than nationalization and expansion of public enterprise. Taken at face value, the campaign statements assigned major weight to indirect forms of intervention (subventions and public credits as steering mechanisms to promote investment activity and consumer demand) and arrangements providing greater public scrutiny into the workings of the private sector and big business.

The most striking difference in the argumentation of the two elections was the ascendancy of ideological themes invoking political ideals in the 1946 propaganda to the general electorate and non-labor movement target groups. In contrast to the 1944 propaganda to the general electorate, which barely mentioned the ideological aspiration of economic democracy, the Social Democrats proclaimed "democratization of society politically, socially and economically" an urgent task in their election platform. Both the platform and the flyer with the widest distribution declared that economic democracy constituted an inevitable phase in the construction of a democratic society. The flyer also equated economic democracy with breaking the dominance of big finance over the Swedish economy, and the Social Democrats stated that they wanted the people to be economically the master of their own house, as they had become politically through universal suffrage.[53] Economic democracy was also an argument in messages to white-collar workers and small businessmen.

However, specific economic policy proposals of a controversial nature were often justified as practical measures to achieve practical objectives and less in terms of achieving ideological goals. (The proposals for branch councils and in housing were the most notable exceptions.) Proposals involving

nationalization, for instance, were presented as promoting greater efficiency and rationalization and, to a lesser extent, combating monopolies. In other words, greater efficiency was the chief justification of nationalization measures; and although Social Democratic economic policy was loosely fashioned as leading to a democratization of the economy, none of the specific nationalization proposals was directly depicted as promoting economic democracy.

Another shift in the election argumentation concerned justifications stemming from a critical view of private enterprise. A marked mellowing occurred as well as a decline in their number. Now the bulk of Social Democratic economic criticism focused on big finance, but these hostile remarks only occasionally took the form of justifications for Social Democratic policy proposals.[54)]

Did the recommendations and their justifications in the 1946 propaganda represent a retreat or radicalization in comparison to 1944? With regard to actual recommendations, certain retreats transpired. For the most part, these retreats were more than offset by the party's unyielding position on housing along with the bold initiative reflected in the rationalization proposals and the tax program. The prominence of the theme of economic democracy as well as the tendency to characterize Social Democratic economic policy in more ideological terms in messages to the entire electorate and non-labor target groups in 1946 provide an initial impression of a radicalization in argumentation. But compared to the argumentation aimed at party supporters in 1944, the substance of economic democracy in 1946 underwent a dilution in certain respects. Most obvious was that in 1944 economic democracy was linked to removal of ownership privileges and the extension of the right of common ownership, but in the 1946 propaganda economic democracy was generally related to a series of measures not necessarily entailing an extension of public ownership. Even explanations to party sypmathizers made it clear that a democratization of the economy could be achieved without nationalization or only a modicum of it.

Statements on Party Differences

The chief ideological difference drawn between the Social Democrats and the non-Socialists was economic democracy, and it was deemed the prime source of conflict between the parties. A message, widely distributed but mainly aimed at the workers, declared: "Political and social democracy, which the labor movement has won in a hard struggle against the resistance of the wealthy classes, must be complemented with economic democracy and greater economic justice. In reality, this is what the social struggle is about. The bourgeois

parties and the private foundations of big finance oppose Social Democratic endeavors because the Social Democrats desire the attainment of such an order." This message also emphasized economic democracy in terms of workers' and employees' influence over questions affecting their economic livelihood.

The most interesting statement on economic democracy occurred in Richard Sterner's pamphlet "More Democracy in the Economy". Although Sterner did not explicitly specify that economic democracy was a party difference, the whole of his pamphlet dealt with non-Socialist opposition to the party's economic policy. One of his major points was that the aim of the Social Democrats was not nationalization but a democratization of the economy, thus implying that economic democracy was the basis of party cleavage. Furthermore democratization of the economy and socialization were used interchangeably, while a distinction was made between socialization and nationalization. In defining socialization, Sterner maintained that it was better to use the word in a broad sense, which was in accord with its actual character, so as to encompass "*all changes which contribute to planning in the economy and simultaneously strengthen democratic influences over the economy, making the management of production accountable not only to private owners but above all to wage-earners, consumers and the entire people, and thereby make it possible for production to be more directly geared to satisfying the people's real wants.*"[55)]

This line of argument was important for several reasons. Primarily it constituted the solution to the major tactical dilemma of Social Democrats on the issue of socialization during these years, viz. retaining supporters hesitant about increased nationalization and at the same time halting the exodus to the left as the Communists put forward more specific demands for nationalization and advocated broader governmental powers in economic planning. This definition of socialization served to underline the "socialism" of the party. But it did not commit the Social Democrats irrevocably to a policy of nationalization.

Ideological differences between the Social Democrats and the Communists also revolved around democracy. The Social Democrats insisted that the two parties espoused fundamentally different philosophies, and that their dissimilar views on democracy constituted an unbridgable gulf. It was emphasized that the essence of Communist ideology was a belief in a one-party system, which prohibited oppositional views, and the Communists were attributed with wanting to introduce the Soviet system in Sweden. The Social Democrats professed their faith in democracy and the rights of the opposition, repudiating dictatorships of all sorts.[56)]

Statements Defending the Party

In defending themselves the Social Democrats concentrated on refuting non-Socialist accusations concerning economic policy. Contrary to the 1944 election when ideological statements defending the party were primarily issued to regular backers, statements of this sort were now also addressed to marginal voters.

Most crucial in the defense of Social Democratic economic policy was a clarification of the party's position on nationalization and the extent of public enterprise. Four points were emphasized. First, the notion that the party advocated total nationalization was vigorously rejected, and it was pointed out that the Party Program did not prescribe one hundred per cent nationalization of the economy. Secondly, the Social Democrats stressed that nationalization was a means and not a goal. Repeatedly the propaganda qualified the importance of nationalization as a means. For example, Sterner stated:

> In *some* cases, nationalization or local government ownership (*kommunalisering* - in combination with other measures - can directly prove to be an appropriate means. But we underline: it is only a means - not a goal. It is one means among several others. *And these other means will be employed to a much greater extent than nationalization or municipalization, at any rate during the entire foreseeable future.* 57)

Thirdly, nationalization, the form of enterprise (private, public, or mixed) and the extent of state intervention were subordinate to efficiency. In stating their position, the Social Democrats cited the Postwar Program:

> To the extent that private enterprise succeeds in solving the specified task - to provide the masses with as much of the good in this life, which is technically possible through utilizing fully and efficiently labor and material productive resources - private enterprise can be permitted to function in the future approximately in the same way as before the war. But to the same extent that it cannot solve the task, the government must intervene with planned economy measures...

Fourthly, decisions to nationalize and introduce public measures were to be based on the merits in each particular case arrived at by detailed investigations. In this connection the Social Democrats emphasized that their position on public ownership and state intervention was pragmatic and not hidebound by dogma, whereas the non-Socialists were doctrinaire in these matters.[58)]

Far less prominent was a defense of economic policy in response to the accusation that it menaced freedom. It was explained that economic planning involved broad steering of key processes in the economy rather than detailed regulation. The pamphlet directed to white-collar workers also defended

economic planning by quoting the Postwar Program:

> It is Social Democracy's firm conviction that such planning of the economic life need not stifle the freedom of individuals but on the contrary can serve to increase it. All planning, all cooperation, all organization are accompanied by limitations and bonds. They can be used to produce conformity and subjugation. But they can also be a means to release the personal activity of the masses, to give them the feeling of freedom it means to participate and decide over their own destiny, to draw the circumference of the sphere where the individual, in the shelter of the security afforded by the organization, can freely develop his own personal uniqueness. Economic planning is only a technical tool conceived by human inventiveness. Like all technology it can be employed to the destruction or benefit of man and his achievements. Social Democracy wants to rally the people to the task of mastering technology instead of allowing themselves to be mastered by it. Economic planning shall not be a planning of oppression but of liberation.

Sterner also belittled non-Socialist charges that the Social Democrats' economic recommendations endangered economic freedom - such as consumer's choice, choice of occupation, individual initiative. He retorted by inquiring what sort of consumer and occupational choice existed in a society of mass underconsumption and unemployment - or free initiative in an economy dominated by private monopolies.[59)]

The Social Democrats contended that their economic policy was not at loggerheads with private enterprise. The platform maintained that coordination of economic activity under the direction of the state did not conflict with the legitimate interests of private enterprise. Elsewhere it was declared that in rationalizing production, the Social Democrats overwhelmingly relied on private enterprise in combination with cooperative planning between private enterprise and public bodies. Party policy was presented as advantageous, indeed as a necessity, for private enterprise. This line of argument was accompanied by statements reflecting a more positive attitude toward private enterprise.[60)]

Attention was also devoted to allegations that Social Democratic economic policy would lead to bureaucratization and that public enterprises were intrinsically inferior to private enterprise and less efficient. The Social Democrats sought to place the onus for the inadequacies of the bureaucracy on the non-Socialists by claiming that deficiencies had been inherited from the era of the traditional authoritarian state. Sterner further argued that a de-bureaucratization would occur through industrial democracy and through increasing the influence of mass organizations over the direction of the economy at the regional and local levels.[61)]

Statements Articulating Interests and Aggregating Groups

The alliance-building strategy resulted in more pronounced and comprehensive aggregation through ideological statements in the 1946 election as compared to 1944. Two themes, in particular, stand out: 1) the nature of economic cleavage in Swedish society and 2) the extension of democracy to additional areas of society and especially economic democracy.

In the 1946 election, statements about social structure and cleavage pertained to the whole of society, as distinct from 1944 when primarily economic divisions within the farming population were emphasized. Now the campaign pronouncements reflected a dominant feature in the Party Program's assessment of society - the existence of a basic cleavage between the interests of the majority and those of the minority of capital owners. In the propaganda the majority consisted of small and middle income groups and the minority of the wealthy and big finance. Moreover a common trait of the messages to target groups outside the labor movement was the theme that their interests were at odds with the interests of the wealthy or that a cleavage of interests, based on wealth or economic position, existed within the target groups themselves. Thus the Social Democrats attempted to weld together a broad alliance of labor and these other groups under the banner of the Social Democrats being "the party of the small and the many".

More specifically, the appeal to the rural population continued to emphasize differences in income and land holdings among the farmers. Now the Social Democrats stressed more emphatically that Agrarian policy reflected the interests of the larger farmers who were said to be a tiny minority. In addition, the Agrarians were portrayed as paying little heed to the problems of the rural population not engaged in agriculture - and, as the party of large farmers, were alleged to represent a mere fraction of the rural population. Messages to small businessmen played upon differences and antagonisms between small entrepreneurs and big business and finance. Similarly the appeal to the fishermen laid the blame for economic ills on big finance. And the fishing industry was characterized as one of the branches of the economy in which dominant private capitalistic interests had not been able to solve problems in a satisfactory manner. In the case of white-collar workers, the Social Democrats put emphasis on the affinity between the white-collar worker's and the manual laborer's relationship to the employer, along with the deep-seated clash of interests between employees and employers. The propaganda accentuated this schism concerning higher wages, better working conditions and industrial democracy. Messages to the white-collar workers also contained some of the strongest statements linking the non-Socialist parties

with the interests of big finance, and these occurred mainly in connection with the wage issue.[62)]

Economic democracy was a common theme in the appeals directed to manual laborers, white-collar workers and small businessmen. The most widely distributed message to labor emphasized increased influence of the workers and employees over economic conditions; other propaganda intended for the workers implied a broader meaning of economic democracy, and several proposals were depicted as democratizing the economy. In the appeal to white-collar workers the theme of economic democracy focused on the demand for industrial democracy, which was described as a mutual aspiration of labor and white-collar workers.[63)]

The basic ideological argument in the appeal to small businessmen was that economic democracy would strengthen private enterprise. This would be accomplished by eliminating private monopolies of large capitalists and reinstating competition. Further, a democratization of the economy - co-determination by employees, improved public information about economic conditions and big business, and cooperation between business and public bodies - would benefit private enterprise. Economic democracy was claimed to be the paramount change desired by the Social Democrats rather than a possible extension of public enterprise.[64)]

In the group appeals the demand to extend democracy to other areas of society was not confined to the economy. Democratization of education was advocated in messages to white-collar workers and youth. The young socialists additionally called for a democratization within the military services: broader recruitment to officer training programs, relaxation of requirements to salute officers, more influence for conscripts, democratic elections of conscripts' representatives, and a revision of military law to bring it in line with civilian jurisprudence.[65)]

The ideals of solidarity and cooperation were in some instances significant in aggregating groups of voters. The most prevalent theme was cooperation and solidarity among groups in society. This theme was important in integrating the competitive interests of farmers and consumers. The appeal to the farming population called for support of a solution of agriculture's vital questions in cooperation with the major groups of society. Additionally, the pamphlet to white-collar workers alluded to a policy of mutual understanding; this policy of compromise between the farmers and workers was to be extended to the white-collar workers. A second theme - that solidarity in the form of collective or organizational endeavors was superior to individual efforts - was expressed in the appeal to white-collar workers, and it was inferred that the belief in solidarity and collective cooperation was a basis of affinity between the white-collar workers and labor. Reassurances to private enterprise also underscored cooperation. And the appeal to

Christians stressed cooperation and solidarity as virtues of the good society, and this emphasis was combined with a negative attitude toward a competitive society with gross economic inequalities and class distinctions.[66]

Pronouncements on freedom occurred in messages to white-collar workers, Christians and labor. The pamphlet addressed to white-collar workers stressed economic planning for freedom (freedom through social engineering) as well as freedom in the sense of self-development and being able to exert influence over one's own destiny. The Christian Social Democrats also laid emphasis on the free development of the individual, and they further underlined the importance of economics in determining the freedom of the individual. Comments to party sympathizers and workers highlighted the elimination of economic conditions limiting freedom and creating greater possibilities for freedom.[67]

. . . . .

What can be concluded about the pattern of tasks and uses of ideological statements in the 1946 election? To begin with, there are several differences between the two elections which are related to the alliance-building strategy in 1946. The two most striking dissimilarities in tactical uses concerned ideological statements 1) aggregating groups and 2) defending the party.

First, aggregation through ideological statements encompassed more groups of voters. Statements on class structure and economic democracy were key vehicles of aggregation.

Second, ideological statements defending the party were more salient in a wider range of propaganda, including messages to both party supporters and marginal voters. The growing prominence of defensive statements can be seen in the use of quotations of the Postwar Program in the two elections. In 1944 the Social Democrats, quoting the Postwar Program, called for a planned economy and generally coupled economic planning to the demand for full employment - a vote-winning issue of the 1930s. In 1946 the party continued to campaign on a planned economy and quoted the Postwar Program in clarifying the nature of planned economy measures. But now the statements were addressed to a narrower section of the electorate and had twin purposes of serving as a campaign recommendation and a refutation of non-Socialist charges. Moreover the other instances of citing the Program were largely to counter non-Socialist propaganda.

Defensive statements in 1946 differed from those in 1944 in another important way. In 1944 the statements basically reaffirmed traditional aspirations: removal of ownership privileges, equalization, democratization of the capital market, freedom through industrial democracy. In 1946 counter-arguments did this less frequently. The two major exceptions were statements on economic planning for freedom and Sterner's argument that industrial democracy

and strengthening the influence of mass organizations over the economy would check official bureaucracy. Otherwise defensive statements underlined limitations and qualified rather than reaffirmed traditional aspirations and instruments.

Third, turning to similarities between the elections, statements with traditional controversial content were frequently not in the form of recommendations. Or if they were, it was usually only to a minor extent. Instead other uses stand out. Take the example of statements on nationalization and socialization in 1946. In propaganda with a limited distribution, nationalization was mentioned as a possible measure. At the same time, defensive statements on nationalization predominated. Campaign statements on socialization primarily redefined it so as to legitimize basic features of party policy. Economic democracy was something of an exception. Specific recommendations were put forward as promoting economic democracy. However, the statements were equally important in demarcating party differences and aggregating groups.

Fourth, when statements with traditional controversial content were presented as recommendations they were usually justified by practical or utilitarian objectives and not as the fulfillment of ideological aspirations. This tendency is evident during both elections. In 1944 a planned economy was necessary to secure full employment. The proposal to nationalize monopolies in the building materials industry was explained as a measure to lower construction costs and consequently rents. In 1946 greater efficiency was the main justification for specific nationalization recommendations. And the proposed tax program was not generally argued in terms of levelling.

Notes

1 Ernst Wigforss, Minnen, p. 284; Elis Håstad, "Samlingsregeringen och samarbetsidén, Svensk tidskrift, 1945, p. 234; Ragnar Casparsson, LO. Bakgrund, utveckling, verksamhet (Stockholm: Prisma, 1966) p. 133, p. 369. In terms of the number of working days lost, the metal workers' strike surpassed both the general strike in 1909 and the strike/lockout in the spring of 1980.

2 Olof Ruin, Mellan samlingsregering och tvåpartisystem (Stockholm:Bonniers, 1968) pp. 132-150.

3 Socialdemokratiska partistyrelsen, berättelse för år 1945, p. 45.

4 Landsorganisationen i Sverige, berättelse 1945, p. 264; Erik Lundberg, Business Cycles and Economic Policy (London: Allen & Unwin, 1957) p. 64.

5 SOU 1945:46, pp. 13-41, pp. 276-277; Ernst Wigforss, Minnen, p. 304; Stig Hadenius, Hans Wieslander, Björn Molin, op.cit., pp. 194-195; Hugh Heclo, Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden (New Haven: Yale,1974) pp. 228-230.

6 Nils Elvander, Svensk skattepolitik 1945-1970 (Stockholm: Rabén & Sjögren, 1972) pp. 29-31.

7 Leif Lewin, op.cit., pp. 252-256, pp. 262-323; Socialidemokratiska partistyrelsen, berättelse för år 1946, p. 111.

8 Leif Lewin, op.cit., p. 325; Politisk valhandbok 1946 (Stockholm: Högerns riksorganisation, 1946) pp. 74-94.

9 For postwar changes in the ownership structure of apartment houses, see e.g. Rolf Ejvegård, Samhället och bostäderna (Stockholm: Svenska riksbyggen, 1969) p. 15. For a more general discussion of housing policy, see Bruce Headey, Housing Policy in the Developed Economy (London: Croom Helm, 1978) pp. 66-96.

10 T.L. Johnston, Collective Bargaining in Sweden (London: Allen & Unwin, 1962) pp. 216-221; Industriell demokrati (Stockholm: Folkpartiet, 1946); Frihet och framsteg (Stockholm: Högerns riksorganisation, 1946) pp. 138-140.

11 Medborgaren, 1945, No. 1, p. 3; Leif Lewin, op.cit., pp. 187-191; Stockholms-Högern, 1944, No. 28, pp. 9-10; 1946, No. 2, pp. 16-17. See esp. the last paragraph of "Handlingsprogrammet", Medborgaren, 1946, No. 7, pp. 2-3.

12 Folkpartiet, 1944, No. 6, p. 6, p. 17; 1945, No. 1, p. 4; No. 3, p. 3; No 5, p. 4; No. 6, p. 3, p. 15; No. 7, p. 4; No. 8, p. 4; 1946, No. 2, p. 4, p. 17; Politiska dagsfrågor, 1946, No. 1, see the poster for the propaganda drive in March 1946, "Good Leadership, Growing Membership"; H.-K. Rönblom, "Den liberala folkrörelsen", På liberalismens grund (Stockholm: Folkpartiet, 1953) p. 41, p 44; Folkpartiet, 1946, No. 2 (cover) and p. 4; Ombudsmannens berättelse, 1946-47, pp. 17-18, p. 28, p. 30.

13 BM, 1944, October, p. 2, pp. 6-7; December, pp. 4-5; Verksamhetsberättelse för Landsbygdspartiet Bondeförbundet år 1945, p. 23. Cf. Grundprogram för Landsbygdspartiet Bondeförbundet. Antaget vid 1946 års förbundsstämma and Grundprogram för Bondeförbundet. Antaget vid 1933 års förbundsstämma.

14 Resolution antagen vid sammanträde den 13-14 oktober 1945 med styrelsen i SKP, Vår tid, 1945, No. 9, p. 3; Sven Linderot and Hilding Hagberg, Samling kring efterkrigsprogrammet (Stockholm: Arbetarkultur, 1946) pp. 3-4.

15 Sven Linderot, Demokratins handlingsprogram (Stockholm: Arbetarkultur, 1946) pp. 18-22 in Vårt handlingsprogram; Vår tid, 1946, No. 6, p. 2. Additional strains on party unity were likely created by the influx of new members. Party membership more than doubled between 1944 and 1946, totalling 48,000 in April 1946; and 84 % of the members had joined the party after 1939.

16 Nils Elvander, op.cit., pp. 30-31.

17 See e.g. BM, 1945, August, p. 9; October, p. 2, p. 3; December, pp. 1-2, p. 12.

18 Svenska valprogram; Högern vill ..., Högerns handlingsprogram. Antaget av Högerns representantskap den 28 maj 1946; Politisk valhandbok 1946 (hereafter Valhandbok) p. 15, p. 39, pp. 46-47, pp. 58-59, pp. 150-53; "Högerns linje blev folkets linje"; Medborgaren, 1946, No. 7, pp. 2-3; No. 9, pp. 3-5.

19 See e.g. "Som Du röstar får Du skatta"; Medborgaren, 1946, No. 8, pp. 2-3; No. 9, p. 12; Ekonomi och politik,1946, No. 2; Stockholms-Högern, 1946, No 9, pp. 4-5; No. 10, p. 15, 18; Valhandbok, p. 15, 42, pp. 47-59; Sten Natt och Dag and Nils-Ivar Roslund, Och sossarna gå till valet med skilda program (Stockholm: Högerns riksorganisation, 1946) pp. 74-81.

20 Valhandbok, pp. 15-16; Medborgaren, 1946, No. 9, pp. 4-5; Sten Natt och Dag and Nils-Ivar Roslund, op.cit., pp. 29-33.

21 Svenska valprogram; leaflet to farmers, Ekonomi och politik, 1946, Nos. 3 and 4; Högern vill ...; "Du vill vara en god demokrat?"

22 Elis Håstad, "Gallup" och den svenska väljarkåren (Uppsala: Gebers, 1950) p. 250; Sten Natt och Dag and Nils-Ivar Roslund, op.cit., pp. 29-48.

23 Medborgaren, 1946, No. 9, pp. 4-5.

24 Folkpartiet, 1946, No. 5, p. 3, 17; No. 2, p. 4, 17; Politiska dagsfrågor, 1946, No. 1; Folkpartiets valhandbok IV. Kommunalvalen 1946 (hereafter Folkpartiets valhandbok) pp. 3-9, 79-83; Hörde Ni? Valprogrammen i radio 1946 (Stockholm: Radiotjänst, 1946) pp. 30-33, 49-51 (hereafter Hörde Ni?)

25 Svenska valprogram; Hörde Ni?, p. 50; Folkpartiet, No. 5, p. 9, p. 12; Folkpartiets valhandbok, pp. 15-17; Industriell demokrati (Stockholm: Folkpartiet, 1946); Vi tjänstemän, 1946, No. 2.

26 See e.g. Folkpartiet, No. 4, p. 3, 14; No. 5, p. 5, pp. 16-17; Folkpartiets valhandbok, pp. 10-14, p. 8.
As the campaign progressed and the discussion shifted from the sales tax to lower income taxes, the Liberals became visibly irritated with the Conservatives' expounding that they were prepared to lower taxes more than any other party; and considerable effort was expended in pointing out the holes in the Conservatives' propaganda. In fact during the major radio debate between the parties, the Liberals addressed the main portion of their critical remarks on taxation to the Conservatives. Hörde Ni?, p. 56, 62, 66, pp. 29-30, 65-66.

27 Wald. Svensson, Jordbrukspolitiken och det mindre jordbruket (Stockholm: Folkpartiet, 1946); Folkpartiet, No. 5, p. 6, p. 9; Folkpartiets valhandbok, pp. 18-27, pp. 35-37, pp. 68-70, pp. 96-101; Vi tjänstemän, 1946, No. 1, pp. 2-3, No. 3.

28 Vårt svenska jordbruk (Stockholm: Landsbygdspartiet Bondeförbundet, 1946); Landsbygden i förgrunden (Stockholm: Landsbygdspartiet Bondeförbundet, 1946); Skogen och bygden (Kalmar: Landsbygdspartiet Bondeförbundet, 1946); BM, 1946, No. 3, p. 1, p. 7, p. 14.

29 "Rättvisa åt landsbygden och de mindre tätorterna"; Landsbygden i förgrunden; "ökad trivsel på landsbygden", BM, No. 3, pp. 10-11, p. 13; "Landsbygdens elektrifiering"; "Bättre folkpension men rättvisa?"; "'som man röstar får man skatta'"; Fiskets framtid (Kalmar: Landsbygdspartiet Bondeförbundet, 1946).

30 Sven Linderot, Demokratins handlingsprogram, pp. 5-9.

31 Svenska valprogram; Sven Linderot, Demokratins handlingsprogram, pp. 14-15, p. 19; C.H. Hermansson, Ekonomiskt handlingsprogram (Stockholm: Arbetarkultur, 1946) p. 18, pp. 9-10; Nils Holmberg, Porträtt av storfinans (Stockholm: Arbetarkultur, 1946).

32 "Det lönar sig att rösta med kommunisterna"; Gösta Kempe, Bo bättre och billigare (Stockholm: Arbetarkultur, 1946); C.H. Hermansson, Vilka skall bestämma - arbetare eller kapitalister? (Stockholm: Arbetarkultur, 1946) pp. 14-17; Margit Lindström, Kvinnornas problem (Stockholm: Arbetarkultur, 1946) pp. 4-8; Land och folk, 1946, No. 8, p. 3; Erik Karlsson, Jordbrukets framtid (Stockholm: Arbetarkultur, 1946) pp. 8-18.

33 C.H. Hermansson, Ekonomiskt handlingsprogram, pp. 6-7, pp. 10-15 and Vilka skall bestämma - arbetare eller kapitalister?, pp. 17-22. It should also be noted that this is a very different picture from that provided by Leif Lewin whose analysis of Communist economic policy during the mid-1940s is mainly based on statements issued in 1944 and fails to observe the substantial shift which occurred in 1946. See Leif Lewin, op.cit., pp. 234-241, p. 323.

34 See the poster "Safeguard the Postwar Program"; Svenska valprogram; "Slå vakt om efterkrigsprogrammet"; Vår väg, 1946, No. 2, p. 3, p. 11; No. 3, p. 3, p. 11, p. 15; Säkra efterkrigsprogrammet (Stockholm: Tiden, 1946); Fakta, 1946, p. 226; "Vad är det som skiljer?"

35 Vår väg, Nos. 2 & 3, p. 8, pp. 12-13; "Se nästa sida"; Fakta, No. 5, p. 180, pp. 183-185; Nu gäller det tjänstemännen (Stockholm: Tiden, 1946) pp. 28-29; Skatter och statsfinanser.

36 Richard Sterner, Mera demokrati i näringslivet (Stockholm: Tiden, 1946) pp. 30-32; Säkra efterkrigsprogrammet, pp. 19-20; Vår väg, No. 1 1/2, p. 12; Fakta, p. 271. See also Vår väg, No. 1, pp. 2-4.

37 See Cirkulär, 1946, No. 10. The new scope of appeals was, in part, facilitated by the Communists mellowing the tone of their messages to workers, while the Agrarians dropped their pointed appeal to farm laborers.

38 See the platform; Socialdemokratiska partistyrelsen, berättelse för år 1946, pp. 117-120; "Säkra fiskets framtid"; "Tjänstemännens väg"; Nu gäller det tjänstemännen, pp. 10-16; Partiets organisationsformer och upplysningsverksamhet (Stockholm: Socialdemokratiska partistyrelsen, 1948) (hereafter Partiets organisationsformer) pp. 23-25; Vår väg, 1946, No. 1 1/2, esp. pp. 4-10, pp. 13-15.

39 See the poster "Familjens väl, Arbetarepartiets mål"; Svenska valprogram; Vår väg, 1946, Nos. 2 and 3, p. 16, p. 3; No. 2, p. 11; "Slå vakt om efterkrigsprogrammet".

40 Svenska valprogram; Nu gäller det tjänstemännen, pp. 15-16; Vår väg, No. 3, p. 7; Säkra efterkrigsprogrammet, pp. 11-12; Fakta, No. 6, pp. 233-236.

41 Svenska valprogram; "Se nästa sida"; Vår väg, Nos. 2 and 3, pp. 12-13; Nu gäller det tjänstemännen, pp. 27-30; Fakta, No. 5, pp. 183-85; Skatter och statsfinanser; Säkra efterkrigsprogrammet, pp. 8-9; Frihet, No. 18, p. 20.

42 Svenska valprogram, "Rättvisa åt jordbrukets folk", Vår väg, No. 2, pp. 5-6, 14-15; Har landsbygden missgynnats? (Stockholm: Tiden, 1946) pp. 22-24; Säkra efterkrigsprogrammet, pp. 15-16; Fakta, 1946, No. 6, pp. 231-3; Frihet, No. 18, p. 8, p. 21.

43 Richard Sterner, op.cit., pp. 28-9, p. 26, 7; Vår väg, No. 3, p. 5; No. 1 1/2, pp. 8-10; Säkra efterkrigsprogrammet, p. 21, pp. 14-15; Nu gäller det tjänstemännen, p. 14; Fakta, No. 6, pp. 227-30.

44 Nu gäller det tjänstemännen, p. 12; Richard Sterner, op.cit., p. 13.

45 Richard Sterner, op.cit., pp. 7-8, pp. 28-29. See also Aktuell politik 1946, "Programmet blir verklighet", Sveriges socialdemokratiska ungdomsförbund, 1946, p. 18, p. 21; Svenska valprogram; Vår väg, No. 1 1/2; "Säkra fiskets framtid".

46 Richard Sterner, op.cit., pp. 23-24, pp. 28-29; Säkra efterkrigsprogrammet, pp. 17-18.

47 Vår väg, No. 1 1/2, p. 11; Richard Sterner, op.cit., pp. 14-15, pp. 23-27.

48 Vår väg, No. 1 1/2, p. 11; Richard Sterner, op.cit., p. 9, pp. 20-22; Säkra efterkrigsprogrammet, p. 17.

49 Säkra efterkrigsprogrammet, p. 21; Richard Sterner, op.cit., p. 13; Nu gäller det tjänstemännen, p. 12.

50 Richard Sterner, op.cit., p. 5, p. 7; Säkra efterkrigsprogrammet, p. 22; Vår väg, No. 1 1/2, pp. 11-12.

51 Vår väg, No. 1 1/2, p. 11; Richard Sterner, op.cit., pp. 8-9, p. 27; Säkra efterkrigsprogrammet, pp. 22-23; Vår väg, No. 3, p. 15; Nu gäller det tjänstemännen, p. 16.

52 Säkra efterkrigsprogrammet, pp. 20-21, pp. 13-14; Nu gäller det tjänstemännen, p. 22; Richard Sterner, op.cit., pp. 23-29.

53 Svenska valprogram; "Slå vakt om efterkrigsprogrammet".

54 See e.g. Richard Sterner, op.cit., p. 9; Vår väg, No. 1 1/2, p. 11, p. 4, p. 14; "Säkra fiskets framtid".

55 "Vad är det som skiljer?" (quotation); Vår väg, No. 3, p. 15 (quotation); Fakta, No. 6, p. 226; Richard Sterner, op.cit., pp. 5-8 (quotation, p. 5, italics original).

56 "Vad är det som skiljer?"; Vår väg, No. 3, p. 15; Richard Sterner, op.cit., p. 31.

57 Richard Sterner, op.cit., pp. 12-13, pp. 5-6 (quotation, pp. 5-6, italics original); Nu gäller det tjänstemännen, p. 12; Edvin Gustafsson, Ägare eller förvaltare (Stockholm: Broderskap, 1946) p. 13.

58 Vår väg, No. 1 1/2, pp. 11-12; Richard Sterner, op.cit., pp. 11-14, pp. 23-25 (quotation p. 13); Nu gäller det tjänstemännen, p. 12 (also quotation); Edvin Gustafsson, op.cit., p. 13; Säkra efterkrigsprogrammet, pp. 17-19.

59 Nu gäller det tjänstemännen, pp. 20-22 (quotation, pp. 20-21); Richard Sterner, op.cit., p. 31

60 Svenska valprogram; Vår väg, No. 1 1/2, pp. 5-6, pp. 10-11; Richard Sterner, op.cit., p. 9, p. 29.

61 Vår väg, No. 3, p. 6, p. 11, p. 14; Richard Sterner, op.cit., pp. 18-19.

62 Vår väg, No. 2; "Rättvisa åt jordbrukets folk"; Har landsbygden missgynnats?, pp. 3-5, pp. 17-22; Vår väg, No. 1 1/2, p. 4, pp. 13-14; "Säkra fiskets framtid"; "Tjänstemännens väg"; Nu gäller det tjänstemännen, pp. 4-10; p. 19, pp. 24-26, pp. 30-31.

63 "Vad är det som skiljer?"; Vår väg, No. 3, p. 15; Richard Sterner, op. cit., pp. 8-9; Säkra efterkrigsprogrammet, pp. 22-23; Nu gäller det tjänstemännen, p. 16, p. 19.

64 Vår väg, No. 1 1/2, pp. 10-12.

65 Nu gäller det tjänstemännen, pp. 15-16; "Det angår dig"; Bertil Johansson, Det angår dig (Stockholm: Sveriges socialdemokratiska ungdomsförbund, 1946) p. 23, pp. 12-18, pp. 7-9; Frihet, 1946, No. 18, p. 5, pp. 12-13.

66 Vår väg, No. 2, p. 6; Nu gäller det tjänstemännen, p. 18, pp. 8-9, pp. 30-31; Vår väg, No. 1 1/2, pp. 11-12; Edvin Gustafsson, op.cit., pp. 14-15.

67 Nu gäller det tjänstemännen, pp. 20-21, p. 32; Edvin Gustafsson, op.cit., p. 14; Richard Sterner, op.cit., p. 31.

Chapter 5

THE 1948 ELECTION: "Don't Turn Back the Clock"

5.1 The Political Situation: Economic Adversity and Attacks from All Sides

The 1946 election resulted in relatively small shifts in the electoral support of the parties and had little immediate impact on the composition of parliament. The Social Democrats retained their majority in the upper chamber, and they estimated that their majority was ensured into the 1950s.[1] (See Table 1. p. 45).

Nonetheless, the shifts in electoral support were not without significance. First, in terms of electoral support (but not membership in parliament), the Liberals became the largest non-Socialist party, inching ahead of the Conservatives. Their new position in Swedish politics became an important theme in the party's propaganda - the Liberals stressed that they were the leading non-Socialist party.[2] Secondly, the Communists had continued to gain support, while the Social Democrats had lost voters for the third consecutive time. For the Communists, 11.2 % was a record high in voter support. Of special concern to the Social Democrats were estimates that in Gothenburg the Communists had won 40 % of the working class vote and in Stockholm 32 %. Such percentages kept alive Social Democratic fears that the Communists might succeed in splitting the working class in half.[3]

Between the 1946 and 1948 elections the focus of domestic politics gradually moved from reforms to problems of disequilibrium in the economy. An impressive amount of reform legislation was enacted through the 1947 session of the Riksdag. However, during 1946-48 Sweden's economic situation successively deteriorated, and the seriousness of this deterioration became dramatically apparent during 1947.

The major pieces of reform legislation consisted of national health insurance (to come into effect in the early 1950s), general child allowances, measures in the areas of housing, town planning, agriculture, and taxation. In most cases it was possible to reach wide agreement and in a few instances unanimity.[4]

The 1947 tax reform however caused an extended, bitter party conflict. After the 1946 election the focal point of non-Socialist criticism shifted to the government's proposals for higher taxes on business, wealth and inheritances. The Conservatives and Liberals argued that these tax hikes would jeopardize saving and capital formation, curtail production, and ultimately endanger social reforms. All three non-Socialist parties were adamantly against the proposed inheritance tax, modelled after Anglo-Saxon death duties.

It was described as confiscation of private property and thus a form of socialization. Party positions were unbending, and meager efforts to reach a compromise failed. When the government bill on taxation was adopted by a Social Democratic/Communist majority in July 1947, the Conservatives took the unusual step of underlining their disapproval by issuing a party reservation.[5] Nor did the Conservatives and Liberals allow the issue to die; it was integrated into their major offensive against the Social Democrats: mismanagement of the government and failure to come to grips with the deteriorating economic situation.

By the end of 1946 and the beginning of 1947, it was obvious that the Swedish economy was in serious trouble. Contrary to the many predictions of a depression, numerous factors combined to produce excess demand. This, in turn, led to a currency crisis and inflation. Imports grew in 1946 and reached a record level in 1947. The increase in imports precipitated a severe drain on Swedish foreign currency reserves, which fell from 2.8 billion in December 1945 to 700 million in December 1947. Inflation became pronounced at the end of 1946, and subsequently the cost of living index rose steadily.

The first major attempt to come to grips with these problems occurred in March 1947. Control of imports through a licensing system and a sharp reduction of construction were the chief measures. Of less economic significance, but psychologically and politically important due to its unpopularity, the rationing of coffee (also tea and cocoa) was resumed. Later in the year the government presented a more comprehensive program to deal with the crisis, and additional austerity measures were introduced in 1948 in connection with overbalancing the budget. Social Democratic efforts also focused on a stabilization of incomes. The first step in this direction was achieved through a voluntary agreement on wage restraints by state employees in the spring of 1948, and later LO agreed to observe restraint during the 1949 wage negotiations.[6]

The Social Democrats had tried to get the other political parties and the major interest organizations to rally behind a common policy to fight inflation. Party negotiations concerning a joint anti-inflation program occurred early in 1947 and again in the autumn. On both occasions negotiations broke down, and each side blamed the other for the failure.[7]

Shortly after the first party negotiations collapsed in March 1947 and in conjunction with the government's announcement of its initial measures to deal with the crisis, the non-Socialists accused the Social Democrats of mismanaging the economy and government. And Ohlin urged that a new election be called. "Misgovernment" (*Vanstyre*) became the slogan of an enormous propaganda drive which continued right up until election day. The Social Democrats

were held responsible for the crisis. Now non-Socialist accusations concerning socialization and a planned economy assumed a new guise. The introduction of more stringent controls to cope with the crisis was equated with socialization and socialist planning. And the fact that there was an inflationary crisis and it had not been foreseen by the government were pointed to as evidence of the bankruptcy of the whole notion of a planned economy.[8)]

The constellation of party conflict on economic policy, which stood out in the propaganda aimed at the general public, was the Conservatives and the Liberals versus the Social Democrats. During the spring of 1948, however, a different configuration emerged in the Riksdag. The Conservatives set themselves apart from the other parties by an alternative anti-inflation policy. Conservative statements in parliament indicated that the party supported a hike in the rate of interest and some sort of general tax on consumption rather than selective indirect taxes. The demarcation of the Conservatives' position also manifested itself in the party's opposition to certain crisis measures supported by the Social Democrats, the Liberals and the Agrarians.[9)]

The deterioration of the economic situation also had important consequences for the Social Democrats' recommendations for increased state intervention in the economy - especially proposals entailing public ownership and the establishment of branch councils. By the beginning of 1948, three of the inquiry commissions examining various branches of industry had presented their reports. One proposed the nationalization of oil imports, another piecemeal municipalization, and two commissions recommended the establishment of branch councils. These proposals were severely criticized by the non-Socialists and private business. Although the government had announced in April 1947 that the nationalization of oil would have to be postponed because of the precarious situation of Sweden's foreign currency reserves and the dollar shortage,[10)] there was as yet little sign of the Social Democrats backing down on the issue of increased state intervention in various branches of industry. During the major political debate after the opening of the 1948 Riksdag, however, the speeches of the Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance implied a retreat on this issue. They both declared that the government was prepared to put aside issues generating party controversy. These statements were interpreted by the non-Socialists and the Communists as meaning that the issue of socialization was going to be put in mothballs.[11)] No additional branch inquiry commissions were appointed, and no commission reported during 1948.[12)]

The course of recent events in international politics loomed in the background of the 1948 election. The events of 1947 signaled the formation of two antagonistic blocs in Europe, and in 1948 the contours of the blocs crystallyzed more sharply. Of particular importance to Swedish domestic

politics, in terms of the reaction it provoked, was the Communists' dramatic consolidation of power in Czechoslovakia at the end of February in 1948. A more enduring consequence - which was to last into the 1960s - was the emergence of a democratic - non-democratic cleavage in Swedish postwar party politics. The legitimacy of the Communists as a democratic party was called in question by the other four parties which referred to themselves as the democratic parties.

The predominant feature of party activities during this period was a vast build-up of resources for the coming election. Efforts were made to enroll members, to improve organizational strength, to expand channels of propaganda, and to fill party tills. Most active in all these areas were the Liberals, the Social Democrats and the Communists. In particular the Liberals made spectacular strides in building up their resources. Moving from an extremely weak position in 1944, the Liberals on the eve of the 1948 election possessed the largest and strongest party organization in their history up to that point. Their financial resources seem to have improved markedly, and there are also indications that the Liberal press was engaged in the 1948 election on an unprecedented scale.[13] The Conservatives concentrated on promoting party publications and ensuring their supremacy in the area of party finance. The Agrarians appear least involved in this mobilization process.

Between the two elections, reorientations occurred in two of the parties - the Agrarians and the Communists. After the 1946 election the Agrarians became increasingly critical of the Social Democrats' position on socialization. As the economic situation worsened, the Agrarians scored the Social Democratic government for its handling of the crisis. On the other hand, the tone of the Agrarians' criticism did not reach the same pitch as that of the Liberals and Conservatives. Secondly, the Agrarians put more stress on their centrist position, and efforts were intensified to specify the content of a centrist policy. Gradually the Agrarians with greater frequency linked the Conservatives and Liberals with big business. On the eve of the election the Agrarians styled themselves as between socialism and big finance or PHM, and the middle way or a centrist policy was given a broader meaning.[14]

In the Communist party significant changes took place during the period between the elections, but only after the 1948 election was there a total break with the line adopted by the 1946 party congress. Following the 1946 election the Communists continued to give priority to the creation of a democratic front and implementation of the Postwar Program, which were designated as the two immediate tasks of the party, and their realization was viewed as opening the way for a peaceful transition to socialism. By the spring of 1948 there was a reformulation of the prime task of the party and a change

in attitude toward the Social Democrats. The foremost task of the party, as defined by the 1948 congress, was to defend peace and Sweden's national independence from US imperialism and involvement in a Western bloc. Talk of a peaceful transition to socialism faded into the background. The party's stance regarding the Social Democratic government and leadership changed from a position of support and seeking collaboration between the two parties to a stance of non-support and increasing criticism. In late February the Communists lambasted the Social Democratic government's new course: its abandonment of the Postwar Program and its battle against the Communists. Subsequently the Social Democrats were depicted as having moved to the right and fraternizing with big finance and the bourgeois parties.[15)]

Finally the Social Democrats' losses in the 1946 election further spurred their endeavors to improve the organizational strength of the party and to gain firmer control of the trade unions by reducing Communist influence as much as possible. It appears that a fundamental aspect of the Social Democrats' strategy in 1948 was to regain a majority of elected posts in the local trade union executives and local coordinating committees, then for these bodies to lay down a "line" of undivided support for the Social Democratic party, and finally on the basis of that line to call for unity. With all levels of trade union leadership endorsing the Social Democrats, Communist propaganda which did not support the Social Democrats could and was labelled as an effort to split and weaken the labor movement at a time when unity was imperative for the continued existence of a workers' government.[16)]

In summation, the odds seemed to be heavily stacked against the Social Democrats at first glance. Economic adversity and inflation are generally viewed as creating a grave disadvantage for a party in government. Since early 1947 the voters had been bombarded with alarming reports about the state of the economy, they had been confronted with the reimposition of rationing and the introduction of other austerity measures and controls. Nor were there any conclusive signs of improvement in the offing.

The other four parties held the Social Democrats accountable for the economic difficulties. The Liberals and Conservatives linked the crisis controls with the larger issue of socialism - giving the threat of socialization a new and very tangible dimension. The state of the economy also provided a common focal point for non-Socialist criticism, as did certain features of Social Democratic tax policy. In these respects the non-Socialist parties were more united than they had been in the two previous campaigns. Furthermore, the unilaterally proclaimed "honeymoon" period between the Communists and the Social Democrats was gradually terminated. The combined result was the re-emergence of a two-front situation for the Social Democrats, charac-

terized by hostile attacks from both sides.

During most of the period between the elections the Social Democrats were on the defensive, fielding broad charges of mismanagement and incompetence as well as criticism of specific policies, such as a credit agreement with the Soviet Union, taxation and measures to combat inflation. Intermeshed in the non-Socialist offensive were attacks on leading Social Democrats. Of these attacks, the one levelled against Tage Erlander, the new Prime Minister, was perhaps the most troublesome. Erlander had succeeded Per Albin Hansson, who died quite suddenly about three weeks after the 1946 election.[17] The 1948 election was Erlander's first election as party leader, and he clearly lacked the stature and authority of his predecessor.

Nevertheless the tactical situation of the Social Democrats was not entirely gloomy. Trade union elections in the spring of 1948 revealed that Communist influence was ebbing. Events in Czechoslovakia, and Eastern Europe in general, furnished the Social Democrats with added ammunition in their efforts to reduce Communist influence. Secondly, the non-Socialists may have been united in criticizing the Social Democrats' handling of the economy. But they were not united on measures to restore balance in the economy. The Social Democrats did not neglect the opportunity afforded by this disunity. Finally, the sizable proportion of non-voters in the working class held out the prospect of a strategy focusing on getting out the vote.[18] In this connection the intensity of the party struggle was possibly a blessing in disguise. It may have cemented the workers together and aided the Social Democrats in urging them to go to the polls.

5.2 Basic Features of the Rival Parties' Campaigns

The Liberals: The Threefold Attack on Socialization, Misgovernment and One-Party Rule

A threefold attack on socialization, misgovernment and one-party rule formed the backbone of the Liberals' challenge as to whether the Social Democrats deserved to remain in power. Once again the Liberals fashioned socialization and a socialist society as the crucial issue of the election. Besides several arguments from the two previous elections emphasizing the socialist intentions of the Social Democrats, the issue was now fused with the economic crisis. By pointing to the growing number of controls, the Liberals claimed that socialization and a socialist society of controls posed an immediate threat.[19]

A socialist society of controls was contrasted with a progressive policy of social liberalism and the society desired by the Liberals: a free enter-

prise economy combined with social reforms to provide freedom and opportunities for the individual. In this election more stress was placed on social liberalism which was now linked with a number of radical themes, such as progressive change, elimination of class barriers and class mentality, and economic democratization. The presentation of a social liberal society was vital to the party's argument that socialization and not social reforms was the issue of the election, and that socialization constituted the main dividing line between the Liberals and the Social Democrats.[20] It was also essential in projecting an image of having a positive alternative, thus countering charges of negativism and the accusation that the Liberals lacked an alternative. The image of a positive alternative was also conveyed in propaganda which assumed the form of a list of planks - giving the impression of an explicit program of action.[21]

The second argument in the threefold attack was misgovernment. The Liberals underlined that the Social Democrats through misgovernment were responsible for the economic crisis and resulting hardships for the voters - rationing, rising prices, new taxes, controls and red-tape, and shortages of housing and consumer goods. The government's economic policy was described as blunders, poor judgements and indecisiveness, and the Liberals concluded that the Social Democrats appeared incapable of extricating Sweden from the crisis.[22]

The third argument concerned the detrimental effects of "socialist one-party rule". It constituted a threat to democracy and resulted in bad policy, e.g. the Soviet credit agreement, taxes and various economic measures. Democracy was jeopardized due to the Social Democrats' affinity and collaboration with the Communists who were clearly anti-democratic; and eliminating socialist one-party rule was often related to reducing the influence of the Communist party. It was further held that socialist one-party rule reflected class interests and neglected to give consideration to the legitimate interests of all groups in society.[23]

A characteristic feature of the Liberals' propaganda, irrespective of its subject matter and ranging from poster slogans and brochure headings to the major themes of the election, was a dichotomized structure. These dichotomies consisted of painting issues and themes in black and white, of pitting a "good" against a "bad" and imparting a sense of choice between them. For example, the main election poster read: "No to a society of controls - Yes to the People's party", and typical brochure headings were: "Against dictatorship, for prosperity" and "Reasonable taxes and greater production - or socialist confiscation?". The threefold attack on the Social Democrats embodied similar dichotomies. Misgovernment by the Social Democrats was contrasted

with the economic wisdom and foresight of the opposition, the socialist society of controls with a progressive free society of social liberalism, and socialist one-party rule with democratic cooperation.

A crucial innovation in the Liberal campaign strategy was a drive to get out the vote, and this was combined with a substantial appeal to working class voters. One facet of the effort to mobilize voters was to emphasize the importance of the election in determining Sweden's future and to create a "now or never" atmosphere. The closeness of the election and the ability of the individual voter to influence its outcome were also stressed, and non-voting was depicted as allowing the Communists to have the deciding voice in Swedish politics.[24] Liberal appeals to groups known to have a low turn-out, such as women and young voters, were intensified. Furthermore, the Liberals appreciably strengthened their propaganda to farmers and workers, while messages to other target groups were distributed in approximately the same numbers as in 1946. Of particular interest were endeavors to convert working class voters to the party. The appeal to the workers did not explicitly state how Liberal proposals would benefit the workers. Instead it argued against class mentality and voting on the basis of class or occupation. Expressed in negative terms, a poster equated voting according to class with robot-like behavior. In its positive form, the theme underscored that a good democrat voted according to convictions and beliefs.[25]

The Conservatives: "The Rugged Line" and a Return to a Traditional Profile
The election propaganda of the Conservatives was a blend of themes similar to those of the Liberals and themes conveying a distinctive party profile. The Conservatives vied with the Liberals in criticizing the government's economic policy, stressing the dangers of controls and socialization, and contrasting a socialist society of controls with a society based on freedom. The two parties used somewhat similar arguments to get voters to go to the polls. Both parties jostled for position as the leading non-Socialist opposition party. And they both designated themselves as the freedom party. In the case of the Conservatives, the party's claim to this title was incorporated in the major theme that internal and external freedom was at stake in the election. One of their main slogans declared: "You still have freedom to choose, choose freedom".

Themes tending to give the Conservatives a distinctive image were: "the rugged line", i.e. the necessity of an austere economic policy, the need for a revival of spiritual values, and the importance of a strong defense. These three themes, together with the Conservatives' intransigent stand against communism, represented a return to a more traditional profile.[26]

The Conservatives were now more adamant in their criticism of the government's policy than in the 1946 election, and they propounded that rigorous measures were required to rectify the economic situation. The period of Social Democratic government was equated with three years of socialistic planned economy. Specific government measures subjected to heavy attack were taxes, price controls and agricultural legislation. In some instances, these measures were branded as indirect socialization, and controls on prices and credit were characterized as the portal to a totalitarian order. A free, decentralized society as advocated by the Conservatives was juxtaposed against a controlled, centralized socialist society. The Conservatives' alternative was depicted as one of freedom, particularly devoid of restrictions curbing the individual's actions. Substantial weight was attached to a free enterprise economy, and it was maintained that individual savings and the right of private ownership were prerequisites for personal freedom.[27)]

The party's alternative also featured the theme that the Conservatives had a remedy for Sweden's economic ills - the "rugged line". The bulk of the campaign literature described the rugged line in general terms. The economy was diagnosed as sick and in need of a stiff dose of medicine. Increased saving, hard work and a period of sacrifice were prescribed. Less prominent were actual recommendations. These included the repeal of the recently introduced death duties, a general tax on consumption rather than selective taxes on certain consumer goods, a contraction of the money supply, a flexible rate of interest with an immediate increase, and termination of the purchase of bonds by the Riksbank. For the most part, the rugged line was termed an alternative to Social Democratic policy. But some statements also noted that only the Conservatives proposed rigorous measures, and that the other non-Socialist parties had sided with the government. This latter distinction was made clear mainly in literature aimed at traditional supporters and businessmen.[28)]

The rugged line also had strong moral overtones. Domö contended that the prevailing uneasiness and lack of confidence characterizing the economic situation was a symptom of a more fundamental malaise. He lamented over the neglect of spiritual values and emphasized the need for a moral revival. In the campaign literature, Christianity was heralded as a vital force in the struggle against totalitarianism and materialism; and the Conservatives underlined the importance of a Christian homelife and religious instruction in the schools.[29)] Parenthetically the relatively strong emphasis on Christianity can also be viewed as an attempt to court the religious wing of the People's party.

Both articulation and aggregation of interests came more visibly to the fore in the Conservative propaganda for the 1948 election than during the two previous campaigns. The main target groups were businessmen, farmers and white-collar workers, and the common issue in mustering their support was criticism of Social Democratic economic policy and controls. The messages to businessmen contained some of the sharpest attacks on the government's policy and the most specific recommendations. In addition the Liberals were criticized, and it was asserted that there was little difference between Ohlin's proposals and the Social Democrats' planned economy. Besides assailing controls, the appeal to farmers objected to recent agricultural and forestry legislation.[30)]

The Agrarians: Campaigning as the Center Party

For the first time, the address of portions of Agrarian election propaganda was explicitly beamed beyond the rural section of the population. Now a key slogan was "A sound policy for the best of the entire people", as compared to "Justice for the countryside" in 1944 and "How will the countryside's future be formed?" in 1946. In a narrow sense, the Agrarians' call for a sound policy alluded to measures to surmount current economic problems. More broadly it referred to the Agrarians' "third way", which was characterized as a centrist policy. Furthermore the party's regular appeals to farmers and rural groups were combined with efforts to gain a foothold in cities and towns. Thus a fourfold orientation can be discerned in the campaign literature: messages were directed to 1) the farmers and allied occupations 2) the rural population 3) urban voters and 4) the general electorate.

In propaganda aimed at the entire electorate, the party joined the Liberals and Conservatives in condemning the government's economic policy as inept and ineffective. But Agrarian criticism differed in substance and tone from that of the other two parties. The Agrarians focused almost entirely on problems of imbalance in the economy, and they did not couple Sweden's economic difficulties to the issue of socialization, as did the Liberals and Conservatives. Nor did the Agrarians harp on controls and rationing to the same extent. In fact their criticism was that the government had delayed introducing certain controls and restrictions. Specific objections were levelled at the Soviet credit agreement, export measures affecting forest products and the gasoline tax. The Agrarians offered no alternative recommendations; they stressed the necessity of producing more, consuming less, and cooperation in order to solve economic problems.[31)]

The Agrarians also explained their basic goals and policy as promoting national interests and reducing class antagonisms, and they presented the

"third way", which was fashioned as a centrist policy between the extremes of socialistic coercion and uncontrolled capitalism. In somewhat more concrete terms, the main features of a centrist policy were listed as: first, an economic policy entailing competition between private, cooperative and public enterprise, simultaneously enhancing individual initiative and safeguarding the right of private ownership; secondly, a decentralization of the economy and government administration; and thirdly, an active business cycle policy.

Cooperation, compromise and equilibrium in group representation were also emphasized as facets of the Agrarian alternative. The party stated that it was unhappy with the existing situation of a single party in power which precluded satisfactory representation of group interests - and which permitted one party to make decisions without giving adequate consideration to the views of others. Obvious similarities exist between this line of argument and the Liberals' theme of socialist one-party rule versus democratic cooperation. However the Agrarian version was devoid of overtones of confrontation and an ideological dichotomy; it stressed moderation and that the Agrarians with their centrist postition were a guarantee for tranquil (*lugn*) progress.[32)]

These general themes were complemented by messages directed to the urban voter. Voters who had recently moved to cities were urged not to forget their rural ties and origins. Initial, although rather meager, efforts were made to point out convergences in the values and interests of farmers and other small entrepreneurs, and how the party's policy specifically benefited small entrepreneurs in cities. For the most part, comments on rural/urban antagonisms were now deleted. Instead the propaganda described solving rural problems in terms of mutual benefit to cities and the countryside, e.g. halting rural depopulation was explained to be of vital interest to cities in easing the urban housing shortage.[33)]

The virtual elimination of expressions of rural/urban hostility represented a substantial change in the content and tone of the propaganda addressed to the rural population. Nonetheless the Agrarians continued to proclaim that they were the special party of the rural community; and messages to rural voters basically reiterated past demands - raising the standard of living for rural groups, improving facilities and services in the countryside, and abolishing the cost of living index regions. Propaganda to farmers and allied occupations also largely focused on recommendations and themes of the two previous elections.[34)]

The Communists: Between United Front Tactics and the Politics of Recrimination

Traces of Communist efforts to create a democratic front can still be observed in the 1948 election, but recriminations characteristic of the cold war

period predominated. The Communists resumed their bitter assaults on the Social Democratic party. They insisted that there were no real policy differences between the Social Democrats and bourgeois parties, and that the Social Democrats had capitulated to big finance. This theme was summed up in the caption: "Like two peas in a pod" (*Lika som två blåbär*). According to the Communists, the Social Democrats and the bourgeois parties were in agreement on foreign affairs, the economic stabilization policy, a pause in social reforms, and the recent anti-Communist campaign.[35] Another frequently mentioned failure of the Social Democrats was their "flight from the Postwar Program". The Communists declared that the Social Democrats had decided to shelve the Program, and this was also held up as a concession to big finance and as proof of a rapprochement between the Social Democrats and the bourgeois parties.

In the area of foreign policy, the Communists argued that the joint acceptance by the Social Democrats and the bourgeois parties of Marshall aid was a threat to Swedish sovereignty, and the platform denounced the aim of the Marshall Plan as "incorporating" /Sweden/ into an imperialist bloc under the leadership of American dollar capitalists". It was additionally insinuated that the parties were ready to go even farther, that they were willing to have Sweden join a Western military alliance. In this connection the Liberals came under special fire. The Communists also warned of the ominous prospects of a new war, and messages to the mass electorate contained admonishments like: "Our youth must not become cannon fodder" and "You, who do not want to see our country turned into a theater of the war planned by US capitalist magnates, ...".[36]

The economic policy of the Social Democrats, and especially their stabilization program, was condemned. Major targets of Communist criticism were rising prices and ineffective price controls, erosion of social benefits through inflation, freezing wages without guarantees against higher prices, taxes on consumer goods, and rationing. Apart from the complaints about the stabilization program and inadequate price controls, there were several parallels between the Communist and non-Socialist criticism. However, the Communists' analysis of the causes of economic adversity strongly diverged from the non-Socialists'. The Communists joined the chorus against mismanagement of the economy and misgovernment, but they attributed mismanagement of the economy to big finance. And misgovernment was defined as insufficient use of economic controls and inadequate measures against monopoly capitalists. The Communists argued that if the Social Democrats had instituted a planned economy, as advocated in the Postwar Program, the deterioration of the economy would never have occurred. The idea that the masses had excess buying power was also

ridiculed. Instead the Communists claimed that it was business companies that had excess buying power - and profits were climbing.[37)]

The Communists proclaimed that only they provided the voters with an alternative in view of the rapprochement between the Social Democrats and the bourgeois parties. The party's alternative was coined in the slogan "Peace, democracy and prosperity". In widely distributed propaganda, the alternative was largely described in terms of opposition to the present policy or formulated as fairly general demands.

The party polemics of the Communists in 1948 resembled the 1944 pattern inasmuch as charges against the Social Democrats again assumed a central position. Owing to events in Czechoslovakia, however, the Communists' offensive posture was now much weaker than in 1944. The party's attacks and demands had to be complemented with defensive statements, and anti-communist propaganda was generally labelled a hate campaign instigated by war-mongers and fascists. The Conservatives were still criticized, but now more attacks were levelled at the Liberals than the Conservatives. "Social liberalism" and the party's stand on taxes and housing were berated, and the Liberal press was accused of "gangster journalism".[38)]

Remnants of united front tactics were evident in the pattern of group appeals and statements concerning the party's ideological alternative. The Communists endeavored to extend their appeal to a much broader spectrum of the electorate than in 1944, and this reflected a lingering effort to create a democratic front. Besides the workers and farming population, the platform solicited the backing of progressive intellectuals and white-collar workers, and propaganda was directed to the middle stratum and specifically to public employees.[39)]

The ideological alternative of the Communists, echoing themes of the 1946 election, was summed up as extending democracy to all areas of society. Most emphasis was placed on a democratic economy. This was explained as smashing big finance's domination over the economy, giving the people's representatives a decisive say in economic regulatory agencies, and doing away with the bureaucratic features of the economic boards. Democratization of the entire state apparatus was again urged. In general the party argued that it wanted more democracy than the bourgeois parties and elaborated on the shortcomings of "bourgeois democracy": firstly, the lack of guarantees for civil liberties as exemplified during the war and, secondly, the economic power structure seriously limited democracy by excluding the masses from key positions of leadership in society.[40)]

5.3 Social Democratic Election Propaganda and Ideological Statements

5.3.1 The Election Propaganda: An Overview

The main slogan of the Social Democrats in the 1948 election was "Don't turn back the clock", and much of the propaganda spelled out this slogan in terms of the positive consequences of the Social Democrats staying in power and the negative effects of a non-Socialist election victory. The Social Democrats underlined the merits of their measures to deal with current economic difficulties, primarily emphasizing the objectives of the measures: the *combined* goals of stabilization, a high level of employment, and a fair distribution of available goods. It was especially stressed that full employment must not be sacrificed in the effort to restore equilibrium in the economy. Most important among the positive consequences, however, was the continuation of welfare policies and reforms. The Social Democrats dusted off several of their past recommendations and presented them as an updated agenda for reform. The "updated" agenda focused primarily on the imminent educational reform and social policy measures.[41] Thus, the Social Democrats had once again repeated the tactic of seizing the lead in initiating policy - or at least projecting an image of initiating reforms. The presentation of a long list of future reforms also meant that they did not have to fight out the election from a purely defensive position or one of negativism. This stance additionally created a sharp contrast to the Liberals and Agrarians who espoused reforms but did not put forward any concrete proposals. The recommendations also tended to undercut Communist propaganda that the Social Democrats and the non-Socialists were agreed on a pause in reforms.

In pointing to the negative consequences of a non-Socialist victory the Social Democrats equated a change in government with ending an epoch of reforms. A non-Socialist victory was also depicted as giving financial interests a decisive influence in government. The alternative to the austerity measures introduced by the Social Democrats was dubbed the alternative of big finance and described as higher prices, higher rents and lower wages - and the alternative where the masses bore the brunt of the burden. Lastly a non-Socialist majority, it was held, would result in a return to pre-1932 parliamentary politics characterized by an anti-labor policy as well as ineffectual and unstable governments.[42] Defining the major issue of the election in these terms was also a crucial aspect of how the Social Democrats handled the issue of socialization. Reforms and ultimately a regression in development were the main issue - not socialization.

Arguments to the effect that social policy and reforms constituted a party difference were important in attempting to fight out the election on

the issue of continued reforms.[43] Another key area of differences concerned measures to overcome the economic crisis. The Social Democrats maintained that the only clearly formulated alternative to the government's measures had been put forward by business. The Conservatives and, to a lesser degree, the Liberals were identified with various points of the stabilization package recommended by business. It was pointed out that the Conservatives wanted to raise the rate of interest and introduce a general sales tax. Both the Conservatives and the Liberals were said to favor tax reductions for wealthy groups and corporations. Indirectly the two parties were associated with business's alternative by frequent assertions that they represented the interests of big finance. A number of statements on specific policy differences in other areas also reinforced the impression that the two parties safeguarded the interests of big business and the wealthy.[44]

Much of the foregoing description of the election propaganda can be regarded as the offensive thrust of the Social Democrats' election strategy vis-à-vis the non-Socialists. But in the 1948 campaign the Social Democrats were much more on the defensive regarding the non-Socialists than in either 1946 och 1944. The Social Democrats concentrated on refuting charges of misgovernment and mismanagement of the economy, explaining the necessity of rationing and other controls, and denying collaboration with the Communists.

One aspect of how the Social Democrats dealt with the unpopular matter of rationing is particularly interesting. They sought to reformulate the question so that it was not simply a choice between the existence or nonexistence of rationing. Instead rationing was pitted against an alternative evil - higher prices - which was pictured as worse than rationing.[45] In effect, this can be intepreted as an attempt to convert a "valence" issue (an issue where there is essentially one body of opinion on values or goals) into a "position" issue (an issue where the parties position themselves to appeal to voters who favor alternative policies or goals).[46]

A second offensive thrust of the Social Democrats' campaign was in relation to the Communists. Derogatory comments about the Communists resumed proportions approaching those in 1944, and past criticism were now fused with events in Eastern Europe. The unreliable and anti-democratic nature of the Communists was stressed, and more than before their actions were portrayed as dictated by foreign interests. Communist proposals to rectify Swedish economic difficulties were mainly discredited by pointing to economic shortcomings in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The party's foreign policy recommendations were challenged on the grounds that they entailed the abandonment of the principle of neutrality and would tie Sweden to the East bloc. In contrast, the Social Democratic course was described as an alterna-

tive between East and West as far as foreign policy and the economy were concerned. Finally the propaganda sought to create a "negative" bandwagon effect, by declaring that people were deserting the Communist party in droves, and a vote for the Communists was a wasted vote.[47)]

In general, polemic statements (characterizations and attacks on the other parties as well as defensive statements) increased; and their tone became sharper - with the exception of criticism of the Agrarians which was actually dampened in 1948. Otherwise what had been innuendoes about the Conservatives and Liberals in the 1946 campaign literature became clear-cut allegations in the 1948 propaganda. Not only the intensity but also the pattern of party polemics changed in several ways. Although the Social Democrats had waged a campaign on both flanks in the two previous elections, now it was an explicit theme in the election propaganda. Both the non-Socialists and the Communists were designated as the adversaries of the Social Democrats and the labor movement, having the common aim of bringing down the labor government.[48)] Other modifications concerned the polemics vis-à-vis the non-Socialists. The most conspicuous change was the growing attention given to the Liberals. Prime emphasis was put on their ties with big finance and large campaign contributions.[49)]

Of special significance, the key target groups of this election were defined in two different ways. First, as in the earlier elections, the target groups were identified on the basis of social and/or occupational status. Together with the labor movement, major appeals were directed to the farming population and white-collar workers. Second, target groups were identified in terms of strategic importance, and the following groups were designated as strategically decisive: 1) the floating middle class vote susceptible to non-Socialist propaganda, with leanings toward the Liberals and to a lesser extent toward the Agrarians 2) wavering working class voters who had supported the Communists in the last two elections 3) working class non-voters in the last election, including persons now entitled to vote for the first time. The campaign literature and instructions to election workers indicate that most weight was attached to the third group. The Social Democrats mounted an allout effort to mobilize party sympathizers with a moderate and low turnout rate - workers, pensioners, women and youth - emphasizing that the outcome of the election depended on their votes.[50)] In large measure, the 1948 strategy was a getting-out-the-vote strategy.

In getting out the labor vote, the Social Democrats addressed the labor movement as the working class; and messages played upon labor voters' sense of class identification, class solidarity, and pride in a labor government and the trade unions. The issue of the election, according to the propaganda

specifically aimed at the labor movement, was a workers' government; in a few instances it was added that the future of the trade union movement was also at stake. In particular, the negative effects of a non-Socialist victory were accentuated: unemployment as a permanent threat, the return of moneyed interests' influence in government, a policy shifting the burden to persons with the least means. The messages underlined the bourgeois assault on the government, and that it was backed by big finance, but also that with both sides attacking there was a real possibility of losing power. At the same time it was pointed out that LO members and their families constituted a majority of the electorate, and that unity among the workers was the only guarantee of the continued existence of a labor government. The Social Democrats launched the slogan "Restore unity!".[51] This latter point was also crucial in attempting to get working class voters to switch from the Communists to the Social Democrats.

These arguments in specific messages to labor voters, which sought to activate them to go to the polls, were reinforced by several themes in the general propaganda. For example, the many pronouncements about the positive consequences of the Social Democrats staying in power. Moreover the propaganda reveals several interesting uses of ideological statements which ought to have aided in securing the labor vote.

5.3.2 Ideological Statements in the Propaganda

Recommendations and Argumentation

The party's recommendations focused on future reforms and measures to restore equilibrium in the economy. Ideologically, future reforms were fashioned as a continuation of the democratization of society, and long-term economic policy as aspiring to a democratization of the economy. Ideological arguments were also important in making austerity measures - rationing and controls - more palatable. Prescribed state intervention was now the product of current economic problems and the lingering influence of the recommendations of the Postwar Program.

Austerity Measures and the Stabilization Policy

The Social Democrats declared that measures to overcome economic difficulties and the government's emerging stabilization policy were a major issue of the election. However the actual measures did not figure very prominently in the election propaganda - with the exception of rationing which was dealt with extensively in all forms of campaign literature. The party pledged that rationing and other restrictions on consumption would be lifted as soon as shortages disappeared. But it argued that as long as scarcities existed,

rationing was necessary.

Besides attempting to convert rationing into a position issue, as summed up by the slogan "Rationing or higher prices", the Social Democrats advanced ideological justifications for rationing and controls. The measures were described as safeguards for fair distribution, benefiting persons with small incomes and limited purchasing power. Rationing, in particular, was justified as an instrument for achieving a fairer distribution than market forces could provide, and this justification merged with the Social Democrats' arguments on freedom. As expressed in the platform: "They /rationing and controls/ are a guarantee for the freedom of all persons in relation to excessive freedom for those groups which through larger incomes can take for themselves more than their rightful share on the free market". Justifications invoking freedom were most pronounced in a pamphlet authored by Wigforss. The argument in the platform was reiterated and additionally applied to price and rent controls as well as import and currency restrictions.

Both of these arguments were clothed in socialist legitimacy. In the case of fair distribution, Wigforss designated it a socialist aspiration. This aspiration, in his words, entailed ensuring all citizens a reasonable and fair share of the wealth produced by community endeavors and doing so through public measures. In an entirely different context, equal freedom for all was indirectly related to a socialist transformation of society.[52)]

Future Reforms

Reforms involving 1) social and labor policies 2) education and the field of culture and 3) the economy were highlighted in the election propaganda. Most emphasis was on welfare reforms and labor legislation and particularly on the recommendations in the "updated" agenda of reforms. The platform declared that the major issue to be decided by the voters was if the democratization of society was to continue under Social Democratic leadership. To a large extent, the democratization of society was synonymous with the continuation of welfare policies and social reforms. Otherwise, however, statements specifically justifying welfare reform recommendations were relatively few, and those which occurred were quite abbreviated. Justifications consisted of the elimination of social misery and poverty, along with the enhancement of human dignity, security, freedom, and fair distribution.[53)]

The second group of imminent reforms concerned education and culture. Again the propaganda stressed equal educational opportunities and the elimination of wealth in determining the level and type of education. As stated in the platform, "The educational monopoly of better-off groups must be broken and equal educational opportunities created for all young people

irrespective of their parents' economic position or place of residence. The propaganda additionally coupled the school reform to furthering democracy. It was also pointed out that the impending reform would establish one common school for all Swedish children. With regard to culture, the platform urged that the democratization process be extended to the area of culture, the goal being equal rights as participants in the Swedish cultural heritage. More generous public support of the arts was also advocated.[54)]

The third area of reform pertained to the economy. The bulk of the discussion focused on the goals of economic policy: democratization of the economy and greater production. Only general guidelines to attain these goals were offered, and these loosely formulated demands were seldom accompanied by specific proposals for the future.

Greater production through cooperation between the government, enterprises and employees was mentioned in the election platform and by Erlander. The only more detailed statement about how to raise production was in Wigforss' pamphlet. He declared that a more active collaboration by persons barred from ownership and responsibility would benefit efforts to raise production. This collaboration was envisioned as occurring through 1) "measures of the state - as the body representing the common interests of the citizens" and 2) "more active participation by employees and their organizations in the development of the economy".

A far more salient theme than greater production was democratization of the economy. In fact, as evident from the preceding paragraph, the means of attaining greater production converged with those of achieving more democracy in the economy. Wigforss, citing a 1948 party congress resolution, declared that a democratization of the economy was the core of the Social Democrats' future economic policy. Several guidelines for attaining more democracy in the economy can be discerned in the propaganda. The election platform specifically designated cooperation between the government, enterprises, employees and consumers as a development in the spirit of economic democracy. Besides this cooperation, limiting the power of private monopolies was emphasized. The platform stated: "*The power of private monopolies must be limited. Government surveillance of monopolies ought to be successively expanded.*" Campaign statements also referred to the branch inquiry commissions in connection with combating monopolies. Three election pamphlets commented on economic democracy in the sense of industrial democracy. Wigforss maintained that the Social Democrats wanted to encourage the new development of cooperation between labor and management and industrial democracy now taking shape. He also alluded to a reorganization of the economy on the basis of a redistribution of influence and responsibility between owners and employees. Finally,

Wigforss discussed public ownership as an instrument for bringing about more democracy in the economy. As for more concrete recommendations to achieve economic democracy, these were confined to recently adopted arrangements - the works councils and government surveillance of monopolies. The expansion and improvement of these arrangements were either advocated or implied but without any further concretizations.[55)]

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The scope and types of state intervention actually recommended by the Social Democrats in the 1948 election propaganda were best summed up in Erlander's presentation of the party's economic program for the coming four years. He listed controls in agriculture, rent controls, increased government influence over the credit system, housing construction and the location of industry, along with the possibility of price controls. Concerning nationalization and public ownership, Wigforss' pamphlet contained a brief theoretical discussion of the subject, dealing with both its limitations and merits. Wigforss reaffirmed that nationalization and public ownership were means of attaining both economic democracy and freedom for the laboring people, and he referred to socialization as a long-range aspiration. But he concluded that no extensive concrete proposals entailing nationalization or public ownership were pending, and nationalization of a part of the economy was not the issue of the election. Instead he fashioned the issue of the election as an eventual democratization of the economy and linked this to retaining the possibility of expanding state influence (in various forms) over the economy. Moreover, the propaganda did not advocate any specific nationalization measures. Erlander did mention the commissions investigating the nationalization of insurance companies and the establishment of public enterprises, but he made no recommendations one way or the other. And the campaign statements indicate preferences for setting up new public enterprises as distinct from nationalization.[56)]

A comparison of economic policy as presented in the 1948 propaganda and the other two elections reveals a number of changes. Although there were several recommendations and arguments similar in the three elections, certain recommendations were deleted in 1948. An overall trend in 1948 was a decline in the number and specificity of proposals. Now there was little discussion of a planned economy, and certain so-called planned economy measures faded into the background. The main remnants of recommendations related to a planned economy were increasing government influence over the credit market and housing construction, along with references to the inquiry commissions. Another omission, as noted earlier, concerned nationalization. In 1944 and 1946 nationalization of particular enterprises - the building materials in-

dustry (1944), insurance companies, the import of oil, the shoe industry and a few minor branches (1946) - was advocated as a possible measure. Such statements were missing in 1948. An additional recommendation in the two previous campaigns, which was fairly specific, was the nationalization of monopolies. In 1948 this recourse was not mentioned. Instead emphasis was on the newly established watch-dog agency, and creating public enterprises to compete with private monopolies was suggested as a possibility. Similarly the recommendation to establish branch councils was ushered from the electoral arena. The decline in specificity of recommendations can be most clearly seen in the demand for increased government influence over the housing sector. In the previous election, state intervention in housing was discussed in some detail; in 1948 it was limited to this general demand. The same tendency is evident, as compared to 1946, with regard to the themes of rationalization of the economy and cooperation between the government, enterprises and their employees.

Shifts in argumentation also occurred. With regard to economic policy, prime emphasis was on greater efficiency as a justification in 1946, and arguments of greater efficiency were put forward in connection with fairly radical proposals. In 1948 greater efficiency was overshadowed by the theme of more democracy in the economy, but in many cases the latter demand appears as a long-range aspiration, detached from immediate specific recommendations. The analysis of the campaign literature from 1944 and 1946 revealed that radical, controversial proposals were often justified in practical or utilitarian terms and less on ideological grounds, i.e. as an aspect of socialism or in terms of political values of freedom, democracy, equality, or justice. The pattern which emerges in the 1948 campaign is that controversial proposals have been largely jettisoned and so have their practical and utilitarian justifications. All that remained was a radical argumentation - a discussion of goals and ideals with little indication of the immediate means of attaining the goals. No doubt this invocation of traditional ideological aspirations was important in mobilizing sections of the labor vote and in competing with the Communists.

On the other hand, many of the most specific recommendations in the campaign - particularly welfare and labor policy reforms - were backed up by relatively few ideological arguments. However, an interesting shift in the ideological justifications of social reforms can be observed. Welfare reforms - and reforms in general - were said to promote freedom. Previously, especially in the 1944 propaganda but also in 1946, reforms were mainly linked to a higher standard of living, fair distribution and levelling. Moreover, levelling was primarily presented as an accomplishment rather than

an aspiration in 1948.

In conclusion, the pattern of recommendations and argumentation reveals an interesting aspect of how the Social Democrats dealt with the dilemma of simultaneously appealing to radical voters and more moderate sections of the electorate in 1948. First, substantial emphasis was put on radical argumentation. The party pointed to democratization of the economy and socialization as long-range aspirations - and campaigned on a democratization of the economy. At the same time, three controversial ideological demands were largely shelved: a planned economy, nationalization projects and levelling. The Social Democrats proclaimed that substantial levelling had been achieved; and a planned economy and specific nationalization projects were quietly dropped.

Statements on Party Differences

The major ideological differences vis-à-vis the non-Socialists centered on economic democracy and freedom; frequently these differences were fused with divergent views on state intervention. To a large extent, the line of argument concerning economic democracy resembled that in the 1946 campaign. Socialization of the economy was not the issue but rather democratization of the economy. Party differences on this issue were largely implied by stressing the opposition of big finance and employers to democratization of the economy, and subsequently associating the non-Socialists with big finance and/or employers. In implying party dissimilarities, the Social Democrats focused on two facets of economic democracy: 1) popular influence over the economy and 2) greater employee influence in enterprises. Less prominent, economic democracy defined as the redistribution of economic power was mentioned as a party difference.

Two widely distributed statements presented economic democracy as the people - in contrast to big finance - having the decisive influence over the economy. In the same breath the non-Socialists were linked with big finance. Similarly Wigforss stated that the choice of the voters was whether the most important and fundamental decisions about the economy and the livelihood of the people were to be made by private groups with industrial and financial power or if these decisions were to be ultimately entrusted to the representatives of the people.

Greater employee influence was designated or inferred as a party difference in two election pamphlets, Morgonbris, the Christian Social Democratic newspaper, Broderskap, and by Wigforss on the radio. Wigforss argued:

> Thus it is up to the voters to decide whether they want to support a bourgeois policy, based on the view that the existing form of the economy as embodied in private capitalism is a final and unalterable stage in the development of society. Or if they prefer ... to give the wage-earners more influence in the economy, if they ... want to try out various forms of economic organization. The Social Democrats want to give consideration to an option where the demand to expand public enterprise is included, where democratization within enterprises is not confronted by a dogmatic belief that the existing distribution of influence and responsibility between owners and employees is unalterable. 57)

Ideological distinctions concerning freedom were generally much more explicitly formulated than in the case of economic democracy. Wigforss declared that much of the struggle between the parties concerned economic freedom. He maintained that the nature of freedom itself was not a matter of dispute but that party differences centered on the question of whose freedom, and the theme of "freedom - for whom" recurred in other propaganda. In its more general form, two variants of the theme can be discerned. First, it was "the freedom which is not that of a minority, not solely bourgeois freedom, but rather ... equal freedom of all". In other words, the theme of whose freedom shaded into an argument for equality in freedom, Secondly, the theme was spelled out as the freedom of the masses, championed by the Social Democrats, which could conflict with the freedom of big finance and economically privileged groups defended by the non-Socialists. Lastly, Wigforss stated that there were party differences concerning the means of creating and preserving economic freedom. His discussion of the means to enhance freedom dealt mainly with various sorts of state intervention: economic controls, public expenditures, an expansionary economic policy and deficit spending, and public ownership. He also discussed tax relief and industrial democracy as ways of increasing freedom.[58)]

Closely allied to this complex of arguments was the theme of party divergencies concerning state intervention in cases of conflict between private and public interests. This conflict was presented as individuals promoting their own private gains to the detriment of the common good. In these instances it was declared that the Social Democrats favored the public interest and state intervention curbing private gain, while the non-Socialists were pictured as promoting unhealthy, selfish private interests and opposing state intervention. The Social Democrats pointed to concrete examples of recently passed legislation opposed by the non-Socialists: expropriation legislation to combat speculation in hydro-power development and agricultural legislation.[59)]

Finally, the chief ideological distinction between the Social Democrats and the Communists was again political democracy and guarantees for basic

liberties and especially the rights of the opposition. Now, however, the Social Democrats linked the Swedish Communists with recent events in Eastern Europe, noting their support of the new regimes and the tactics and means used to install these regimes. The Social Democrats derided the term "people's democracy" as a new guise for Communist dictatorship, and pointed to Czechoslovakia as a telling example.[60)]

Statements Defending the Party

Ideological statements were of major significance in refuting two sets of charges levelled by the non-Socialists: 1) allegations that rationing and controls were the first phase in introducing a socialist economy and 2) insinuations of Social Democratic collaboration with the Communists.

The accusations of an impending socialist economy - characterized by controls, massive socialization and state monopolies - and a subsequent loss of freedom for the individual were primarily countered in two ways. First, the limited nature of socialization - in the sense of nationalization and public ownership - advocated by the Social Democrats was emphasized, and the future role of economic controls was indicated. Secondly, it was argued that in some respects public ownership and controls promoted freedom. As brought out earlier, a recurrent theme of the election propaganda was that Social Democratic policy afforded greater freedom and security to employees and persons of modest means, but simultaneously restricted the freedom of action of big business and economically privileged groups. Especially rationing but also rent controls, import and currency restrictions were presented in these terms. Moreover, it was pointed out that reforms equalizing opportunities and the resultant increase in freedom created strains on existing resources and posed new problems. The solution, Erlander argued, necessitated controls during a transitional period and state involvement.

Contrary to the defense of controls, statements defending socialization by virtue of its enhancing freedom occupied a very minor place in the campaign literature. Only Wigforss dealt with the question of public ownership and freedom. Basically, he maintained that socialization could pave the way for a greater feeling of freedom for wage-earners by eliminating their dependence upon owners and increasing employees' collaboration in production.

These arguments invoking freedom, whose common denominator was that state intervention in various forms contributed to the freedom of a majority of individuals, were part of a larger endeavor to refute non-Socialist charges that Social Democratic policy constituted a threat to freedom. Two additional arguments were used to underline that the Social Democrats championed the cause of freedom. The first argument stressed the material basis of freedom,

and that the aspiration of increasing economic freedom had shaped the entire activity of the party. Erlander explained:

> The steady rise in the standard of living for the broad masses has entailed greater freedom of action and an enlargement of the sphere in which the citizen himself can determine how he will use his resources. The poor person has not much right of determination. He must take whatever shelter and food he can get. The higher his income the greater his freedom of choice.

The second argument emphasized that the Social Democrats desired equality in freedom: everyone should have an equal right to freedom.[61]

The other set of accusations - Liberal charges of Social Democratic collaboration with the Communists which threatened to undermine Swedish democracy - were denied and often ridiculed. The propaganda highlighted the party's stand on political democracy and civil liberties - and added that political democracy had to be complemented by economic democracy. The Social Democrats pointed to their democratic convictions as a cause for consistently refusing to become involved in any form of cooperation with the Communists.[62]

Statements Articulating Interests and Aggregating Groups

Because of the dissimilar thrusts of the messages aimed at the major target groups, not much aggregation through common ideological themes occurred in these messages.[63] On the other hand, certain ideological themes in the propaganda directed to the general electorate lent themselves to aggregation of large groups of voters and articulation of their interests. Before discussing this phenomenon, let us examine the content of the ideological statements in the specific appeals to the major target groups - white-collar workers, manual laborers, and the farming population.

The most prevalent ideological theme in messages explicitly addressed to white-collar workers dealt with freedom. Several aspects of the nature of freedom desired by the Social Democrats were mentioned: Freedom in the sense of expanded opportunities through reforms, increased economic freedom through a general rise in the standard of living and social security, equality in freedom, and greater freedom and independence for employees through exerting influence over their conditions of work.[64]

Although similar statements were contained in much of the campaign material and were doubtless read by workers, such statements did not appear in the messages specifically aimed at them. In fact the main ideological theme in the appeal to the workers involved neither a statement of goals nor means. Rather the appeal emphasized divisions of class and wealth in society and bordered on invoking the class struggle. The appeal addressed labor as the

working class, and the election was likened to a struggle between the rich and the poor, between the small people and a wealthy minority and big finance.[65]

The appeal to the farming population, as in the previous elections, noted that economic divisions in society were more important than differences between rural and urban groups. The advantages of state intervention in the farm sector were also stressed and explained as increasing opportunities for the individual farmer and curtailing abuses arising from unrestricted ownership rights.[66]

Thus the ideological content of the appeals presents a rather disparate picture. The main similarities were statements on economic divisions in society in the appeals to labor and the farming population, and economic democracy was mentioned in messages to white-collar workers, women and Christians. The LO poster also called for economic democracy, but the campaign literature aimed specifically at the workers did not refer to the issue.

Ideological statements aggregating groups also occurred in the propaganda to the general electorate. The platform declared that laborers, white-collar workers, farmers and small businessmen had a common interest in preventing a halt of the current democratization process. More frequent ideological themes aggregating groups were freedom and fair distribution. Two facets of the Social Democratic argumentation on freedom were especially well suited to aggregation: the themes of "freedom for whom" and an equal right to freedom for everyone. In connection with the theme of whose freedom, various measures - such as rationing, price and rent controls, tax cuts, public spending, and industrial democracy - were spelled out as promoting the freedom of specific groups: persons with small incomes, apartment tenants, employees and workers. Moreover, the aggregating potential of this theme was considerable. On a general plane it was framed as freedom of the majority and many. Specifically it encompassed groups consisting of large numbers of voters. This was also true of the theme of an equal right to freedom for all, since part of the argument was that the existing distribution of freedom was extremely uneven, and hence equality of freedom was explained as being to the advantage of the majority - as an augmentation of their freedom. As is evident, much of the discussion on equality of freedom reinforced the theme of whose freedom, and the two themes shaded into fair distribution.

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In summing up the pattern of ideological statements in the 1948 election, several distinctive features stand out. Three of them were intimately bound up with the party's endeavors to get out the labor vote, and accordingly formed an integral part of the getting-out-the-vote strategy.

First, in attempting to galvanize labor voters into action, the Social Democrats emphasized class divisions, and pitted the interests and aspirations of the working class against those of big finance. In essence the propaganda revived the notion of the class struggle and sought to instill a fighting spirit among activists and to rally hestitant working class voters.

Second, legitimation through ideological statements was quite prominent and differed from the two previous elections. Most notably, the party used ideological justifications to make unpopular measures more palatable. Rationing and controls were justified ideologically by arguments of fair distribution and equality in freedom - which in turn were related to the party's socialistic aspirations. This line of argument can be viewed as an effort to strengthen the allegiance of regular backers and labor voters.

Third, radical argumentation - and in particular the invocation of traditional ideological goals - was important in soliciting the votes of party supporters and the more radical sections of the electorate. Democratization of the economy and, to a much lesser extent, socialization were declared long-range aspirations. These declarations assumed even greater significance in retaining the support of regular backers in view of the party discarding other ideological demands.

Fourth, there was a growing gap between recommendations and ideological argumentation. Several of the main campaign recommendations - especially social and labor legislation - were seldom presented in ideological terms, and the main ideological aspirations in the election propaganda were largely divorced from specific recommendations.

Fifth, and in connection with the point above, the statements on socialization present a rather paradoxical picture. On the one hand, the demand for socialization in the sense of public ownership as an immediate recommendation was further whittled down. On the other hand, socialization was not entirely shunted into the background. Wigforss continued to discuss socialization as a principle and aspiration; and in some cases his remarks were addressed to the mass electorate.

Perhaps the most important factor accounting for this ambivalence, and the fact that socialization was not yet entirely shunted into the background, was public opinion concerning state intervention in the economy and socialization. Polls from 1942-1948 consistently revealed a larger body of opinion against than for extending government control over the economy. Even among Social Democratic sympathizers there was seldom an absolute majority for greater government control or nationalization. On the other hand, a substantial proportion of Social Democratic voters favored more intervention

and public ownership. And often the percentage of party sympathizers in favor was larger than those opposed, while significant numbers were undecided. Not surprisingly, the polls showed higher percentages for state intervention among Communist supporters.[67] The divided opinion among Social Democratic sympathizers, together with the unusually strong share of the vote for the Communists, provides an explanation of the ambivalent position on socialization in the 1948 election.

Sixth, a retreat occurred concerning the demand for a planned economy and specific nationalization projects. The reasons for the retreat also deserve additional comment.

One of the most obvious factors contributing to these demands being discarded was the course of economic developments during the immediate postwar years. The demands were based on predictions of a depression; instead a boom period and problems of inflation ensued. Moreover, both the issue of a planned economy and the form of enterprise had been tied to the criterion of efficiency. The party's view of efficiency stressed the macro-economic perspective, i.e. the efficient performance of the economy as a whole,[68] and two aspects can be discerned. The first consisted of efficiency in terms of the economy operating at *full* capacity to be attained, if necessary, through an expansionary economic policy. Much of the Social Democratic efficiency argument in the propaganda of the two previous elections was based on an underlying conviction in the inherent inability of a private enterprise economy to utilize available labor and material resources to the full. The second and less prominent aspect focused on the economy operating at *optimal* capacity, primarily by introducing rationalization measures embracing the economy as a whole and/or entire branches of production. The Social Democrats maintained that an intrinsic feature of a private enterprise economy was that rationalization measures were confined to individual enterprises and were not concerned with coordination, stabilization and rationalization of the entire economy. As the state of the economy deteriorated, it became increasingly difficult to campaign on arguments of efficiency - especially those dealing with full capacity. Arguments involving optimal capacity were subtler and seem more difficult to put across to the voters. At any rate, they lacked a prime advantage of full capacity arguments as an election campaign vehicle. Arguments emphasizing efficiency as full capacity could be easily spelled out as concrete benefits - jobs, purchasing power, credit guarantees and subventions.

The seriousness of economic difficulties also put a premium on bringing bitter partisan conflict to an end.[69] During the party negotiations concerning a joint inflation program in the autumn of 1947, the non-Socialists had

demanded the termination of the work of the inquiry commissions investigating various branches[70] - which formed the backbone of the "socialization offensive". At the time the Social Democrats refused, but in early 1948 they expressed a willingness to shelve controversial issues. Moreover, recommendations to establish branch councils faded abruptly from Social Democratic propaganda in late 1947.

Finally, as the economic and international situation worsened, polls disclosed that the voters were mainly concerned about inflation, housing, instability in world politics and the danger of a new war. Large sections of the electorate did not perceive state intervention as a major issue;[71] and, as brought out above, there was no majority opinion favoring greater intervention or socialization. These circumstances lessened the desirability of campaigning on the issues of a planned economy and nationalization and, more important, the possibilities of a successful election strategy based on these issues.

Notes

1 Socialdemokratiska partistyrelsen, berättelse för år 1946, p. 53.

2 Folkpartiet 1946-1947, Ombudsmannens berättelse, p. 1; Folkpartiet, 1946,No. 6, p. 9, p. 3, p. 19. See also the March 1947 poster to recruit new members and the Freedom Day poster, the cover of Folkpartiet, 1947, No. 2 and No. 7, p. 4.

3 Socialdemokratiska partistyrelsen, berättelse för år 1946, p. 47; Gustav Möller, "Partierna och väljarna", Tiden, 1946, p. 462.

4 Stig Hadenius, Björn Molin, Hans Wieslander, op.cit., pp. 194-196; Leif Lewin, op.cit., pp. 337-340.

5 Nils Elvander, op.cit., pp. 26-62, esp. pp. 37-40.

6 Erik Lundberg, op.cit., pp. 271-272, p. 60; Ernst Wigforss, Minnen, p. 356, p. 360, p. 315, pp. 376-377, pp. 384-388; Tage Erlander, 1940-1949 (Stockholm: Tiden, 1973) p. 317, pp. 326-327.

7 For a detailed analysis of the party negotiations, see Olof Ruin, op.cit., pp. 166-174.

8 Ernst Wigforss, Minnen, p. 347, pp. 356-357; Tage Erlander, op.cit., p. 308, Herbert Tingsten; Mitt liv, Tidningen 1946-1952 (Stockholm: Norstedt, 1963) pp. 143-144; Leif Lewin, op.cit., pp. 341-342.

9 Elisabeth Tjerneld, "De politiska partiernas propaganda inför 1948 års val" (Unpublished licentiat dissertation, University of Stockholm, 1962) p. 26.

10 The three commissions which reported were the oil import commission, the commission on stevedore activities, and the furniture industry commission. SOU 1947:14, p. 314; SOU 1947:28, p. 79; SOU 1947:53, pp. 323-324. See also Leif Lewin, op.cit., pp. 324-327, p. 331; Tage Erlander, op.cit., p. 308.

11 Elisabeth Tjerneld, op.cit., p. 55. See also e.g. Medborgaren, 1948, No. 4, p. 8 and Vårt arbete, 1948, No. 2½.

12 Some of the inquiry commissions eventually disbanded without submitting any recommendations. Moreover, most of the subsequent commission reports did not present any radical proposals comparable to those in the three reports delivered in 1947. For example, the insurance commission - the bane of the non-Socialists - did not propose nationalization, and the commission investigating the electrical industry concluded that there was no need of a state company. For a summary of how the various points in section III of the Postwar Program were translated or failed to be translated into legislation and policy, see Leif Lewin, op.cit., pp. 324-339. However, Lewin's discussion overlooks an area of success for the Social Democrats - public housing.

13 Folkpartiet, 1946, No. 8, p. 4; Ombudsmannens berättelse, 1946-47, p. 21, p. 4; Ombudsmannens berättelse, 1947-48, p. 23; SOU 1951:56, p. 73; H-K Rönblom, op.cit., p. 49; Ombudsmannens berättelse, 1948-49, pp. 44-45; Herbert Tingsten, Mitt liv, esp. pp. 144-152. In his memoirs Tingsten states that Dagens Nyheter assumed the character of a journalistic weapon bent on a Social Democratic defeat at the polls. He also confides that election propaganda was not confined to editorials, and on election day the entire front page was an appeal to the voters.

14 Cf. Politisk tidskrift, 1945, No. 8, p. 232 and 1947, No. 6, p. 162, See also Politisk tidskrift, 1947, No. 7, pp. 196-202; No. 8, pp. 225-229; BM, 1948, No. 1, p. 2; No. 2, p. 2; Politisk tidskrift, 1946, No. 10, pp. 291-299; 1948, No. 4, pp. 115-120, p. 165; No. 8, p. 197; Bröder, låtom oss enas (Stockholm: Bondeförbundet, 1950) p. 356.

15 Cf. För agitation och propaganda, 1946, November, pp. 13-14, pp. 19-22, p. 7; December, pp. 18-20; Vårt arbete, 1946, No, 6, p. 1 and För agitation och propaganda, 1948, June, pp. 10-12, pp. 15-16; Gunnar Öhman, För fred, demokrati, välstånd (Stockholm: Arbetarkultur, 1948) pp. 7-9, p. 18. See e.g. Vårt arbete, 1948, No. 2½; Vår tid, 1948, No. 5, p. 2.

16 Cirkulär, 1946, Nos. 14 and 19; Partiets organisationsformer, pp. 10-14, pp. 22-23, pp. 26-27, pp. 34-35; Fakta, 1948, pp. 117-118; Tiden, 1948, pp. 312-313; Protokoll från Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetarepartis adertonde kongress, 1948, pp. 9-10.

17 Tage Erlander, age 45 in 1946, represented the younger generation of the Social Democratic leadership, and he had been a member of the cabinet for only two years when he became Prime Minister. Outside the party he was relatively unknown. In his memoirs, Erlander has summed up a fairly widespread reaction to the news that he had been chosen Prime Minister by citing a newspaper headline: "Who the heck is Erlander?". See Tage Erlander, op.cit., pp. 262-263, pp. 337-339.

18 Fakta, 1948, pp. 234-235; Jörgen Westerståhl, "Några synpunkter på det socialdemokratiska partiets ställning", Tiden, 1947, p. 216. See also Sven Aspling, "Blick på valet", Tiden, 1948, p. 296.

19 See e.g. "Vem har rätt?"; "Krisen ...", pp. 4-5, pp. 8-10; Svenska valprogram; Folkpartiets valhandbok, pp. 78-94; "Tycker Du?"; Valstriden i radio 1948 (Stockholm: Radiotjänst, 1949) (hereafter Valstriden) pp. 119-120, pp. 137-138.

20 "Sverige - åter ett möjligheternas land"; "Lägg om rodret"; "Varför Folkpartiet?", pp. 12-14; "Släpp fram ungdomen"; "Nu är det Du"; Folkpartiet, 1948, No. 5, p. 2, p. 11; No. 6, pp. 2-3; Valstriden, pp. 79-81. For additional statements on social liberalism, see Vi tjänstemän, 1948, No. 2, pp. 2-3, p. 14; Folkpartiets valhandbok, pp. 3-6, Bertil Ohlin, Ekonomisk demokratisering (Stockholm: Folkpartiet, 1948); Socialliberal samhällssyn (Stockholm: Folkpartiet, 1948). The party's position on specific reforms was that the rate of introducing reforms had to be determined by economic growth, and taxes should not be raised in order to hasten the implementation of reforms.

21 Upon closer examination, many of the points are quite vague, and none of these statements is exactly the same, although they overlap. See e.g. "Krisen ...", pp. 11-13; Folkpartiet, No. 5, p. 6; "Lägg om rodret"; Folkpartiets valhandbok, pp. 7-8 and much of the local propaganda.

22 "Tycker du"; "Krisen ..."; "Sverige - åter ett möjligheternas land".

23 See e.g. the platform; "Vem har rätt?"; Folkpartiet, No. 6, back cover; "Ett nydaningsarbete i demokratiens tjänst", Valstriden, p. 82.

24 See e.g. the platform; "5 minuter i 12"; "Rösträtt är i år röstplikt"; "Du är röstberättigad"; "Använd Din rösträtt"; "Avgörandet är Ditt"; "Vem har rätt?".

25 The poster "I vote on the basis of my own beliefs"; "Vem har rätt?"; "Tycker Du?"; "Lägg om rodret"; Elisabeth Tjerneld, op.cit., p. 110; Valstriden, p. 139.

26 "Högern, friheten, framtiden"; the platform (the full version); "Frihet, trygghet, människovärde"; "Att skapa skydd för vår yttre frihet"; "Frihet under ansvar"; "Ännu har Ni frihet att välja - välj friheten"; "Varför väljer jag Högern?"; "Rösta på dem som vill som Du"; "Fakta om Högern" and the poster: "The Conservatives lead. Support the leading opposition party - vote for the Conservatives".

27 See e.g. both versions of the platform (abbreviated version in Svenska valprogram and the complete version in e.g. Medborgaren, 1948, No. 33, p. 9); "Högern, friheten, framtiden"; "Frihet, trygghet, människovärde"; Allt om valet, p. 3; Ransoneringar och regleringar måste avvecklas (Skara, 1948) p. 4, p. 10; Välj rätt (Skara, 1948) pp. 3-4; "Nu är det er tur att säga er mening"; Ekonomi och politik, 1948, No. 6; Politisk argumentsamling 1948, pp. 29-32; Politiskt ABC, Del 1, p. 54.

28 Full version of the platform; Allt om valet, p. 3, p. 5; Valstriden, p. 100; Läs, pp. 14-15; Rösta för bättre tider, ..., p. 12, p. 15.

29 Medborgaren, 1948, Nos. 25-26, p. 1, p. 16; "Frihet, trygghet, människovärde"; "Högern, friheten, framtiden"; Ekonomi och politik, Nos. 1 and 4.

30 See e.g. Stockholms-Företagaren, Nos. 1-8; Stockholms-Högern, No. 13, p. 8, pp. 10-11, p. 21; "Till alla inom handel, hantverk, industri och sjöfart"; Einar Haeggblom, Högerns jordbrukspolitik(Uddevalla: Högerns riksorganisation, 1948); Ekonomi och politik, No. 5; Ransoneringar och regleringar måste avvecklas, p. 12; "Varför väljer jag Högern?"; "Tjänstemän!"; Tjänstemannapolitiken, 1948, No. 3.

31 En sund politik (Stockholm: Landsbygdspartiet Bondeförbundet, 1948); "Frihet, rättvisa, välstånd"; Valstriden, p. 44, pp. 112-13. See also BM, 1948, No. 1, p. 2, p. 4; No. 2, p. 2; No. 3, pp. 2-3.

32 "Frihet, rättvisa, välstånd"; Valstriden, pp. 43-44, p. 114, p. 128; "Jag inbjuder er att se mig arg--"; "läs först ... välj sedan"; Politiska argument, p. 48. See also BM, No. 3, p. 2, p. 10, p. 12.

33 "Till väljare i Stockholm"; "Till väljare i Jönköpings stan med omnejd"; "Till fastighetsägarna i Kalmar"; "läs först ... välj sedan".

34 See the platform; "Med Landsbygdspartiet bondeförbundet"; "Förmån efter dyrort"; "Ärade medborgare!"; Valstriden, pp. 42-44; Politiska argument, pp. 42-46; BM, No. 3, pp. 2-5, pp. 7-8, p. 11; Skogen (Stockholm: Bondeförbundets riksorganisation, 1948); "Trygghet genom samverkan".

35 "Vad gäller valet?", Vår tid, 1948, No. 7, pp. 1-2; Gustav Johansson, Politiska knuten (Stockholm: Arbetarkultur, 1948) p. 1, p. 6, pp. 12-14; "Nu får det vara nog!"; "Lika som två blåbär"; Debatten Linderot-Erlander (Stockholm: Arbetarkultur, 1948) pp. 14-17; Gunnar Öhman, op. cit., pp. 12-14.

36 See the platform, "Vad gäller valet?"; Gustav Johansson, op.cit., pp. 19-22; the poster "Against the West bloc"; Hilding Hagberg, Marshallplanen, västblocket och Sverge (Stockholm: Arbetarkultur, 1948); "Vad vill Folkpartiet?"; Land och folk, 1948, No. 8, p. 1, p. 8, p. 10; No. 9, p. 10. Quotations from "Vår ungdom får inte bli kanonmat" and "Varför angriper man Tjeckoslovakien?". See also "Nu får det vara nog".

37 "Nu får det vara nog"; "Husmödrar, låt oss talas vid i 5 minuter"; "Sanningen om barnbidragen"; "Folkpensionerna"; "Hur 'kakan' fördelas mellan rika och fattiga"; "Väljare! läs detta"; the poster "More for the people, less for corporations"; Gustav Johansson, op.cit., pp. 7-12; "Storfinansens vanstyre", För agitation och propaganda, 1948, Land och folk, No. 9, p. 3.

38 See e.g. "Vad sker i Tjeckoslovakien?"; "Varför angriper man Tjeckoslovakien?"; "Den reaktionära hetsen (Tjeckoslovakien, Finland)", För agitation och propaganda, 1948; "Nu får det vara nog"; "Vad vill Folkpartiet?" and the cover of Hilding Hagberg, Marshallplanen, västblocket och Sverge.

39 The platform; Vårt arbete, 1948, No. 7, p. 7; No. 6, pp. 3-4; "Metallarbetare"; Land och folk, 1948, Nos, 8 and 9; Statstjänare (Stockholm: SKP, 1948); "Statstjänare!"; "Husmödrar"; "Sanningen om barnbidragen"; "Folkpensionerna".

40 See the platform; "Vad gäller valet?" "Vad sker i Tjeckoslovakien?"; Gunnar Öhman, op.cit., pp. 10-11, p. 20; Gustav Johansson, op.cit., pp. 15-18; Helmer Holmberg, Kommunisterna föreslår (Stockholm: Arbetarkultur, 1948) pp. 19-20; Harald Rubinstein, Kommunisterna och demokratin (Stockholm: Arbetarkultur, 1948).

41 These included improved unemployment insurance, maternity insurance, better survivors' benefits, extended vacations, shorter working hours for heavy industry and shift workers, continued public housing construction and housing subventions, the replacement of antiquated poor relief by modern social assistance, improved institutional care. Longer vacations were singled out in particular, and the first poster put up by the Social Democrats promised to extend vacations from two weeks to three.

42 The platform; the posters; "Vad valet gäller"; Vår väg, 1948, No. 2; Valstriden, p. 61; Gustav Möller, Från fattig-Sverige till social-Sverige (Stockholm: Tiden, 1948) pp. 14-15, Tage Erlander, Socialdemokratins väg (Stockholm: Tiden, 1948) p. 14; Tage Erlander, "Socialdemokratin inför 1948 års val", Tiden, 1948, pp. 329-335.

43 Vår väg, No. 2, pp. 12-14; Gustav Möller, Från fattig-Sverige till social-Sverige, pp. 10-12, p. 15; Frans Nilsson, Gärningar som tala (Stockholm: Frihets förlag, 1948) p. 29, p. 32; "Vad valet gäller"; "50 resultat av 'vanstyret'"; Valstriden, p. 152, pp. 126-27, pp. 142-43.

44 Ernst Wigforss, Frihet - för vem? (Stockholm: Tiden, 1948) pp. 12-13, pp. 18-19, pp. 25-27; C.G. Malmström, Tjänstemännen och politiken (Stockholm: Tiden, 1948) pp. 15-19; Valstriden, pp. 90-91, pp. 124-125, p. 127, pp. 135-136, pp. 142-143, p. 152; Politiska argument och fakta, pp. 9-10, p. 17, p. 31; "Vi håller samman"; Vår väg, No. 2, p. 2, p. 11; Tage Erlander, Socialdemokratins väg, pp. 18-20, p. 22.

45 "50 resultat av 'vanstyret'"; Vår väg, No. 2, pp. 4-7; Frans Nilsson, op.cit., p. 10, p. 38; Politiska argument och fakta, pp, 51-70; Fakta, 1948, pp. 244-245, pp. 257-259, pp. 281-282; Valstriden, pp. 109-110; C.G. Malmström, op.cit., pp. 19-21; Gunnar Sträng, Ransonering eller prisstegring (Stockholm: Tiden, 1948).

46 For definitions in these terms, see David Butler and Donald Stokes, Political Change in Britain (London: Macmillan, 1969) p. 189, cf. 390-394.

47 "I år"; "Vad valet gäller"; Vår väg, No. 2, p. 2, p. 15; Politiska argument och fakta, pp. 33-50; "Vi håller samman"; the platform; Sven Andersson, Varför 2 arbetarpartier? (Stockholm: Tiden, 1948); Fakta, p. 283; Valstriden, p. 62.

48 The platform; Frans Nilsson, op.cit., p. 36; Fakta, pp. 241-243; "I år"; "Ett gemensamt mål"; "Nya tag mot inflationsfara"; Tage Erlander, Socialdemokratins väg, p. 22.

49 Vår väg, No. 2, pp. 2-4, p. 11; "Folkpartiets samröre med storfinansen" "3:dje ronden!"; "Bolagsguld för folkpartiets valagitation"; "Storfinansen satsar miljoner"; "Sosialidemokratian tie"; Valstriden, pp. 68-69, pp. 130-131, p. 149.
The election propaganda proclaimed that Ohlin -- backed by big finance and particularly the Wallenbergs, Bonniers and Kreugers, and the press controlled by the latter two families - was hoping to gain office by a demagogic campaign against the Social Democrats. In the final stages of the campaign, the Social Democrats pointed out that Boliden, a large mining corporation, had donated 50,000 crowns to the Liberals. Such charges were eventually blown out of proportion by an unpleasant incident - the so-called Molander affair. Set Molander, a Social Democratic M.P. who was a bank employee, claimed that he had seen bank documents

revealing that the Liberal party in Stockholm had 3.5 million crowns at its disposal during early 1948. The Liberals denied it and called for an impartial investigation into Molander's charges. The day before the election the investigation reported that Molander's accusations were entirely unfounded. The incident created many bitter feelings and has been cited as evidence of the inflamed political climate in 1948.

50 Cirkulär, 1948, Nos. 5 and 7; Fakta, 1948, pp. 234-35. See e.g. "Till alla folkpensionärer"; "Hur skulle folkpensionärerna haft det om inte socialdemokraterna tagit sig an deras sak"; Morgonbris, 1948, No. 9, p. 3 and the flyers issued by the young socialists.

51 See e.g. "Vi håller samman"; Fakta, 1948, p. 243; "I år"; "Till avdelnings- och verkstadsklubbsstyrelserna"; "Till fackföreningsfolk i Nyköping"; "Nya tag mot inflationsfaran"; "Upprop till Frostvikens arbetare, män och kvinnor"; "Kvinnor säkra segern"; "Ett gemensamt mål"; "Aldrig förr"; "Inför ett viktigt val".

52 The platform; Gunnar Sträng, op.cit., p. 30; Tage Erlander, Socialdemokratins väg, p. 23; Ernst Wigforss, Frihet - för vem?, pp. 7-10, pp. 26-28; Ernst Wigforss, "Friheten i morgondagens samhälle", Tiden, 1948 (hereafter Ernst Wigforss, Tiden) p. 337.

53 Vår väg, No. 2, p. 4, p. 12, p. 14; the platform; Gustav Möller, Från fattig-Sverige till social-Sverige, p. 13, p. 11; "Människans bästa i centrum"; Ernst Wigforss, Frihet - för vem?, p. 20; Tjänstemannen i politik och samhälle, 1948, No. 2, p. 2; Valstriden, p. 61; Frans Nilsson, op.cit., p. 21; Ernst Wigforss, Tiden, p. 337.

54 The platform; Vår väg, No. 2, p. 14; Valstriden, p. 61; Tage Erlander, Socialdemokratins väg, p. 10; Frans Nilsson, op.cit., pp. 34-35 and the young socialists' poster "Intelligent but poor - give him an equal chance".

55 The platform (italics original); Tage Erlander, Socialdemokratins väg, pp. 27-28; Ernst Wigforss, Frihet - för vem?, pp. 21-23 (quotations p. 23), pp. 29-30; Frans Nilsson, op.cit., p. 32; C.G. Malmström, op.cit., p. 29; Tjänstemannen i politik och samhälle, No. 2, pp. 11-13; Valstriden, p. 61, pp. 131-132; Vår väg, No. 2, p. 11, p. 8; "50 resultat av 'vanstyret'".

56 Tage Erlander, Socialdemokratins väg, pp. 26-27, p. 10, p. 12; Valstriden, p. 61, pp. 131-132; Ernst Wigforss, Frihet - för vem?, pp. 28-32; Tiden, p. 338.

57 Vår väg, No. 2, p. 3, p. 11; Ernst Wigforss, Frihet - för vem?, p. 32 (quotation); Morgonbris, 1948, September, p. 4 (also quotation); Broderskap, September 11, 1948, p. 1; C.G. Malmström, op.cit., pp. 29-30; Tjänstemannen i politik och samhälle, No. 2, p. 2; Valstriden, p. 139; Ernst Wigforss, Tiden, pp. 336-37.

58 Ernst Wigforss, Frihet - för vem?, pp. 5-32 (quotation p. 32); the platform; Morgonbris, p. 4, p. 14; Tjänstemannen i politik och samhälle, No. 2, p. 2, pp. 11-13, p. 15; Ernst Wigforss, Tiden, pp. 336-37; Gustav Möller, Från fattig-Sverige till social-Sverige, p. 11; Frans Nilsson, op.cit., p. 38; Politiska argument och fakta, pp. 4-5; Valstriden, p. 139; C.G, Malmström, op.cit., pp. 25-26; Richard Sterner, Hur fritt är det fria näringslivet? (Stockholm: Tiden, 1948); Vår väg, No. 2, p. 11.

59 Vår väg, No. 2, p. 10; "50 resultat av 'vanstyret'"; Politiska argument och fakta, p, 5; Tjänstemannen i politik och samhälle, No. 2, p. 15; Per Edvin Sköld, Småbrukarna och jordbrukspolitiken, pp. 15-19; "Till jordbrukets folk".

60 The platform; Vår väg, No. 2, p. 2, p. 15; Politiska argument och fakta, pp. 34-36, pp. 48-50; Sven Andersson, op.cit., pp. 4-5, pp. 9-10, p. 23; "Vad valet gäller"; "I år".

61 Tage Erlander, Socialdemokratins väg, pp. 22-25 (quotation p. 22-23); Ernst Wigforss, Frihet - för vem?, pp. 5-10, pp. 26-28, p. 32; Politiska argument och fakta, p. 4; Gustav Möller, Från fattig-Sverige till social-Sverige, p. 11, p. 5; Gunnar Sträng, op.cit., p. 25; Tjänstemannen i politik och samhälle, No. 2, p. 2, p. 10; Morgonbris, p. 4; Ernst Wigforss, Tiden, p. 336.

62 Vår väg, No. 2, p. 3; Frans Nilsson, op.cit., pp. 42-43; C.G. Malmström, op.cit., pp. 27-29; Valstriden, pp. 46-47, p. 109; Politiska argument och fakta, pp. 21-22.

63 The appeals to the key target groups singled out different major themes in the propaganda to the general electorate. The appeal to workers stressed the negative consequences of a non-Socialist victory. The appeal to the farming population described recent agricultural legislation as reforms benefiting small farmers and other low-income farm groups - and declared that reforms were endangered if the non-Socialists came to power. The most distinctive feature of the appeal to white-collar workers was its defensive posture. It refuted charges concerning mismanagement of the economy, controls and collaboration with the Communists.

64 Tjänstemannen i politik och samhälle, No. 2, p. 2, pp. 10-13; C.G. Malmström, op.cit., pp. 25-26; "Friheten är socialdemokratiens ledstjärna".

65 See e.g. "Vi håller samman"; "Till fackföreningsfolk i Nyköping"; "Nya tag mot inflationsfaran"; "Upprop till Frostvikens arbetare, män och kvinnor".

66 The platform: "Till jordbrukets folk"; Per Edvin Sköld, Småbrukarna och jordbrukspolitiken; Politiska argument och fakta, pp. 15-16.

67 For the polls, see Elis Håstad, "Gallup" och den svenska väljarkåren, p. 250, p. 308, p. 316; Elisabeth Tjerneld, op.cit., p. 122; John D. Stephens, "The Consequences of Social Structural Change for the Development of Socialism in Sweden" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1976) pp. 222-23.

68 Leif Lewin, op.cit., pp. 105-106.

69 Ibid., pp. 332-33, p. 341.

70 Ernst Wigforss, Minnen, pp. 377-378.

71 Elisabeth Tjerneld, op.cit., p. 120.

Chapter 6

The Role of Prominent Ideological Themes in the Elections: A Summary

So far a variegated picture has emerged in the analysis of the ideological statements in the elections. A wide range of uses has been documented and discussed in relation to the distinctive aspects of the party's strategies in the three elections. As a conclusion to the analysis of the role of ideology in electoral politics, this chapter sums up the tasks and uses of prominent ideological themes in the elections. The themes, which have been relatively salient in at least one but usually two of the elections, are: democracy, freedom, socialization and public ownership, economic planning, levelling and fair distribution, and state intervention. Each theme is first examined in terms of its prominence in the three elections. Then its role as revealed through the analysis based on the functional categories is discussed. This discussion focuses on the following tasks and uses: presenting guidelines for action and specific recommendations, legitimizing policy and proposed measures, demarcating party differences, refuting the criticism of the other parties, and aggregating groups.

Democracy

In all three elections "continuing the democratization process" recurred as a theme in the Social Democrats' propaganda. They maintained that political democracy had to be complemented by economic and social democracy, and prime emphasis was on economic democracy and the democratization of education. Statements on continuing the democratization process and economic democracy were least prominent in the 1944 campaign, and messages mentioning these themes were largely confined to party sympathizers. In 1946, by contrast, the themes figured significantly in *all* types of messages. Economic democracy was the single, most important ideological theme of the election. In 1948 it was still an important theme but did not occupy the same pivotal position as in 1946.

The demands for democratization were frequently backed up by recommendations, providing explicit action-orientation. For example, to democratize education, the Social Democrats advocated measures to remove economic and geographical barriers to education and a radical restructuring of the school system. A unified structure - the comprehensive school - would replace the variety of schools and do away with early differentiation among pupils.

The recommendations for more democracy in the economy varied somewhat in specificity and content during the three elections. The 1944 propaganda contained a general plea for increased state intervention, including a

mandate for socialization and the adoption of forms of economic organization conducive to workers' co-determination. In 1946 several concrete proposals were advanced: industrial democracy through works councils, the establishment of branch councils, measures to combat monopolies, and legislation requiring public disclosure of business records. In 1948 the most concrete and frequent proposals were measures which had already been adopted. On the other hand, statements pointed out that democratization of the economy was a long-range aspiration, and that it was not possible to specify the exact nature of the process nor the amount or forms of state intervention necessary. In other words, in 1948 the means of creating more democracy in the economy were overwhelmingly either existing arrangements or guidelines for a future society whose immediate relevance was both vague and qualified. Nonetheless, the theme was crucial in keeping open the option of greater state intervention in the economy.

The argument of economic democracy was also important in legitimizing campaign recommendations involving state intervention. In fact, by defining economic democracy as the extension of the common influence of the people over the economy, state intervention was equated with economic democracy. Equally significant, the theme served to endow past policy and accomplishments with ideological legitimacy. For example, the campaign literature, especially in 1946, referred to past policy and achievements as a democratization of the economy - including trade union and cooperative movement influence, state economic intervention, welfare policy and taxation. Even the theme of "continuing the democratization process", which was both future and past-oriented, had a similar function.

The Social Democrats emphasized that their position on democracy was a basic difference between them and parties on both the left and the right in the 1946 and 1948 elections. Social Democratic adherence to political democracy and the Communist denial of the rights of the opposition created an unbridgable gulf between the two parties. Simultaneously, the Social Democrats' desire to introduce economic democracy was depicted as the source of party conflict between them and the non-Socialists. In 1946 the propaganda aimed at workers and party sympathizers stressed greater employee influence as the prime distinction. In 1948 party differences concerning economic democracy were brought out in a greater variety of messages, and the statements centered primarily on popular influence over the economy versus the power of big finance and secondly on employee influence.

In aggregating groups, statements on industrial democracy in 1944 contained an embryonic attempt to aggregate manual laborers and white-collar workers on this issue. The importance and scope of these statements increased

in 1946 when economic democracy was presented as accommodating the interests of these two groups as well as small businessmen. This feature substantially diminished in 1948.

Finally, the stress on economic democracy constituted an important offensive posture in the 1946 and 1948 elections. By generally portraying their economic policy as a democratization of the economy and proclaiming the attainment of economic democracy as an urgent task, the Social Democrats apparently sought to fight out the issue of greater economic intervention in the name of economic democracy rather than as socialization or state intervention per se. The combined effect of promulgating economic democracy as a chief aspiration of the party and pinpointing it as the source of party controversy was that the Social Democrats gained the lead in standing out as the champions of economic democracy vis-à-vis the non-Socialist parties - and wanting more democracy than they did.[1)] The emphasis on economic democracy also preserved the ideological integrity and profile of the party at a time when Communist efforts to woo away Social Democratic sympathizers posed an extreme threat.

Freedom

In 1944 freedom was one of the major ideological themes in the campaign literature. As revealed by the title "Bread and Freedom", it was a central topic in Wigforss' 1944 election pamphlet; the young socialists, the Christian Social Democrats, and the ads on housing also mentioned freedom. In 1946 statements on freedom were eclipsed by emphasis on economic democracy, but they still cropped up in the campaign literature. Freedom resumed a salient position in the 1948 election propaganda. Together with economic democracy, it was the most prominent ideological theme, and statements on freedom occurred in a wider range of propaganda than in either 1944 or 1946.

Statements about freedom in the three elections were frequently of a defensive nature, and especially in 1944 and 1946 their prime task was to defend the party. In 1948 the Social Democrats not only attempted to refute non-Socialist charges, they also sought to discredit the non-Socialists' position on freedom. In this election three tactical uses were inextricably bound up: defense, demarcating party differences and aggregation. In rebuking accusations that they threatened freedom, the Social Democrats raised the question of whose freedom. They underlined that their policies extended the right of freedom to all and enhanced the freedom of the common man, the broad strata of society, workers and employees, and low income groups. The non-Socialists were attributed with endeavoring to preserve the freedom of privileged and wealthy groups, big business and employers - largely at the

expense of the freedom of the small and the many. Simultaneously the Social Democrats noted a number of party divergencies stemming from this dichotomy of interests, and the arguments of whose freedom were also a chief ideological vehicle in aggregating groups. In the two previous campaigns, remarks on freedom served to aggregate groups on a much more limited scale.

Thus the defensive component and these tactical aspects dominated the campaign statements on freedom. However, denials often explained how Social Democratic policy and proposals furthered freedom and consequently legitimized them (and in some instances implied or expressed guidelines for action). In somewhat varying degrees, the campaign literature of all three elections argued that reforms and social legislation enlarged freedom, and public ownership and state intervention were justified in terms of freedom. In 1948 arguments on freedom were also used to legitimize rationing and specific controls.

Socialization, Nationalization and Public Enterprise

Only a few suggestions involving socialization in the sense of public ownership or nationalization were put forward in the elections, and they were overshadowed by a massive array of recommendations in other areas. Despite this, the demand for socialization in 1944 was the most articulate it had been since the 1928 election. Recommendations focused on socialization of monopolies. The propaganda reiterated Pt. 23 of the Postwar Program: "Government support of non-profit production or socialization where private enterprise entails abuses or monopolistic practices." Specifically, socialization of the building materials industry was suggested. More generally, Wigforss mentioned nationalization of monopolies controlling an entire branch of industry, and creating competition in the form of public enterprises. The number of specific proposals increased in the 1946 propaganda. However, nationalization of monopolies was toned down and deemed at last resort. In 1948 the advocacy of socialization, as reflected in specific proposals, was sharply reduced. The campaign statements alluded to creating new public enterprises. These references can be contrasted with Wigforss' suggestions in 1944 which also included the nationalization of entire branches. It is also worth noting that the dominant features of Social Democratic policy involving public ownership for the subsequent two decades were the creation of public enterprises to compete with private companies and the virtual absence of nationalization of entire branches of industry.

In all three elections the discussion on socialization addressed itself in varying degrees to the sweeping charges of the Conservatives and Liberals. And in 1946 and 1948 several statements were of a defensive nature. Basically,

three tacks were employed. The Social Democrats specified the limits of socialization, which in part was a restatement of the position in the Party Program and the 27 Points. Secondly, they underlined the pragmatic nature of their advocacy of socialization; and they attempted to reverse the charges, arguing that it was the non-Socialists who were dogmatic on the issue of ownership. The third device was to redefine socialization, often in rather innocuous or at least less controversial terms.

The legitimation function was most obvious in 1946. Socialization was not only defined so as not necessarily involving nationalization. It was also defined so as to encompass certain basic features of party policy - both welfare policy and state intervention in general - and endowed them with socialist legitimacy. Parallels can also be drawn between the statements on socialization in 1946 and comments about socialism and "socialistic measures" in 1944 and 1948, which bestowed socialist legitimacy upon everyday policy. In 1944 Wigforss declared that welfare measures were a form of socialism. On another occasion he called common measures - an epithet for state intervention - socialistic in the broadest sense of the word. Similarly the young socialists equated a larger economic role for the state with socialism. In 1948 Wigforss designated government measures and controls which ensured all citizens a decent and fair share of the prosperity produced by common efforts as socialistic measures, and he spoke of the public sector as the "socialized sector". Erlander, in his pamphlet, presented the party's economic program for the next four years under the heading, "Social change in the spirit of socialism".[2)]

A recurrent but not very prominent feature of the propaganda was references to socialistic measures and socialization as the fountainhead of party conflict. In 1944 the opponents of Social Democracy were said to oppose common measures because of their socialistic content. In 1946 socialization, in a more indirect manner, was attributed with being the basis of party differences. Democratization of the economy was designated as the source of party controversy, and in turn socialization and a democratization of the economy were equated. Similar instances also occurred in the 1948 election. During the final radio debate, Wigforss noted that attitudes toward the unequal dispersion of ownership constituted the chief difference between the Social Democrats and the bourgeois parties. In an elliptical fashion, Erlander referred to differences between the Social Democrats and the non-Socialists in discussing social change in the spirit of socialism.[3)]

Planned Economy/Economic Planning

Introducing a planned economy was quite a prevalent theme in the 1944 campaign, since it was linked to full employment - a key issue of the election. In 1946 planned economy measures continued to figure prominently in the propaganda. But in 1948 the general demand for a planned economy was largely dropped, although a few essential recommendations of the planned economy policy were retained.

The most frequent statement on a planned economy in 1944 called for coordination of economic activity under government direction in cooperation with economic organizations to ensure full and rational utilization of labor and material resources. The major recommendations consisted of an expansionary economic policy to avert a feared depression, i.e. public measures to sustain both demand and production. Control over investments was also briefly mentioned by Wigforss. In addition he referred to the agricultural sector as an example of a planned economy with its price controls, marketing guarantees to safeguard the standard of living of the farming population, and public measures to encourage rationalization. Wigforss further intimated that housing construction and the manufacture of consumer goods were sectors slated for "similar planned intercessions".[4)]

The most specific pronouncement in the 1946 campaign literature enumerated planned economy measures as promoting cooperative and other non-profit production; expanding the activity of public enterprise, with or without nationalization; supporting and regulating investments; and strengthening demand. And the propaganda highlighted maintaining production and demand through public aid 1) to support investments and 2) to improve marketing conditions. The Social Democrats' "new" public housing policy was also characterized as an aspect of planned economy. Public measures to promote rationalization of branches of industry were discussed.

In 1948 a planned economy faded from the election propaganda. Aspects of a planned economy which were exclusively expansionary economic policy measures were discarded since they were irrelevant - not to say counterproductive - in view of existing inflation. Rationalization was barely mentioned. Statements calling for coordination of economic activity under government direction, so prevalent in 1944 and still frequent in 1946, were totally supplanted by appeals for cooperation between government, enterprises and employees. Two key components of the planned economy policy were retained but as muted and highly generalized recommendations - greater government influence in the fields of credit and housing. Again, interestingly, it was in these areas where subsequent Social Democratic policy was eventually to alter the structure of ownership.

Finally, interwoven with recommendations in 1946 was also a defensive element. In general the Social Democrats depicted non-Socialist criticism of their economic policy as gross and misleading, and they especially denounced PHM propaganda. There were certain tactical assets - particularly prior to the serious imbalance in the economy - in defending their economic policy as planning and in labelling critics as PHM - the opposition to planned economy. One significant tactical advantage stemmed from the Agrarians' fairly positive position on planned economy in contrast to their rejection of socialization. It will also be recalled that through the support of Agrarian MPs, the Social Democrats had been able to secure passage of their new economic policy - "a policy of planned economy" - in the 1930s.[5)]

Levelling and Fair Distribution

During the 1944 campaign the themes of levelling and fair distribution occurred in a variety of contexts. In the subsequent elections, mention of levelling successively diminished. However the tax proposals of the 1946 election contained bold and controversial levelling features. In the 1948 propaganda, fair distribution re-emerged as a theme.

In the 1944 propaganda to the general electorate, the Social Democrats presented only a few recommendations in terms of fair distribution and levelling. They called for an equivalent standard of living for the agricultural population and levelling the financial burden of having children. For the most part, recommendations involving levelling were reserved for party sympathizers and activists. Levelling policy was explained primarily as improving the conditions of underprivileged and low income groups - specifically through welfare, education and wage policies. And measures in these three policy areas were emphasized in the propaganda. The 1944 campaign statements also made clear that levelling policy included measures to reduce extreme riches, but these comments were not backed up by definite proposals. In connection with levelling policy, Wigforss also assigned higher priority to social reforms than to lower taxes - at least to tax cuts across the board. Nevertheless in the 1946 campaign, reduction of extreme wealth came to the fore in the proposals for higher taxes on sizable earnings, wealth and inheritances.

In 1948 scant mention was made of levelling. As distinct from the previous elections when levelling was mainly viewed as an impending task, the platform and most other comments in 1948 referred to levelling as an achievement. However, the redistributive aspects of the pending education reform were stressed in 1948: the existing educational monopoly of the wealthy strata of society was to be replaced by equal educational opportunities.

Levelling - or equalization - and redistributive effects were a major ideological justification in legitimizing welfare and wage policy recommendations and educational reform. As a justification of policy positions, the arguments of levelling and fair distribution were important in other ways. First, the broad welfare program urged by the Social Democrats entailed heavy increases in government expenditures. At the same time Social Democratic supporters demanded tax relief. By presenting this complex of issues as a matter of levelling and as socialist levelling policy, it was perhaps hoped that party followers would be persuaded to accept the expansion of reform policy in preference to lower taxes - or probably more aptly in preference to more thoroughgoing reductions. Secondly, the argument of fair distribution in 1948 served to legitimize unpopular rationing and restrictions on consumption.

The Social Democrats pointed out that levelling and fair distribution comprised a basic difference between them and the non-Socialists in 1944. More generally the Social Democrats pictured the non-Socialists as hesitant about a more equitable distribution, and they underlined non-Socialist opposition to levelling policies. It was also claimed that the Agrarians together with the Conservatives wanted a levelling between rural and urban areas, and that they, in contrast to the Social Democrats, were not interested in a levelling of economic differences in the countryside. The 1948 propaganda implied party differences by presenting Social Democratic crisis measures as seeking to ensure a fair distribution of benefits and privations - whereas alternative measures were described as shifting the burden to low income groups.

Statements on levelling in 1944 frequently defended the party or its recommendations. With regard to the Agrarians, declarations on levelling and fair distribution reaffirmed the Social Democrats' espousal of equality and countered, first, Agrarian charges that the Social Democrats' policy contradicted the principle of equality and, secondly, the Agrarians' challenges in emulating the Social Democrats in the area of welfare policy. In relation to the Conservatives and Liberals, much of the discussion was a repudiation of non-Socialist objections to levelling measures, e.g. their futility as well as their threatening economic progress and capital formation. Indirectly the levelling arguments also undercut Communist criticism.

Lastly, in aggregating voters the themes of levelling and fair distribution were significant. In all three elections, economic differences within the farming population were related to aspirations involving fair distribution and levelling. In more narrow terms the Social Democrats proposed the reduction of economic differences by replacing inadequate holdings with

viable family farms. On a more general plane, the party called for an equivalent standard of living for the agrarian population and equal educational opportunities for rural youth. In 1948 the theme of fair distribution aided in aggregating various low income groups.

State Intervention

State intervention was a very pervasive element in the propaganda of the three elections. It converged with or was an essential ingredient in several of the previous themes: democratization of the economy, socialization, planned economy. This overlapping is an indication of the centrality of state intervention in the ideological statements in the elections. Moreover, it was a theme in its own right.

In two of the elections, state intervention was designated as an area of party controversy and the basis of party differences. In some instances, these statements were made in connection with arguments bestowing intervention with ideological legitimacy, e.g. when it was labelled as socialism and socialistic measures. State intervention was also a significant theme in aggregating the labor movement and the farming population in the 1944 campaign. It was presented as a feature of Social Democratic agricultural policy proposals and explained as accommodating the interests of farmers and workers alike.

Of prime importance, however, the expansion of state intervention was the most predominant recommendation of the elections, and the campaign literature contained a spate of specific proposals for state intervention - far too numerous to reiterate here. On a general plane, the state and government measures were viewed as a common instrument for attaining the public good and the general welfare. Its virtues were frequently heightened by contrasting it with the anomalies caused by private selfish interests. In a more specific fashion, for example, the 1946 propaganda maintained that the state had responsibility for securing full employment; adequate housing; income maintenance in cases of sickness, old age, disability and unemployment; and the efficient functioning of the economy. In addition to these concrete and utilitarian notions of the general welfare, state intervention was fused with the attainment of political ideals: freedom, democracy and equalization in the sense of a fair distribution.

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Having mapped out the pattern of ideological statements in each of the elections and summed up the tasks and uses of the prominent ideological themes in the campaigns, the discussion turns to the question of the effects of the tactical uses of ideological statements in electoral politics on

ideological content and guidelines for action.

Notes

1 Bertil Ohlin quickly perceived the tactical implications of this stance, and the Social Democratic line was countered but none too effectively during the 1946 election. In 1948 Ohlin included an economic democratization among the aspirations of social liberalism. See e.g. Bertil Ohlin, Ekonomisk demokratisering (Stockholm: Folkpartiet,1948).

2 See esp. Richard Sterner, Mera demokrati i näringslivet, pp. 5-9; Edvin Gustafsson, op.cit., p. 13; Aktuell politik 1946, "Programmet blir verklighet", pp. 17-18; Bertil Johansson, op.cit., p. 14, p. 16; Ernst Wigforss, Frihet - för vem?, p. 10, p. 24; Tage Erlander, Socialdemokratins väg, pp. 26-27.

3 Valstriden, p. 142; Tage Erlander, Socialdemokratins väg, p. 26.

4 Ernst Wigforss, Bröd och frihet, p. 30; Fakta, 1944, No. 5, p. 21.

5 For a discussion of the ideological roots of the Agrarians' support of a policy of planned economy in the 1930s, see Rolf Torstendahl, Mellan nykonservatism och liberalism (Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1969) pp. 55-62, p. 211.

PART III

THE IMPACT ON IDEOLOGY

Chapter 7 Ideological Content and Tactical Uses

First, this chapter examines the impact of electoral politics on party ideology by comparing the ideological content of the election propaganda with the content of the party's official ideology as embodied in the Party Program and the Postwar Program. It describes the similarities and divergencies in the content of the Programs and ideological statements in the elections. The main purpose of this comparison is to find out what modifications occurred in the propaganda and what elements were reinforced. Subesquently the analysis attempts to determine the extent to which modifications and similarities in content can be explained by the tactical uses of ideological statements in electoral politics.

Secondly, changes in guidelines for action and tactical uses are discussed. This discussion explores one aspect of the implications of tactical uses for the intellectual tasks of ideology - or more specifically how prescriptions may be affected by tactical uses.

Thirdly, the question of possible long-range effects is raised by discussing parallels between the modifications in ideological content of the campaign statements of the mid-1940s and the revisions of the Party Program in 1960 and 1975.

7.1.1 Modifications and Similarities in the Ideological Content of the Programs and Campaign Statements

During the period 1944-1948 there was greater accord between ideological statements in elections and formulations of the Party Program than had been the case in the 1930s or was to occur in the 1950s. First, less of a disparity existed than in the 1930s because the 1944 revision had brought the content of the Program more in line with party practice. Secondly, as brought out in the previous chapters, the mid-1940s was a period of radicalization. After the 1948 campaign a successive decline in the congruity between ideological statements in elections and program formulations set in.

In fact, a substantial deradicalization transpired. The ideological retreat of the Social Democrats in the late 1940s and early 1950s has been attributed i.a. to the outcome of the elections in the mid-1940s - the failure to retain an absolute majority - the unpropitious climate for radical proposals caused by the emergence of the cold war, and the formation of the

second Social Democratic-Agrarian coalition government in 1951. Most notably, the theme of socialization was ushered from the electoral arena. Here a parallel can be drawn with the experiences of the 1920 and 1928 elections when socialization had been a campaign issue; the elections resulted in a poor showing for the Social Democrats, and socialization was shunted into the background. Similarly the demand for a planned economy - largely dropped already in the 1948 election - ceased to be mentioned.[1)]

Parenthetically, this decline in congruity should not be construed as the disappearance of ideological statements from Social Democratic campaign literature of the early and mid-1950s. Certain themes persisted, others were occasionally resurrected, modifications and shifts in emphasis occurred, and new themes were launched. For example, continuation of the democratization process recurred as a theme in the election platforms. Demands for fair distribution and levelling were sporadically revived, but not as an assault on extreme wealth. According to the 1954 platform, fair distribution was to be achieved by giving the broad masses a larger share of improvements in the standard of living. State intervention in the form of economic planning or cooperation between government, business and employees was displaced by a recommendation to expand the public sector through investments in services and facilities.[2)]

Hence, in comparison to the 1930s and the 1950s, a substantial degree of congruity existed between ideological statements in the elections and programmatic formulations. Despite this overall accord, however, a detailed examination reveals a steady erosion of traditional tenets and significant modifications in their content, as the comparison moves from the Party Program to the Postwar Program and subsequently to the election propaganda. This becomes especially apparent through a theme-by-theme analysis.

Freedom

Essentially the 1944 Party Program highlighted freedom in two senses. The first was freedom as deliverance from a condition of dependence. The Program specified that the majority, for its livelihood, was dependent upon the decisions of a privileged few who owned and determined the management of capital, and the Program called for the liberation of the majority from this dependence. Secondly, the Program held that the sphere for personal development and independence was circumscribed for those who were barred from participating in the right of ownership - implying a positive meaning of freedom as self-fulfillment. In effect the Program prescribed that greater freedom was to be primarily secured by altering the rights of ownership and determination over production. Civil liberties were also extolled.[3)]

In the Postwar Program, freedom was not a dominant theme. Implications that freedom could be attained through changes in ownership (socialization) generally receded into the background, and emphasis shifted to freedom resulting from influence and participation in the right to determine the organization of the economy. In particular, the Program referred to the feeling of freedom accruing from being able to decide over one's own destiny. Three other notions of freedom occurred - also rooted in Marxist thinking. The Program noted the importance of the material basis of freedom, and argued that increased efficiency would strengthen the material basis of freedom. Secondly, the Program alluded to freedom through social engineering by which man was liberated from environmental forces previously beyond his control. It was declared that economic planning provided a tool with which man could master technology rather than be mastered by it. Thirdly, the Program mentioned releasing the "self-activity" of the masses and freedom as self-development. But contrary to the Party Program, the Postwar Program did not relate self-development to ownership but to co-determination.[4)]

Described in terms similar to the conception of freedom in the Party Program, a substantial part of the Social Democrats' election pronouncements revolved around freedom as the elimination of the masses' condition of dependence. In the campaign statements two sorts of dependency can be distinguished. The first, which contained a direct parallel in the Party Program, was the workers' condition of dependence on the owners of capital. Emancipation in this instance was to be achieved by altering conditions of ownership through socialization. In addition the campaign literature mentioned ways of reducing the powers and functions deriving from ownership of capital and industry and simultaneously increasing the workers' influence concerning these prerogatives. These consisted of industrial democracy; state intervention, including restrictive legislation; and trade union activity.[5)]

The second sort of dependency mentioned in the campaign statements - and without a direct counterpart in the Party Program and only fleetingly referred to in the Postwar Program - was enslavement to economic forces. In this context, freedom meant emancipation from economic necessity, and generally speaking freedom was to come about through an improvement of material conditions, i.e. a rise in production and welfare. More specifically, Wigforss in 1944 maintained that improved educational opportunities and the full employment policy would mitigate economic contraints and thus broaden the individual's sphere of freedom. In 1946 Sterner pursued this argument, adding that marketing guarantees eliminated economic constraints on small businessmen. The Christian Social Democrats in the same election argued that the eradiction of miserable living conditions was a prerequisite

for freedom in the sense of the free development of the uniqueness and talents of the individual. In a similar vein in 1948, improvement of material conditions was seen as leading to freedom of choice and the capacity to determine one's life style - to economic opportunities, free consumer choice and leisure time. Erlander in particular underscored greater freedom through reforms which created opportunities for the individual. Contrary to Wigforss who dealt with unfreedom caused by both dependence on owners and economic want, Erlander emphasized only the material basis of freedom.[6)]

Another feature of the campaign statements was their emphasis on "freedom - for whom". Often freedom of a privileged few was pitted against freedom for the masses, and freedom for everyone was urged. For example, all pieces of propaganda mentioning freedom in 1944 touched in various ways on the extension of freedom so that it was not limited to a privileged minority, and the platform demanded "true freedom for all". And Wigforss called for equal freedom for the entire people.[7)] These themes took on larger proportions in the 1948 campaign.

In summation, a striking characterisitc of the campaign statements was the variety of meanings attached to freedom. The statements reiterated the conceptions of freedom in the Programs, but also expanded them. Second, the increased number of meanings was accompanied by a shift from a primarily negative conception in the Party Program of eliminating dependence to positive conceptions: freedom through participation and co-determination, self-activity and development of the uniqueness of the individual, enlarged opportunities and free choice, the right to freedom for everyone, and equality in freedom. Third, there was a multiplication of instruments for attaining freedom. The instruments in the Party Program were confined to changes in ownership and economic intervention. Besides these means, the campaign literature listed employee influence and trade union activity, welfare reforms, and specific policies, e.g. employment and educational policies.

Democracy

The 1944 revision formally incorporated political and economic democracy as integral components of the good society envisaged in the Party Program. In particular, democracy was related to the elimination of class privileges. The major economic privileges attacked by the Program were the rights of ownership and determination over the essential part of the means of production. The Program also called for joint influence via employees' organizations in the management of enterprises.[8)] Thus, by implication, the cardinal ways of achieving economic democracy were socialization and alter-

ing the right of determination over production.

The demand for democratization in the Postwar Program was more prominent and assumed several forms. Like the Party Program, the Postwar Program coupled economic democracy to changes in rights of ownership and determination, but state intervention as a means of securing economic democracy clearly took ascendancy over socialization in the Postwar Program. The demand for workers' influence was also more pronounced than in the Party Program. The Postwar Program maintained that increased state influence, or the citizens' common right of determination over the economy, was a form of indirect economic democracy which had to be supplemented by direct democracy on the workshop floor and in the management of the enterprise. Participation of employees' representatives in the general planning and coordination of branches of the economy was also advocated.[9)]

Two additional dimensions were given to the demand for democratization in the Postwar Program. First, the Program proposed a "democratic distribution" and a "democratization of the economic, social and cultural conditions of the citizens". In this instance, economic democracy was to be achieved by an equalization of wealth and levelling policies in general. Secondly, the Postwar Program urged a democratization of education, and as distinct from the Party Program, democratizing educational opportunities was viewed as a step towards wiping out class differences.[10)]

Statements on economic democracy in the 1944 propaganda closely resembled the view in the Party Program. Economic democracy was largely tied to the question of doing away with ownership privileges. To eliminate the monopoly of ownership, Wigforss suggested both restricting the rights of ownership of the minority possessing an excessive share and extending the rights of common ownership in large industry. He also touched upon the privilege of capital formation. Wigforss argued that capital formation carried out by the masses instead of wealthy groups could be considered a democratization of the economy.[11)]

In the two subsequent elections, other facets of economic democracy were brought out. Economic democracy was defined in the 1946 election as strengthening democratic influences over the economy, and the element of accountability - making the managers of production responsible not only to private owners but above all to the wage-earners, consumers and the entire people - was stressed. Four ways of strengthening democratic influences over the economy can be discerned: expanding the influence and purview of 1) economic organizations with a mass membership, such as cooperative movements of various types - consumer, agricultural and housing - and trade unions 2) bodies of popular government (*folkets gemensamma organ*) at the

national and local levels, and a variant of this, 3) public agencies composed not only of government officials but also representatives for various interests and 4) through co-determination or influence of workers and other employees in management. To increase accountability in the economy and to enable employees to participate meaningfully in the management of enterprises, the propaganda suggested measures to provide greater public access to business records.[12] Primarily three of these facets recurred in the 1948 election: popular influence over the economy with emphasis on extending the sphere of governmental decision-making affecting the economy, greater employee influence, and economic cooperation between government, business and organizations of employees.

Economic democracy was also equated with breaking the dominance of big finance over the economy in the 1946 and 1948 elections. To a large extent, the dominance of big finance was to be broken by extending popular influence, precisely the means of strengthening democratic influences over the economy. However, coming to grips with monopolies was especially important here; and the propaganda proposed nationalization, supervision and control, and creating competition in the form of public enterprises.

In the election propaganda, continuing the democratization process referred not only to democratizing the economy but also to the Postwar Program's prescription of a "democratization of economic, social and cultural conditions" and hence to social and educational reforms. Once again this is an example of the campaign statements encompassing a larger number of instruments than the Party Program and integrating election pledges with ideological aspirations. In conclusion, the election propaganda discussed several additional aspects of democracy in general and economic democracy as well as instruments of democratization than the Party Program.

Socialization

The 1944 revision, as brought out in Chapter 2, diminished the importance of socialization and encumbered it with limitations. The Postwar Program and the election propaganda further accentuated these tendencies. Despite this, campaign statements - primarily but not solely by Wigforss - also reaffirmed the Party Program's proposition that socialization in large scale industry would promote economic democracy and freedom of the workers.

The demand for socialization, translated into specific recommendations in the Postwar Program and campaign literature, was much narrower than the socialization clause of the Party Program. Most of the Postwar Program's recommendations pertaining to public ownership cropped up in the campaign literature either in 1944 or 1946. But the demand for socialization in the

campaign literature was less resounding than in the Postwar Program - and generally much fainter in the propaganda directed to the voters at large. And the scope of specific proposals was successively circumscribed in the three elections.

The limitations concerning socialization in the Party Program were cited and elaborated upon in the Postwar Program and the campaign statements. Most important, greater efficiency was made a condition for introducing socialization measures. The 1946 propaganda laid down two stipulations: 1) the scope of nationalization depended upon the efficient performance of the private sector and 2) specific nationalization projects were to be undertaken only if it was found that they furthered efficiency. The campaign statements also underlined that socialization was a means and not a goal, that it was one means among several, and that other means were more important.

Private ownership per se was not assailed by the Party Program but rather the concentration of private ownership. In fact the Program specifically sanctioned private ownership of small enterprises, and private ownership was further acknowledged by assigning priority to economic planning irrespective of the form of ownership. The Postwar Program and campaign statements extended the role of private ownership and enterprise in the economy. The narrower demand for socialization in the propaganda implied a wider scope of activity for private enterprise. To boot, the campaign literature argued that Social Democratic measures were a precondition for private enterprise to survive and flourish. The critical assessment of private enterprise was successively toned down. Assurances to private enterprises and praise became more frequent, and cooperation between private enterprise and the government was stressed.

Lastly, the Programs defined socialization in terms of ownership. The campaign literature in 1946 and 1948 gave socialization various other meanings besides this. For example, socialization was redefined in basically two fashions during the 1946 election.

First, socialization was declared to consist of all changes which increased planning in the economy and concurrently strengthened democratic influences over the economy.[13] Although this discussion of socialization circumvented the question of common ownership, implicit was the view that socialization meant that powers - formerly of an absolute nature - derived from the right of private ownership were modified out of broader considerations for the social good.

Second, the propaganda spoke of socialization of the results of production (*socialisering av avkastningen*). This type of socialization occurred through reform measures resulting in a fairer distribution of the common

results of production than provided by the free play of market forces. Elsewhere it was explained that socialization could involve production or demand, and that the Social Democrats had long propounded the "socialization of consumption", i.e. increasing the buying power of low income groups and purchasing power for certain basic needs, such as housing.[14)]

To sum up, the specific demand for socialization in the sense of common ownership was narrower in the campaign literature. Limitations and restrictions were underlined, and socialization was made dependent upon achieving greater efficiency. The role of private enterprise in the economy was expanded. The most conspicuous departures from the content of the Party Program, however, involved the redefinitions of socialization.

Planned Economy/Economic Planning

The 1944 Program enhanced the importance of a planned economy, and stated its primacy in relation to forms of ownership. This not only signified a growing recognition of private enterprise - but also a separation of socialization and economic planning as two distinct courses of action which had been closely intertwined in the 1920 Program. Now major importance was assigned to coordination of economic activity under government direction. Traditionally economic planning had been equated with ending the anarchy of production under capitalism, replacing production determined by private profits with production geared to the satisfaction of human wants, and in the 1920 Program it was related to raising production to increase the level of general welfare. The 1944 Program continued to couple economic planning with satisfaction of needs and the subordination of private profits. Efficiency in the sense of total and efficient utilization of the factors of production, full employment and a fair distribution were also designated as goals of a planned economy.[15)]

The Postwar Program maintained more explicitly the distinction between socialization and a planned economy, and it elaborated upon the notion of a planned economy. It emphasized control and steering investments, boosting purchasing power, rationalization of various branches, encouragement of cooperative and non-profit production, expansion of state economic undertakings, and government supervision of foreign trade.[16)]

Election statements urging a planned economy were fairly prominent in 1944 but the nature of a planned economy and measures for its attainment were often vague. In 1946 the statements were less prevalent but more specific. Now the campaign literature cited the Postwar Program's description of planned economy measures. During both elections, however, prime emphasis was on the goals of a planned economy - full employment in 1944 and greater

efficiency in 1946 - and on public measures to maintain demand and production. Measures in housing and agriculture were also salient - and linked to a planned economy. In short, two features stand out. The first was the waning specificity of the campaign literature, as compared to the Postwar Program, along with the diminished prominence and absence of certain recommendations. Secondly, in arguing the case for a planned economy, the election propaganda attached major weight to the attainment of specific economic objectives: full employment and greater efficiency. Much more seldom was a planned economy directly related to ideological aspirations, such as economic democracy, increased freedom or fair distribution.

Levelling

The Party Program viewed the extremely uneven distribution of property and income, characterizing the Swedish capitalist economy, as a fundamental obstacle to social and cultural equality. It prescribed a basic economic levelling, which would consequently increase social and cultural equality. The Program also noted that through welfare, education and tax policies the initial steps had been taken toward a levelling of economic, social and cultural conditions.[17)]

The Postwar Program commented more extensively on levelling, and the radical content of levelling - in the sense of dispossessing the possessors - was toned down somewhat. Two notions of the levelling process emerge more clearly in the Postwar Program. The first, and most prominent, emphasized raising the standard of living for the masses, and especially measures to improve the situation of groups with the least means. The second aspect of the levelling process consisted of restrictions on wealth and inheritances as well as measures reducing personal fortunes. The Postwar Program further expanded the instruments of levelling: welfare measures, education policy and taxation were supplemented by a solidaristic wage policy and economic policy (*näringspolitik*).[18)]

The recommendations in the election propaganda of the mid-1940s reflected the twofold nature of the levelling process prescribed by the Programs: 1) lifting the masses and 2) reducing extreme wealth and privileges. Major emphasis, however, was on improving conditions for the broad masses. In fact, in many instances, the campaign recommendations were presented as improving the general standard of living without references to equalization.

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This theme-by-theme comparison reveals several modifications in the ideological tenets of the Social Democrats, and the most important ones can be summarized by contrasting the Party Program and the election propaganda.

In the case of freedom, democracy and levelling - one of the most interesting modifications was that "negative" formulations in the Party Program were complemented with positive ones in the election propaganda.

The Party Program's conception of freedom focused on elimination of dependence; the campaign statements additionally mentioned positive dimensions of freedom. Furthermore, as distinct from the Programs, the election propaganda devoted considerable attention to the material basis of freedom as well as liberation from economic necessity, and the main innovation was the argument of equality in freedom.

Democracy in the Party Program was basically conceived of as the removal of privileges. The election propaganda discussed democracy both as eliminating privileges and as participation, exerting influence, and sharing in control and opportunities. In the Party Program the demand for a continued democratization was confined to the economy; in the campaign literature the demand was applied to an increasing number of areas in society.

The notion of levelling in the Party Program put most emphasis on dispossessing the possessors; the campaign literature generally stressed lifting the masses.

The Party Program dealt with socialization of production, and socialization involved changes in ownership. The election propaganda additionally spoke of socialization of the results of production - the socialization of distribution and consumption. Socialization also pertained to the powers derived from the rights of ownership rather than to ownership itself in some of the campaign statements. When the election propaganda did call for public ownership, its demand was more restrictive. Finally, the campaign statements assigned a larger role to private enterprise in the economy, and private enterprise was to be promoted through party measures.

In the Party Program a planned economy was primarily envisioned as coordination of economic activity under government direction and, to a lesser degree, as entailing the expansion of public ownership. The main thrust of the election propaganda was to emphasize measures to increase demand and production.

Besides modifications in the content of individual tenets of the ideology, there were substantial shifts concerning instruments and goals/means relationships. First, a multiplication of instruments occurred. The campaign literature reaffirmed the instruments laid down by the Party Program but also prescribed additional means. The ranking of instruments was also altered. The chief instruments in the Party Program were a planned economy and socialization, even though the 1944 revision signified an elevation in the importance of state intervention and reforms. In the elections, state inter-

vention and reforms, measured as concrete recommendations, were the main instruments for improving society. Finally, traditional goals/means relationships were eroded through a separation of means and goals in the election propaganda. One tendency in 1944 and 1946 was to present traditional instruments - especially socialization and planned economy - as means to attain specific objectives and material benefits rather than the fundamental aims set forth in the General Principles of the Party Program. In 1948 another variant of separation emerged. Fundamental aspirations were largely divorced from means.

7.1.2 Explaining Modifications and Similarities

The tactical uses of ideological statements in the election propaganda offer an interesting analytical perspective in explaining the modifications and similarities revealed by this comparison. Election propaganda is designed to get votes or mobilize support. The mobilization function of ideologies, especially in the setting of electoral politics, involves several tactical uses of ideological statements. The analysis of the election campaigns has documented various tactical uses.

In Chapter 1 the mobilization function of party ideologies was discussed as coping with a basic strategic dilemma: retaining the allegiance of core groups and gaining support among new groups. It is appropriate to recall the tactical uses of ideological statements in solving this dilemma, mentioned in Chapter 1, and to comment on these uses in the propaganda.

The backing of regular supporters can be secured by appealing to them in ideological terms.[19] As suggested in Chapter 1, this can be done by explaining policies and proposals in traditional terms, i.e. using collective beliefs to legitimize policy. The election propaganda revealed three variants of legitimation. As seen in the analysis of recommendations and argumentation, ideological statements served as justifications of specific policy recommendations. Closely related to justifications were instances of equating party policy with traditional tenets or describing party policy in general as fulfilling or contributing to ideological aims. Aspirations and general demands of an ideological nature were invoked and served to legitimize the party by underlining its *raison d'etre*. Another use of ideological statements in mobilizing support is to specify party differences and the distinctive nature of the party. To a large extent, declarations of ideological distinctions were directed to party sympathizers - but at times these pronouncements spilled over into the propaganda aimed at other voters. The use of ideological tenets as counter-arguments or to refute criticism exhibited a similar pattern. However, in the 1946 election ideological statements defending the party

were addressed to party backers and other voters alike. In attempting to maximize support, the party described its goals and means as accommodating as many voters as possible - both regular sympathizers and marginal voters. In the process, ideological statements were used to articulate a growing number of interests and aggregate a wide range of groups.

The two imperatives of maximizing support 1) retaining the backing of core groups and 2) gaining support among new groups may be of value in explaining unaltered features and modifications of content. Uses of ideological statements in efforts to retain regular supporters can be assumed to reinforce traditional ideological features in the election propaganda - and thus account for similarities. Conversely, it can be hypothesized that the uses of ideological statements reflecting endeavors to gain support among new groups would lead to modifications. The subsequent discussion examines the effects on content of employing ideological statements to legitimize the party and its policies, to draw distinctions, to defend the party, and to articulate interests and aggregate groups.

Legitimation

The three ways in which ideological statements were used for legitimation purposes had varying consequences for ideological content. First, the propaganda justifying policy recommendations with traditional ideological arguments accounts for numerous similarities between the campaign statements and the Programs. For example, in the 1944 election the full employment policy was justified by pointing to the inadequacies of capitalism and private enterprise, and by arguing that the policy would enhance the freedom of workers by eliminating their dependence on owners of capital who decided whether it was profitable to provide jobs.

Second, declarations of ultimate ideological aims in the propaganda often reiterated the tenets of the Party Program and tended to preserve ideological congruity. However, statements invoking traditional long-range aspirations without specifying the means of their attainment in terms of concrete proposals can be regarded as containing the seeds of disintegration of traditional goals-means relationships. The statements contributed to a separation of goals and means. In some instances they denied the immediate relevance of traditional instruments and implied goal attainment through existing arrangements - as in the case of economic democracy in the 1948 election.

Third, campaign statements equating party policy with traditional tenets account for one of the major divergencies in the ideological content of the election propaganda and the Party Program - the redefinitions of socialization.

Distinctions

For the most part, statements specifying ideological differences reinforced traditional ideological content. Declarations concerning fair distribution in 1944 and freedom in 1948, for example, resembled the Party Program. However, in some cases, statements of this kind altered traditional content. This occurred mainly when the statements noted the socialist character of the differences, and in effect the meaning of socialism was amplified or redefined. For example, in 1944 common measures, i.e. state intervention, were termed as "socialist in the broadest sense of the word". Likewise in 1946 democratization of the economy was designated a party difference and also equated with socialization. In these instances, traditional content was modified.

Defense and Counter-arguments

The defensive use of ideological statements in the elections left its mark on content - partly through reinforcing certain features, partly through modifications. Campaign statements on levelling in 1944 were often in the form of arguments defending more extensive equalization efforts. For the most part, these statements reaffirmed the Party Program's indictment of economic inequalities and its prescription to reduce possession of great wealth.

Many declarations about freedom were of a defensive nature. They provide an example of reinforcing and enlarging traditional content. In discrediting non-Socialist criticism and presenting their party as the true champion of freedom, the Social Democrats advanced traditional arguments derived from the Party Program. They also marshalled other arguments and explained in more explicit and positive terms how party endeavors enhanced freedom.

As so clearly brought out in the previous chapters, the Social Democrats were on the defensive on the issue of socialization in the elections. A major portion of the election statements on socialization defended and explained the party's position rather than presenting it as an immediate measure. Hence the campaign literature, more than the Party Program, stressed the limited scope of nationalization and emphatically underlined the pragmatic nature of the party's approach to public ownership. The statements also buttressed the view of socialization as a means and its piecemeal nature.

Group Appeals and Aggregation

Numerous modifications of traditional ideological tenets in the election propaganda can be traced to appeals to groups outside the labor movement. Two general trends emerge in this propaganda. First, the substance of aims,

such as freedom and economic democracy, was enlarged through additional meanings. Second, the substance of certain means - a planned economy, socialization and levelling - was altered by deleting certain aspects. In some cases, however, traditional features of the party's ideology were emphasized in the appeals. The propaganda to party sympathizers and the labor movement often contained both traditional and modified ideological arguments concerning aims and means. The result was a multiplication of the meanings of values and instruments in the propaganda as a whole.

The variety of meanings given to economic democracy in the propaganda can be interpreted as a reflection of efforts to broaden the party's appeal to the electorate at large and to various groups. More specifically, the messages to groups outside the party presented aspects of economic democracy accommodating their interests. Statements to small entrepreneurs referred to economic democracy as cooperation between business and government; pronouncements to white-collar workers focused on employee influence; declarations to the general electorate highlighted popular influence over the economy.

The concept of freedom was also tailored to the interests of a wide spectrum of voters. An interesting example is provided by the propaganda to white-collar workers, which defined freedom in a variety of ways - but notably not in terms of the dominant conception in the Party Program. Freedom in the sense of elimination of the dependence of the workers (or more appropriately here the employees) on the owners and managers of capital was not mentioned. Instead the statements concentrated on co-determination and influence over one's daily life, the free development of the individual's uniqueness, freedom through social engineering, greater opportunities and freedom of choice, and equality of freedom.

In general the campaign statements stressed freedom in the sense of independence from economic necessity - "freedom from want" - and eradicating miserable living conditions as a prerequisite for freedom. This notion of freedom was coupled with welfare measures and reforms. This tendency was most likely related to the fact that welfare measures and reforms were the chief policy vehicles of aggregation in the 1940s.

Furthermore the shift from a largely negative conception of freedom in the Party Program (the absence of dependence) to positive conceptions (the development of one's talents and the ability to shape one's destiny, etc) contained in the election propaganda can be attributed to a basic trait of the party's appeals to groups. For the most part, the propaganda explained how Social Democratic policy benefited various groups of voters, and party policy and aspirations were cast in the most advantageous light possible.

The widespread occurrence of the theme of freedom for everybody and

arguments of whose freedom in the campaign literature appear to be an effort of the party to stand out as promoting the freedom of the broadest spectrum of voters. And as the election contests grew more heated, the argument of whose freedom was expanded so as to identify the non-Socialist parties with a tiny fraction of the electorate whose interests were diametrically opposed to the vast majority.

In other instances, efforts to accommodate a wider segment of voters affected ideological content in a different manner. The substance of a concept was whittled down by noting only certain aspects. In addition certain traditional concepts were largely avoided in the propaganda to the mass electorate and marginal groups. A striking example was socialization. Not only was socialization toned down in large amounts of propaganda. A more favorable assessment of private enterprise pervaded the campaign literature, and messages to small businessmen underlined the role of private enterprise and praised it. In fact the propaganda to small businessmen offers one of the clearest illustrations of how group appeals can erode or accelerate modifications of traditional ideological tenets. Besides commending private enterprise, the appeal proposed cooperation between government and business rather than socialization. It also argued that the form of enterprise was a secondary matter and economic performance was what counted. There was also an attempt to reconcile this with socialist principles. Wigforss maintained that state aid to private enterprise in the form of small businesses did not violate the socialist principles of the party by citing the Party Program: the desire to rejoin labor and ownership was said to be fulfilled in the case of small private enterprise.[20)]

The concept of planned economy was quite vague in the election propaganda, in part, due to emphasis on certain features. The campaign literature dealt with planned economy measures which could be easily converted into the everyday concerns of large numbers of voters: measures to improve purchasing power, credit and marketing guarantees, and planning in housing which was said to lead to better and cheaper housing. Or else planned economy measures were mainly presented as necessary to obtain the goal of full employment which was of major concern to the voters.

In the case of levelling, the campaign literature primarily discussed one facet of the levelling process - raising the level of either the general population or economically disadvantaged groups. Concerning the second facet of levelling - reduction of excessive wealth - the Social Democrats seemed hesitant to campaign on this demand - or more aptly to fashion specific proposals in these terms.

Thus several aspects of the erosion of traditional ideological tenets

occurred in messages to target groups other than the labor movement and can be attributed to aggregation. On the other hand, in certain cases the content of group appeals reinforced traditional aspects of Social Democratic ideology. The appeal to the farming population contained stronger overtones of equalization. In contrast to other appeals to groups outside the labor movement, more weight was put on economic differences and the merits of eliminating them. Likewise the messages to white-collar workers highlighted the employee influence and economic democracy. Furthermore, reforms and state intervention were important vehicles of aggregating the major targets in the elections.

In conclusion, the uses of ideological statements in contributing to modifications and similarities reveal a much more complex process than suggested by the simple hypothesis earlier: uses of ideological statements to retain regular backers reinforce traditional features, while their uses to gain support among new groups lead to modifications. The analysis provides some evidence for the hypothesis but in all categories there are exceptions - usually very significant exceptions. Furthermore, different uses of the same tenet may produce either contradictory or reinforcing effects. In this connection it is worth noting that statements on socialization in two categories - defense and group appeals - had a reinforcing effect. Both sorts of statements relegated its importance.

7.2 Changes in Guidelines for Action

Much of the discussion in the literature about the effects of electoral politics on ideological prescriptions and guidelines for action has focused on how traditional prescriptions - especially socialization - have been watered down, shunted into the background or discarded. This focus has been central in the discussion of Swedish Social Democratic ideology and electoral politics, and it has tended to obscure other types of change.

The preceding analysis of ideological content and tactical uses additionally indicates a subtle mechanism of change. The tactical uses of ideology can produce modifications in content. The modified content may contain altered or new pescriptions - or give new priority to certain guidelines for action. The modified ideological content of the campaign statements shows this.

We have seen several examples of the Social Democrats conferring "socialst" legitimacy on policy and recommendations in the election propaganda. In this legitimation process, the orthodox meaning of socialization has been supplemented. To socialization of the means of production has been added socialization of the results of production and demand. The prescriptions implied by these latter notions of socialization were an extension of income

maintenance measures, taxation and social policies. Socialization, defined as democratizing the economy, involved other prescriptions: extending the influence of trade unions and cooperatives, government intervention, and industrial democracy. References to the public sector as the "socialized" sector implied that socialization is equivalent to expanding the public sector. Needless to say, these prescriptions are quite different from the guidelines for action derived from socialization conceived as public ownership.

In tailoring ideological aspirations to encompass the interests of a growing number of groups, the Social Democrats in their election propaganda amplified the concepts of freedom and economic democracy as formulated in the Party Program. These amplifications were not without repercussions for guidelines for action. As an illustration, the various conceptions of economic democracy in the election propaganda contained dissimilar imperatives for action - especially with regard to the type and scope of state intervention. Economic democracy conceived as the removal of ownership privileges implied a prescription for action which differed from economic democracy viewed as strengthening democratic influences over the economy. The former conception focused attention on modifying the distribution of economic power in society and altering property relations. While the latter view was also concerned with the distribution of economic power, altering property relations was no longer the focal point. Likewise economic democracy as industrial democracy in the sense of democratically organized enterprises need not necessarily entail socialization. Clearly Wigforss' statements revealed that he felt that public ownership would facilitate the implementation of industrial democracy, but other campaign literature pointed out that industrial democracy could be accomplished without altering ownership relations. The view of economic democracy stressing the curtailment of private monopolies contained an implicit limitation by focusing on a narrower portion of the economy. The divergences became even greater when economic democracy was related to better access to information about the operations of business and the private sector - or to economic cooperation between business and the government. The first directed concern to watch-dog arrangements, and the second implied a constraint on the scope and type of intervention, insofar as cooperation could preclude actions which were inimical to the business community.

Ideological statements used to defend the party can affect guidelines for action generally in two ways. Denials and stipulations may impose limitations upon certain courses of action as in the case of nationalization and planned economy measures. In other instances counter-arguments have implied prescriptions which have subsequently been elevated to articulated principles

of action. Statements on freedom provide an interesting example of a counter-argument with important implications for guidelines for action. Substantial portions of Wigforss' pamphlet in 1944 were devoted to denying charges that party policies threatened freedom. Among his arguments, he pointed out that reforms - specifically the full employment policy and educational measures - contributed to enlarging one's sphere of freedom. In 1948 he returned to the idea of reforms enhancing freedom and presented it as a guideline for action.[21] During the 1950s and 1960s, Erlander further developed this idea, and it became crucial to a major thrust of party policy. Erlander stressed the expansion of the public sector, especially services and facilities, in providing greater freedom of choice and possibilities for people to shape their own lives.[22]

Finally tactical uses and multiple functions can lead to ambiguities and inconsistencies in the content of party ideologies with adverse effects on guidelines for action. For example, the coherent structure of goals/means relationships was eroded in the election propaganda through a separation of means and goals. This separation may have impaired the clarity and coherency of guidelines for action. In addition, multiple uses may create a diversity of guidelines and in extreme cases produce muddled or contradictory prescriptions. Socialization can be cited as an example. A poll immediately after the 1948 election indicated confusion concerning the meaning of socialization in the minds of Social Democratic voters and ambivalent attitudes towards increased state ownership and control over the economy. One-third could not say what socialization meant. The most frequent definition was state ownership or control, followed by socialization defined as social reforms.[23] The confusion and diversity of definitions can be attributed to erosion of the orthodox meaning caused by various tactical uses.

7.3 Long-Range Implications

This section raises the question whether the modifications in the ideological content of the election propaganda have had any enduring impact on official party ideology as embodied in the Party Program. It examines parallels between the modified ideological content of the election propaganda of the mid-1940s and the revisions of the Party Program in 1960 and 1975.

One of the major trends in the ideological content of the election propaganda, as revealed here, has been the emphasis on political values and their expanded meaning as compared to the 1944 Party Program. In a longer perspective, the successive revisions of the Party Program have also been characterized by an increasingly pronounced espousal of values[24] as well as a specification of their substance. The growing prominence of values is

clearly exhibited in the latest two program revisions in 1960 and 1975. An additional trend in the ideological content of campaign statements involved the dilution of controversial instruments and a separation of means from traditional goals. To some extent this trend is also reflected in the process of program revision.

Of particular interest is the resemblance between the conceptions in values in the election propaganda of the mid-1940s and the 1960 and 1975 Programs. One aspect of the theme of democracy in the election propaganda was extending democracy to all areas of society. This aspiration has been incorporated into the opening goal statement of the 1960 and 1975 Programs. It now reads:

> The aim of the Social Democratic party is to let the ideal of democracy leave its mark on the whole order of society and the mutual relationships of its members so as to give each individual the opportunity of a rich and meaningful life.

To an even greater degree than the 1960 Program, the current Party Program emphasizes the extension of democracy and signals an impending democratization of the economy and the importance of employee influence.[25)]

There is also great similarity between the notion of freedom in the election propaganda and the Programs - especially the 1960 Program. Two important modifications in the campaign literature were the argument of equality in freedom and the emphasis on the material basis of freedom. The 1960 Program stated:

> The Social Democratic party aims at extending the people's freedom to ever wider spheres. In order that the majority may enjoy more freedom, it may be necessary in many cases to decrease the power of the minority. This extended freedom also presupposes greater equality, if freedom is not in actual fact to be the preserve of a small number. There is no conflict between freedom and equality. On the contrary, they are interdependent.

Moreover, the 1960 Program contained references to opportunities for personal development of every individual, and these were related to freedom. The importance of the material basis of freedom also pervaded the Program. The 1975 Program stresses expanding freedom through social change and the removal of social and economic obstacles to freedom.[26)]

Parallels between the campaign literature and the revised Programs involving means can also be observed. Controversial means - government ownership in the 1960 Program and economic planning in both the 1960 and 1975 Programs - have been increasingly related to specific economic objectives. Chapter 2 pointed out a duality regarding socialization as an instrument which emerged during the 1920s and 1930s. On the one hand socialization was a means of

attaining the fundamental features of the good society. On the other hand socialization was increasingly related to achieving specific economic goals: greater production, employment and efficiency. This duality was further magnified in the 1944 Program. The General Principles retained the crucial relationship between socialization and altering the power structure and eliminating class society; whereas in the socialization clause, both a planned economy and socialization were means of attaining full employment, greater efficiency and fair distribution. The campaign literature also revealed this duality. Particularly Wigforss' broad advocacy of socialization in the 1944 and 1948 elections reiterated the tenets in the General Principles. However, actual suggestions involving public ownership during the campaigns were usually argued on utilitarian grounds and in terms of specific objectives. Likewise a planned economy was predominantly presented in these latter terms in the election propaganda. In the 1960 and 1975 Programs economic planning is increasingly viewed as a means in relation to more specific objectives. To the goals enumerated in 1944, the latest Program has added: responsible management of raw materials and energy, control of technological development, environmental protection, curbing inflation and balanced regional growth.[27)]

The case of socialization in the 1960 and 1975 Programs is more complex. The 1960 revision has been fittingly characterized as "the institutionalization of ambiguity" regarding the question of public ownership.[28)] The Program implied the possibility of achieving the fundamental goals of the party without extensive public ownership. In comparison to earlier versions, the 1960 General Principles offered a fairly extensive statement on ownership. Parts of the statement bore a close resemblance to the position in the campaign literature: government ownership and control would be instituted primarily when private ownership faltered, and private enterprise which performed efficiently would be allowed to continue and even promoted. The 1960 General Principles declared:

> It /Social Democracy/ is prepared to establish new enterprises under public ownership or control when private enterprise is unable to satisfy essential needs ... It will encourage private enterprise in those fields which it proves able to combine efficiency and the desire for progress with responsibility toward consumers, employees and the community.

Furthermore, the declaration in the General Principles related the issue of ownership and forms of enterprise to the criteria of material progress and human welfare - and not, as in the 1944 General Principles, to altering the power structure or eliminating class divisions in society.[29)]

In the 1975 Program the importance of collective ownership - in the form of employee as distinct from government ownership - has been reinstated

and linked with additional aspirations than material progress and welfare. For the most part, the 1960 declaration on ownership in the General Principles has been expunged. Instead emphasis is on economic planning, democratic control of the economy, and employee influence and ownership.

A final parallel between the campaign literature and the revised Programs consists in underlining the party's pragmatic position on the issue of ownership. The 1960 Program declared that forms of enterprise (types of ownership) were not ends in themselves, and that the type of ownership arrangements was to be determined by the tasks to be solved. An open attitude is also expressed in the 1975 Program.[30)]

In summary, certain parallels between the modified ideological content of the campaign literature and the revised Programs are evident. Added weight has been given to political values in general, and particularly to democracy and freedom. Secondly, the revised Programs contain shifts in the meanings of these values, which resemble modifications in the election pronouncements. Thirdly, controversial means - especially in the case of a planned economy - have been increasingly related to the attainment of specific economic objectives. However, a duality, i.e. attainment of specific economic objectives and fundamental goals, has been retained, although in differing degrees in the latest two Programs. Finally, as in the campaign literature, the revised Programs point out the party's pragmatic approach to the issue of ownership. These features of the 1960 and 1975 Programs suggest the importance of considering the party's verbal behavior in the electoral arena and the tactical uses of ideological statements as contributing factors in shaping the revision process.

7.4 Concluding Comments

What implications does the analysis in this book have for the scholarly discussion about the effects of electoral politics on ideology? One dominant thesis in the discussion is that ideology - and the ideology of socialist parties in particular - is diluted by the tactical considerations of parties during elections in attempting to gain and stay in office. Two variants of this thesis can be discerned. One focuses on content and argues that traditional tenets are eroded. The second focuses on functions. In effect, it holds that the task of formulating guidelines for action (or in the terminology here the intellectual function of ideology) is displaced by tactical functions. In its extreme form, the proponents of this thesis conclude that an ideology with formerly an action-orientation function is transformed into a legitimizing ideology.

The empirical analysis in this chapter reveals substantial dilution and

modifications of several ideological tenets when they were converted into campaign statements - even during a period of radicalization. In this respect, the analysis confirms the thesis concerning the erosion of content and indicates how various tactical uses account for shifts in meanings.

On the other hand, the empirical analysis also discloses counter-tendencies. Certain ideological tenets were buttressed by tactical uses. Traditional tenets were often reaffirmed in messages to party activists and sympathizers. In addition, prescriptions involving equalization were reinforced in attempting to aggregate labor and farm voters. Similarly industrial democracy was emphasized in aggregating manual laborers and white-collar workers. These findings indicate the necessity to revise the view that the effects of electoral politics on ideological content operate in solely a unidirectional manner towards dilution, deradicalization and "de-ideologicalization".

With regard to the intellectual and tactical functions of ideology, the empirical analysis shows what could be expected: the predominance of tactical uses of ideological statements in the electoral arena. In particular, statements invoking traditional radical content were less seldom put forward as specific recommendations. Instead these statements frequently served to legitimize the party and its policies, demarcate party differences, refute criticism and aggregate groups.

Of equal interest, however, the analysis discloses that tactical uses have important implications for ideological prescriptions. Tactical uses can produce modifications in ideological content, and modified content can alter guidelines for action. In other words, tactical uses may impinge upon and sometimes impair the intellectual function of ideology - but they do not necessarily displace it.

Notes

1 Not only did the Social Democrats withdraw certain ideological demands, party rhetoric was diluted and program formulations couched in innocuous terms. For example, during the 1948 election Wigforss quoted the Party Program: "On the basis of a common right of ownership and public control over the means of production, Social Democracy wants to create forms for the organization of production which provide the workers with greater influence and responsibility, independence and security." In the 1950 election, Erlander rendered this programmatic demand as an "economy where the citizens gain 'influence and responsibility, possibilities for making personal contributions, independence and security'". Cf. Ernst Wigforss, Frihet - för vem?, pp. 29-30 and Tage Erlander, Fem efterkrigsår (Stockholm: Tiden, 1950) p. 30.

2 Svenska valprogram; Socialdemokratiska partistyrelsen, berättelse för år 1954, pp. 91-95; berättelse för år 1956, pp. 111-117. For expanding the public sector, see the 1952 platform and Tage Erlander, Människor i samverkan (Stockholm: SAP and Tiden, 1954) pp. 17-19, pp. 32-33.

3 Partiprogram, pp. 3-6.

4 Efterkrigsprogram, p. 21, p. 212, p. 218.

5 See e.g. Ernst Wigforss, Bröd och frihet, p. 33, pp. 37-38; Bertil Johansson, Vem vinner?, pp. 15-16; Ernst Wigforss, Frihet - för vem?, pp. 23-31; Ernst Wigforss, Tiden, 1948, p. 338.

6 Ernst Wigforss, Bröd och frihet, p. 34, pp. 41-42; "Socialvården - ett verk i linje med den kristna livssynen"; Richard Sterner, Mera demokrati i näringslivet, p. 31; Edvin Gustafsson, op.cit., p. 8, p. 12, p. 14; Ernst Wigforss, Tiden, 1948, p. 337; Valstriden, p. 61; Tage Erlander, Socialdemokratins väg, pp. 22-23; Tjänstemannen i politik och samhälle, No. 2, 1948, p. 2; Protokoll från Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetarepartis 18:e kongress, 1948, p. 12.

7 The platform; Bröd och frihet; p. 34; Vem vinner?, pp. 15-16; "Socialvården - ett verk i linje med den kristna livssynen"; the ads on housing.

8 Partiprogram, pp. 6-7, pp. 3-5, p. 13.

9 Efterkrigsprogram, p. 21, pp. 29-31, p. 45, p. 82, p. 190, pp. 205-208, pp. 215-216.

10 Ibid., p. 14, pp. 18-20, pp. 115-17, p. 142, pp. 148-150, p. 190.

11 Bröd och frihet, p. 48, pp. 37-40, pp. 28-29.

12 Richard Sterner, Mera demokrati i näringslivet, pp. 7-9, p. 27. See also e.g. the platform and Vår väg, 1946, No. 1 1/2, pp. 11-12.

13 Richard Sterner, Mera demokrati i näringslivet, pp. 5-9. More specifically, Sterner designated increased influence of mass organizations, the state and local government as socialization, while industrial democracy, more public information about the economy and scrutinization of monopolies were depicted as developments in a socialist direction. Only once did Sterner relate economic planning to socialization. Housing production during the war (also described as a sector characterized by economic planning) was said to have been largely socialized in the sense that the conditions, volume and direction of housing production were overwhelmingly determined by public organs.

14 Ibid., p.7; Aktuell politik 1946, "Programmet blir verklighet", pp. 17-18; Edvin Gustafsson, op.cit., p. 13.
In 1948 the introduction of industrial democracy within the existing structure of ownership of enterprises was equated with socialization. Cooperative undertakings, local government housing construction and state controls on housing production, and subsidies to private enterprise were also labelled forms of socialization. See C.G. Malmström, op.cit., p. 30.

15 Partiprogram, pp. 7-8, p. 10. Cf. the 1920 Program, p. 4.

16 Efterkrigsprogram, p. 197, p. 45, p. 200.

17 Partiprogram, pp. 3-5, p. 8.

18 Efterkrigsprogram, pp. 14-20, p. 153, p. 163.

19 Magnus Isberg, Anders Wettergren, Jan Wibble, Björn Wittrock, op.cit., pp. 152-153. Interviews of "party strategists" indicated that several of them felt that propaganda with ideological overtones could influence voters with strong party sympathies.

20 Ernst Wigforss, Frihet - för vem?, p. 29.

21 Cf. Ernst Wigforss, Bröd och frihet, p. 34, pp. 41-42; Tiden, 1948, p. 337.

22 Tage Erlander, Två årtionden (Stockholm: Tiden, 1952) pp. 12-14; Människor i samverkan, pp. 16-17, p. 21, p. 49, pp. 52-53. The clearest and most comprehensive statement is found in Tage Erlander, Valfrihetens samhälle (Stockholm: Tiden, 1962) pp. 65-84.

23 John Stephens, "The Consequences of Social Structural Change for the Development of Socialism in Sweden", pp. 229-230.

24 For a quantitative content analysis of the key words in the 1920, 1944 and 1960 Programs, which shows the ascendancy of values such as democracy, equality, freedom, solidarity, cooperation, security, see Bengt Lundberg, Jämlikhet? Socialdemokratin och jämlikhetsbegreppet (Lund: Dialog, 1979) pp. 44-45.

25 Program för Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetareparti. Enligt beslut å partiets tjuguförsta kongress 1960 (hereafter 1960 Partiprogram) p. 3; Partiprogram fastställt av 1975 års partikongress, (hereafter 1975 Partiprogram), p. 4, pp. 15-16, pp. 19-23 (quotation, 1960 Partiprogram, p. 3, 1975 Partiprogram, p. 4).

26 1960 Partiprogram, p. 3, pp. 7-8, p. 10 (quotation, p. 7); 1975 Partiprogram, pp. 4-5.

27 1975 Partiprogram, pp. 17-19; Cf. 1960 Partiprogram, p. 9.

28 John Stephens, "The Consequences of Social Structural Change for the Development of Socialism in Sweden", p. 258.

29 1960 Partiprogram, p. 9.

30 1960 Partiprogram, p. 9; 1975 Partiprogram, p. 19.

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Swedish Social Democratic Ideology and Electoral Politics 1944–1948

by Diane Sainsbury
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This book bisects two separate areas in the study of politics: the analysis of political ideas and ideology and, secondly, electoral research. A major part of the study addresses itself to two basic questions. What role does ideology play in electoral politics? What effects does electoral politics have on ideology?

Chapter 1 discusses definitional and methodological problems and specifies the aims and limits of the empirical analysis. It recommends a functional approach in studying party ideology which focuses on tasks and uses. Chapter 2 deals with the ideological heritage of the Swedish Social Democrats and party ideology of the 1940s. In several respects, the discussion supplements the prevalent picture of Swedish Social Democratic ideology in much of the literature in English. Chapters 3–5 examine three elections in the mid-1940s and the role of ideological statements in Social Democratic campaign propaganda. Three fairly distinct strategies emerge, and the pattern of the tasks and uses of ideological statements in each election is described. Chapter 6 sums up the role of prominent ideological themes in the three elections in terms of tasks and uses. The final chapter attempts to gauge the impact of electoral politics on ideology by analyzing how the tactical uses of ideological statements can shape ideological content and guidelines for action. The analysis shows, firstly, that modifications and persistent elements in ideological content can be explained by tactical uses, thus suggesting that the effects of tactical functions on ideological content may furnish a valuable perspective in understanding aspects of the revision process of party ideology. Secondly, tactical functions can have important repercussions for prescriptions and guidelines for action.

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